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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
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There has been a long tradition in psychology aimed at registering cognitive processes that 
play a role in the etiology and maintenance of addictive behaviors in an attempt to explain 
and control substance use and abuse. Until recently, most research on cognitive processes 
involved in addictive behaviors, including alcohol abuse, has centered on the assessment 
of cognitive processes using direct, self-report measures. Most research using self-report 
measures of alcohol-related cognitive processes has been focused on the assessment of 
drinking motives (e.g., “How often do you drink alcohol because it is fun?”; Cooper, 
1994; Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995) and alcohol outcome expectancies (e.g., 
“Drinking alcohol makes me feel good”; Brown, Goldman, Inn, & Anderson, 1980; 
Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999). Together, these studies identified three basic types 
of alcohol-related cognitions that are involved in alcohol abuse: positive reinforcement 
(i.e., drinking to enhance positive affect), negative reinforcement (i.e., drinking to decrease 
negative affect), and negative expectancies (i.e., drinking is expected to result in negative 
outcomes) (see also Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 2006). 
Although research within the framework of drinking motives and alcohol expectancy 
theory has been fruitful in identifying possible cognitive processes underlying alcohol 
abuse, it may be questioned to what extent research using self-report methods can fully 
reveal the fundamental cognitive processes involved in addictive behaviors. Importantly, 
self-report measures are sensitive to social desirability factors, including impression 
management, and self-deception, which refer to a tendency to respond to self-report 
measures in a manner that makes the respondent look good rather than in an accurate 
and truthful way (e.g., Holtgraves, 2004; Paulhus, 1984). Hence, self-report measures are 
dependent on what people are willing to report regarding the cognitive processes that 
steer their behavior. In addition, it has been suggested that people may not always be able 
to report on the cognitive processes underlying their behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES OF DRINKING BEHAVIOR 
Many psychological theories explaining human behavior, including addictive behaviors, 
are rooted in rational decision theory (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1997) and have in 
common the assumption that people will do what they believe is good for them. However, 
it is obvious that people often act in ways that are inconsistent with this rational model and 
addictive behavior is one of these instances of irrational behavior. Paradoxically, people 
are often very aware of the harmful effects of their substance abuse and yet they continue 
this detrimental behavior. 
Irrational behavior like substance abuse may be better understood from a dual-
process point of view. The core tenet of dual-process theories is that behavior is 
determined by the interplay of two qualitatively different systems: a fast associative 
“impulsive” system in which activation automatically spreads between associated contents, 
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and a slow symbolic “reflective” system that relies on rule-based or controlled processing 
(e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans, 2003; Evans & Coventry, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004). Moreover, it was suggested that, in the impulsive system, the amygdala is the 
critical neural structure which triggers affective signals of immediate outcomes of an 
option, whereas the reflective system is dependent on prefrontal neural structures that 
trigger affective signals of long-term outcomes of an option (Bechara, 2005; Bechara, 
Noel, & Crone, 2006). 
While the reflective system is assumed to determine behavior through deliberative 
decision making, the impulsive system can activate behavioral schemata automatically 
through spreading activation or by influencing the reflective system (Bechara, 2005; 
Bechara et al., 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Importantly, the 
impulsive and reflective system can trigger simultaneous, conflicting signals, but ultimately, 
behavioral decisions are determined by the relative strengths of impulsive and reflective 
processes so that stronger processes gain advantage over weaker ones (Bechara, 2005, 
Bechara et al., 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Importantly, in 
addiction, the reflective system appears unable to dominate the impulsive system either 
due to a dysfunctional reflective system that is unable to inhibit dominant automatic 
responses triggered by impulsive system, and/or because of a hyperactive impulsive system 
that hijacks the cognitive resources that are needed for the normal operation of the 
reflective system (Bechara, 2005; Bechara et al., 2006). 
IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ALCOHOL-RELATED COGNITIONS 
Evidently, there is not only a need for measures that can be used to scrutinize the reflective 
system but also for measures that can tap the impulsive system in order to fully 
comprehend the cognitive processes that determine alcohol use and abuse. It can be 
argued that self-report measures of alcohol-related cognitive processes may not be 
appropriate for examining impulsive or automatic cognitive processes since they present 
ample opportunity for the reflective system to influence responding while at the same time, 
respondents may lack introspective access with respect to the origins of affective reactions 
that are automatically triggered in the impulsive system as well as the automatic influence 
of such affective reactions on behavior. For this reason, the increased understanding of 
human behavior in terms of two semi-independent systems has gone hand in hand with the 
development of a new class of assessment methods that should be better suited to tap 
automatic, impulsive cognitive processes. More specifically, researchers have turned to 
measures of cognitive processes that infer cognitive processes from behavior other than 
self-report. These measures are often referred to as “implicit” measures as opposed to self-
report measures which are typically termed “explicit” measures. 
CHAPTER 1 
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Where is the Implicit? 
Despite the immense popularity of so-called implicit measures, the denotation of the term 
“implicit” remains confusing. Some have argued that the term refers to the measurement 
procedure (Fazio & Olson, 2003), while others believe that implicit measures have 
privileged access to automatic cognitive processes and thus tap different underlying 
cognitive processes than self-report measures (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 
2001; Stacy, 1997; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). According to De Houwer (2006) 
these latter two views of implicit measures actually refer to different things, namely the 
measurement procedure and the outcome of the measurement procedure, respectively. 
As De Houwer (2006) pointed out, most definitions of implicit measures that are 
found in recent psychological literature actually refer to functional properties of 
measurement outcomes, and more specifically to the nature of the processes through 
which to-be-measured cognitions are translated into measurement outcomes, rather than 
properties of measurement procedures (which are simply a set of objective guidelines). De 
Houwer (2006) further argues that an implicit measure is a measurement outcome that 
reflects the to-be-measured construct by virtue of processes that have certain functional 
properties that do not necessarily have to co-occur. These functional properties of implicit 
measures include that the processes that translate cognitive constructs into the 
measurement outcome operate even though participants are unaware of the fact that the 
measurement outcome measures something, even when participants are unaware of the 
cognitions that are measured, and despite efforts to control the measurement outcome. 
Moreover, with respect to the precise functional properties that should be considered when 
defining a measurement outcome as implicit, De Houwer (2006) suggested that it might 
be useful to replace the term “implicit” with the term “automatic” since the term 
“automatic” is often used to define the nature of processes and can therefore easily be 
used to describe the processes underlying measurement outcomes, and because there is a 
long tradition of research on the features that are linked to automaticity. When the term 
“implicit” is considered as a synonym for the concept “automatic”, implicit measures can 
be defined as measurement outcomes that reflect a certain cognitive construct due to 
processes that are uncontrolled, unintentional, goal-independent, autonomous, purely 
stimulus-driven, unconscious, efficient, or slow (De Houwer & Moors, in press). 
Importantly, each of these functional properties should be examined separately in order to 
define in what sense a measurement outcome is an implicit measure of a certain cognitive 
construct (i.e., in what sense the processes through which a measurement outcome reflects a 
certain cognitive construct can be characterized as automatic) (De Houwer, 2006, in press). 
In contrast, when the term measure is used to denote measurement procedures, we 
are in fact referring to a set of objective guidelines and it makes no sense to use the 
adjective “implicit” since there is nothing unconscious, uncontrollable or automatic about 
measurement procedures (De Houwer, 2006, in press). Further, self-report measures and 
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so-called implicit measurement procedures can be easily distinguished by virtue of the 
nature of their objective guidelines. Self-report measures are direct in the sense that 
participants are asked to respond to questions about the cognitive processes of interest. In 
contrast, so-called implicit measurement procedures infer cognitive processes indirectly 
from performance other than self-assessment. Hence, De Houwer (2006) argues that 
measurement procedures can be better characterized as direct or indirect measures and 
that the direct or indirect nature of measurement procedures can be objectively determined 
based on its objective properties. Following De Houwer (2006), the terms “direct” and 
“indirect” will used be here to denote measurement procedures, while the terms “implicit” 
and “automatic” will be used when referring to cognitive processes that are assessed with 
indirect measures whereas the term “explicit will be used to refer to cognitive processes 
measured with direct measures. 
Indirect Measures of Alcohol-Related Cognitions 
Word Association Measures. Word association measures (e.g., Stacy, 1995, 
1997; Stacy, Ames, Sussman, & Dent, 1996; Stacy, Leigh, & Weingardt, 1994) are 
designed to measure substance-related associations by instructing participants to respond 
to a cue word or phrase as quickly as possible with the first response that comes to mind. 
As such, word association measures include measures of associative links between cues 
and substance use (e.g., draft: _____ ) and between outcomes and substance use (e.g., 
having fun: _____ ). Importantly, results with word association measures have been 
demonstrated be related to substance use (e.g., Stacy et al., 1994; Stacy, 1995; Stacy et 
al., 1996), and to account for variability in substance use above self-report measures of 
alcohol-related cognitions (Stacy, 1997). 
 
Priming Paradigms. Sequential priming techniques are particularly useful for studying 
the associative structures of representations in the impulsive system (e.g., Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). In semantic priming, associations are assessed between two different 
concepts and in affective priming associations are assessed between a concept and its 
evaluation. In both priming procedures, the presentation of a prime word or phrase, 
assumed to provide a semantic or evaluative context, is followed by the presentation of a 
target word to which a response has to be generated. For both semantic and affective 
priming procedures, priming effects are indicated by an interaction between prime and 
target valence or meaning, showing faster performance when prime and target are 
congruent than when they are incongruent. 
Hill and Paynter (1992) found that alcohol-related words (e.g., liqueur) but not 
unrelated neutral words (e.g., bulk) primed responding to alcohol-related targets (e.g., 
bottle) in alcohol-dependent drinkers but not in non-dependent drinkers, suggesting that 
alcohol-related concepts are more strongly interrelated in alcohol-dependent drinkers than 
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in non-dependent drinkers. Weingardt, Stacy, and Leigh (1996) demonstrated faster 
responses to alcohol-related targets when primed with positive outcomes of drinking 
alcohol (e.g., “they had fun after they had the-”) than when primed with neutral phrases 
(e.g., “they said it was the-”) and that the degree of priming was related to drinking 
behavior. Hence, these results demonstrate that increased alcohol consumption is related 
to greater activation of alcohol-related concepts following priming with positive outcomes 
(i.e., positive reinforcement), which is consistent with results from alcohol expectancy 
research (e.g., Rather, Goldman, Roehrich, & Brannick, 1992). Zack and co-workers 
demonstrated that negative primes consistently prime alcohol-related concepts in problem 
drinkers with high levels of psychiatric distress (Zack, Toneatto, & MacLeod, 1999) as well 
as in young drinkers for whom the degree of priming was related to the severity of alcohol-
related problems (Zack, Poulos, Fragopoulos, & Macleod, 2003). These results are in line 
with research that has demonstrated that negative reinforcement motivations for drinking 
are related to alcohol-related problems (e.g., Cooper et al., 1995). Finally, Ostafin, 
Palfai, and Wechsler (2003) calculated facilitation scores for approach and avoidance 
targets that were preceded by either an alcohol-related prime or a neutral prime. Results 
showed that alcohol binge episodes and alcohol-related problems were related to weak 
associations between alcohol and avoidance tendencies, and unrelated to associations 
between alcohol and approach tendencies. 
 
The Implicit Association Test. The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is a double categorization task that requires participants to 
classify stimuli into four different categories with two response keys. Typically, two 
categories represent target concepts (e.g., alcohol versus soft drinks) and two categories 
correspond to the poles of an attribute dimension (e.g., positive versus negative). During 
the critical trials of the IAT, the target and attribute categories are assigned to two 
response keys in two different combinations. During one combination task, for example, 
participants have to classify both alcohol and negative words with one response key and 
soft drinks and positive words with the other. During the reversed combination task, 
alcohol and positive are assigned to the same key and soft drinks and negative to the 
other. Because performance will be better when concepts that are associated in memory 
are classified with the same response key (compatible), than when concepts sharing a 
response key are not or only weakly associated (incompatible), one of these combinations 
typically leads to faster and more accurate performance compared to the other. This 
performance difference is referred to as the IAT effect and is assumed to reflect the strength 
of implicit associations between the target concepts and the evaluative attribute categories 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). 
Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong (2002) were the first to apply the IAT in 
order to measure implicit alcohol associations. Specifically, alcohol associations were 
assessed in both heavy and light drinkers’ with the IAT in two dimensions: valence and 
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arousal. Both heavy and light drinkers displayed negative evaluative associations with 
alcohol compared with soft drinks (soda). In addition, heavy drinkers also demonstrated 
associations between alcohol and arousal while this effect was absent in light drinkers. 
These findings have been replicated in a sample of heavy drinkers (Wiers, van de 
Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005) and in a clinical sample of heavy 
drinkers (De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004). Further, Palfai and Ostafin 
(2003) modified the IAT by replacing the valence categories with approach and avoidance 
attributes. Results demonstrated that alcohol is associated with approach motivations (or 
action tendencies) in hazardous drinkers. Further, stronger alcohol-approach associations 
significantly correlated with urge to drink and arousal-reactivity in anticipation of alcohol 
consumption. Wiers et al. (2002) as well as Palfai and Ostafin (2003) suggested that 
arousal and approach associations with alcohol in heavy drinkers could be linked to the 
incentive-sensitization theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003) which states that 
activation of a sensitized “wanting” system automatically increases attention, arousal, and 
approach responses. Moreover, it was recently argued that incentive sensitization belongs 
to the impulsive system and might reflect hyperactivity of the impulsive system (Bechara et 
al., 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006). 
 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De 
Houwer, 2003) is a categorization task that allows the measurement of associations with 
one target concept within one task (rather than through a comparison of two combination 
tasks as in the IAT). In the EAST, attribute words (e.g., positive and negative) are typically 
classified by meaning using two response keys. Because of these task instructions, the 
response keys are assumed to become extrinsically associated with the meaning of the 
attributes assigned to them, creating for example an extrinsically positive and an 
extrinsically negative response key. In contrast, target words (e.g., alcohol, soda), are 
classified with respect to an irrelevant stimulus property (e.g., color, shape) with the same 
two response keys. Participants, for example, may be instructed to respond with one key to 
positive words as well as alcohol and soda stimuli that are presented in blue, and to 
respond with the other key to negative words as well as alcohol and soda targets that are 
presented in green. Subsequently, implicit evaluative associations with alcohol are defined 
as the performance difference between giving an extrinsically positive response to (blue) 
alcohol targets and giving an extrinsically negative response to (green) alcohol targets. 
In a recent study, De Houwer et al. (2004) assessed alcohol associations with an 
EAST in a sample of patients. Alcoholics were more accurate in responding to soda stimuli 
with an extrinsically positive response than with an extrinsically negative response, but 
showed no performance difference with respect to alcohol stimuli. These results suggest 
that participants had a favorable attitude towards soft drinks and a neutral or possibly an 
ambivalent attitude towards alcohol. Further, de Jong, Wiers, van den Braak, and Huijding 
(in press) found similar results with the EAST, demonstrating positive evaluative 
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associations with soda whereas results with respect to alcohol reflected neutral or 
ambivalent evaluative associations. Moreover, de Jong et al. (in press) also demonstrated 
that evaluative associations with alcohol were positively related to alcohol use and 
alcohol-related problems and even predicted behavior above self-reported attitudes. 
Finally, De Houwer and De Bruycker (in press) created a new variant of the EAST, the ID-
EAST, which forced participants to process the target stimuli. In the EAST, the meaning of 
target stimuli is irrelevant and should even be ignored since the correct response depends 
on the color in which the stimuli are presented. However, in order for the target concepts 
to have an influence on performance, it is necessary that the meaning of target concepts is 
processed. Therefore, in the ID-EAST, target and attribute stimuli are both presented in 
uppercase and lowercase letters and attribute stimuli are classified based on their 
meaning, whereas target stimuli are classified based on whether they are presented in 
uppercase or lowercase letters. Importantly, this procedure ensures that participants have 
to process target concepts since participants first have to identify stimuli as attributes or 
targets before they can select the correct response. De Houwer and De Bruycker (in press) 
demonstrated that heavy drinkers had positive evaluative associations with the target beer 
while light drinkers tended to show negative evaluative associations with beer. In addition, 
positive evaluative associations with beer predicted alcohol consumption above self-
reported attitudes toward beer. 
Can Indirect Measurement Procedures Provide Implicit Measures? 
Clearly, indirect measures can be easily distinguished from direct measures based on their 
procedural guidelines. Further, indirect measures might be able to provide implicit 
measures in the sense that the outcomes of indirect measures reflect cognitive constructs 
because of processes that possess functional properties typical of automatic processes. 
However, whether or not an indirect measure is also an implicit measure needs to be 
empirically established based on features of automaticity that are related to goals (i.e., 
uncontrolled, unintentional, autonomous, purely stimulus-driven, goal-independent), 
unconsciousness, and efficiency (i.e., efficient and fast) (De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & 
Moors, in press). 
To say that a measure is implicit in the sense that it is uncontrolled can refer either to 
the fact that the measurement outcome reflects the to-be-measured cognitive construct 
even though the goal to express the construct in the outcome is absent (i.e., unintentional) 
or to the fact that participants cannot control the translation of the to-be-measured 
construct into the measurement outcome (De Houwer & Moors, in press). Moreover, a 
measure that is uncontrolled in both these senses can be referred to as autonomous. 
Studies that have examined whether indirect measures can provide an implicit measure in 
the sense that it is uncontrolled have concentrated mainly on whether participants are able 
to fake the measurement outcome (i.e., change, stop or avoid the translation of the to-be-
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measured construct in the measurement outcome). With respect to the IAT, studies have 
demonstrated that participants were unable to fake their IAT scores so that they would 
appear more positive toward homosexuals (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001), present 
themselves as not shy (Asendorpf, Banse & Mücke, 2002), or make a good impression 
(Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). Importantly, Kim (2003) demonstrated that participants were 
unable to fake their IAT scores unless they were given practice with the task and specific 
instructions on how to fake the IAT. In line with these findings, Steffens (2004) as well as 
Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) demonstrated that prior experience with the IAT is crucial for 
being able to fake IAT scores. Thus, these results indicate that faking the IAT is possible but 
only given experience with the task. Up to now, no studies have yet examined the extent to 
which word association tasks, priming effects, and the EAST are susceptible to faking. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that these measures too will be sensitive to faking 
given practice with the task. Further, it could be argued that it will be fairly easy to fake 
responding on word association tasks once it is clear the frequency of alcohol-related 
responses is the critical score. It is however important to note that indirect measures are 
notably less sensitive to faking compared to direct measures. To refer to a measure as 
implicit in the sense that it is goal-independent means that the translation of the to-be-
measured construct into the measurement outcome does not depend on any (theoretically 
important) goal (De Houwer & Moors, in press). Whereas affective priming effects have 
been demonstrated even when participants did not have the goal of evaluating stimuli in 
the environment (e.g., Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002) and may therefore be 
goal-independent, it seems unreasonable to refer to the IAT or EAST as goal-independent 
since the goal of evaluation is critical in both tasks (cf. De Houwer & Moors, in press). 
With respect to word association measures, it could be argued that the task is goal-
independent in the sense that goals related to alcohol consumption are probably not 
relevant to the task. However, no studies have examined this issue up to now. Also, a 
measure can be implicit in the sense that it is purely stimulus-driven, although this is 
typically very difficult to demonstrate and has not yet been examined for any of the indirect 
measures described above (De Houwer & Moors, in press). 
A measure can also be implicit in the sense that participants are unconscious of a) 
the origin of a certain cognitive construct (e.g., Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006), b) 
the stimuli that activate the construct (e.g., De Houwer & Moors, in press), c) the cognitive 
construct itself (e.g., De Houwer & Moors, in press; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski et 
al., 2006), and d) the fact that, or the manner in which, the construct influences behavior, 
including the performance on an indirect measure (De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & 
Moors, in press; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2006). Are indirect measures 
implicit in the sense that participants are unaware of the origins of the cognitive construct 
that is measured? Olson & Fazio (2001, 2002) have demonstrated that both the IAT and 
affective priming were able to detect attitudes toward Pokémon characters that were 
learned through an evaluative conditioning procedure. Hence, these results show that 
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indirect measures can register cognitive constructs even though participants may be 
unaware of the origins of that cognitive construct. It should be noted, however, that 
participants are also often unaware of the origins of their self-reported cognitions 
(Gawronski et al., 2006). Second, indirect measures could provide an implicit measure in 
the sense that participants may be unaware of the stimuli that activate the cognitive 
construct that is being measured. However, participants typically need to be aware of 
stimuli that activate the cognitive construct in the IAT, the EAST, priming procedures and 
word association tasks since they are an integral part of the task, with the only being 
subliminal priming procedures. Further, whether indirect measures can register 
unconscious cognitive constructs is almost never checked (cf. Fazio & Olson, 2003; De 
Houwer, 2006). Moreover, according to Gawronski et al. (2006) the systematic 
relationship between indirect and direct measures in fact indicates that participants are 
typically aware of the cognitive constructs that are measured with both types of tasks. On 
the other hand, the relationship between indirect and direct measures can be influenced by 
motivational factors (i.e., social desirability), the degree of cognitive deliberation while self-
reporting, and the degree to which direct and indirect measure the same underlying 
construct (Gawronski et al., 2006). Hence, it could be argued that indirect measures have 
merit, not because they measure unconscious constructs, but rather because they are less 
affected by cognitive deliberation, motivational factors. This point will be further discussed 
in the following section regarding the value of implicit measures. However, at this time, it 
seems premature to conclude that indirect measures can never be implicit in the sense that 
they can assess cognitions even though participants are unaware of those cognitions and 
more research is needed with respect to this issue. Finally, can indirect measures provide 
implicit measures in the sense that participants may be unaware of the fact that the to-be-
measured cognitions affects the measurement outcome and the way in which the 
cognitions are translated into the measurement outcome? Up to now, only one study has 
examined this possibility. Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) found that 64% of 
the participants who performed a race IAT were aware of performance differences between 
the compatible and incompatible combination task. In addition, 37% of these participants 
attributed their performance differences to racial attitudes. Thus, although more research is 
needed, it seems that indirect measures are not per definition implicit in the sense that 
participants are unaware that a certain cognitive construct affects their performance. 
Finally, a measure can be referred to as implicit in the sense that the processes that 
translate the to-be-measured construct into the measurement outcome are efficient and 
fast (De Houwer & Moors, in press). Efficiency is typically examined using a dual-task 
method. While affective priming effects have been demonstrated to be unaffected by a 
secondary task (Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000), it is unclear to what extent the same 
can be said about the IAT, the EAST, and word association measures. Further, it could be 
argued that the indirect measures presented in this overview all rely in some way on 
reaction times. Hence, these indirect measures all allow limited time for the translation of 
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the to-be-measured construct into the measurement outcome. As such it seems reasonable 
to assume that these tasks all provide implicit measures in the sense that the processes 
underlying the measurement outcome are relatively fast. 
Why Implicit Measures? 
The main benefit of using indirect measures is thus that they may provide implicit measures 
of cognitions. But why would we be interested in implicit measures? The interest in implicit 
measures can be easily understood from the perspective of dual process theories. Since 
the reflective and impulsive system have been characterized by qualitatively different 
representations, processes, and neural structures, they predict behavior under different 
circumstances and the differential predictive validity of these two systems is moderated by 
several factors including one’s motivation and opportunity to engage in effortful, controlled 
processing (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Similarly, the MODE 
(Motivation and opportunity as DEterminants) model of attitude-to-behavior processes 
(Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) proposes that attitudes influence behavior 
through relatively spontaneous, automatic processes or via more deliberative processes. 
Importantly, the MODE model proposes that deliberative, controlled processing critically 
depends on the ability and the motivation to engage in controlled processing. Thus, when 
implicit measures are defined as measurement outcomes that index cognitive constructs by 
virtue of processes that can be characterized as automatic, it becomes clear that implicit 
measures can be particularly valuable as indices of the spontaneous influence of 
automatically activated cognitions on behavior. Importantly, this perspective on implicit 
measures also implies that implicit measures will predict behavior under specific 
circumstances. Specifically, implicit measures will predict behavior that is determined by 
automatic processes, that is, when the functional properties of the processes underlying the 
to-be-explained behavior match the functional properties of the implicit measure (De 
Houwer, 2006). In sum, implicit measures may index automatically activated cognitions 
that influence behavior in an automatic fashion (cf. De Houwer, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Gawronski et al., 2006). For reasons of clarity, the expressions “implicit” or 
“automatic” will be used for cognitive constructs assessed with indirect measures. 
Conversely, the terms “explicit” or “controlled” will be used to describe cognitive constructs 
assessed with direct measures. 
FOCUS AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis will focus on the IAT as an indirect measure of alcohol-related cognitive 
processes. In the 8 years since its initial publication, the IAT has received enormous 
attention and has quickly become one of the most popular indirect measures. The IAT 
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owes part of this popularity to its ease of administration as well as to the fact that it 
produces large and robust effects. Moreover, the IAT has shown satisfactory internal 
consistency (split-half and Cronbach’s alpha), in the region of .80 and higher (e.g., 
Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Cunningham et al., 2001; Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001). Further, the IAT also displays somewhat lower, though acceptable, test-retest 
reliability with an average test-retest value around .60 (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; 
Cunningham, et al., 2001; cf. Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 
2006). In contrast, lower internal consistencies have been reported for priming measures 
(e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2003) as well as for 
the EAST (e.g., De Houwer, 2003; Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2004). Hence, 
part of the IATs popularity can be attributed to its achievement of higher reliability 
compared to other indirect measures such as the EAST and priming measures (cf. Nosek et 
al., 2006). Promising results were also found regarding the construct validity of the IAT. 
First, although most studies have found correlations between the IAT and other indirect 
measures such as priming measures to be inconsistent, weak, and/or nonexistent (e.g., 
Bosson et al., 2000; Olson & Fazio, 2003), Cunningham et al. (2001) demonstrated 
substantial correlations between the IAT and affective priming measures (r = .55) when 
controlling for measurement error. Second, a large range of positive correlations between 
the IAT and direct measures has been found with a low but positive average of .24 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Moreover, Hofmann et al. 
(2005) demonstrated that the relationship between the IAT and direct measures increased 
as a function of both increased spontaneity of self-reports and increased conceptual 
correspondence between the IAT and direct measures, and varies as a function of method-
related characteristics of the IAT (e.g., counterbalancing of the two combination tasks in 
the IAT). Finally, across a wide variety of research domains the IAT has been demonstrated 
to predict behavior above direct measures (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002; Teachman & Woody, 2003; see also Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, 
& Banaji, 2005). 
Importantly, the reason that the IAT typically achieves higher reliability and validity 
than other indirect measures such as the EAST and priming measures, could be that the 
IAT is primarily based on relevant stimulus-response compatibility effects whereas priming 
measures and the EAST are mainly based on irrelevant stimulus-response compatibility 
effects (De Houwer, in press). More specifically, IAT effects rely on the compatibility 
between responses that have become associated with positive or negative valence and the 
relevant meaning of target stimuli (i.e., the target category to which the stimuli belong) 
whereas in the EAST and in priming measures, the meaning of stimuli related to the 
concept of interest is always irrelevant to the task. 
Despite these promising results with respect to the IAT as a potential implicit measure 
of cognitive constructs that influence behavior relatively automatically, results with the IAT 
in the domain of alcohol use and abuse have been puzzling. Counter intuitively, it was 
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demonstrated that evaluative associations with alcohol are negative, regardless of level of 
alcohol consumption and in clear contrast to participants’ self-reported positivity with 
respect to drinking alcohol (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). 
Moreover, Wiers et al. (2005) demonstrated internal consistencies as well as test-retest 
reliabilities for the alcohol-IAT in the region of .70, indicating that these results were 
probably not due to low reliability of the alcohol-IAT. Thus, these results suggest that 
implicit evaluative associations with alcohol play little to no role in drinking behavior. 
However, recent research has indicated several limitations of the IAT procedure that may 
complicate the interpretation of IAT effects. Therefore, the focus of this thesis was to 
examine whether previous results with the IAT might have been produced by limitations in 
the IAT procedure and to find ways in which the assessment of alcohol-related cognitive 
processes with the IAT might be improved in order to further our understanding of the 
automatic evaluative processes that potentially guide drinking behavior. 
Recoding Influences on IAT effects 
IAT effects are assumed to reflect the strength of evaluative associations with the target 
concepts. However, it has been suggested that compatibility effects in the IAT can also be 
influenced by recoding processes (Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005; for 
evidence see, e.g., De Houwer, Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005; Mierke & Klauer, 2001, 
2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2001, 2004). Recoding refers to the fact that the target 
and/or attribute exemplars are categorized on the basis of features that do not match the 
“nominal definitions” of the respective target and/or attribute concepts (cf. Greenwald, 
Nosek, Banaji, & Klauer, 2005). More specifically, in the case of the IAT applied to 
alcohol research, the nominal features of the target categories are ‘alcohol’ and ‘soda’ 
and target stimuli thus have to be classified based on whether they belong to the alcohol 
category or the soda category whereas the attribute stimuli need to be classified based on 
valence. Importantly, it makes a difference for the interpretation of a given IAT effect 
whether target and attribute exemplars were classified based on their nominal features and 
compatibility effects are therefore based on evaluative associations with the target 
concepts, or whether target and attribute stimuli were classified based on other features 
including familiarity, valence, salience or any other information that can facilitate IAT 
performance in one combination task by reducing the two-dimensional classification task 
(i.e., target classification and attribute classification) to a one-dimensional classification 
task (e.g., all stimuli are classified based on familiarity) but not in the other combination 
task. Influences of recoding on IAT effects are mainly problematic because they tend to 
obscure the nature of the processes that underlie compatibility effects in the IAT. It is often 
not clear whether recoding of the categorization task has actually occurred, and if so, what 
kind of recoding has taken place. It is therefore difficult to interpret the meaning of 
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compatibility effects in the IAT because it is unclear with regard to which feature the target 
and attribute categories are compatible. 
In the first part of this thesis, it was examined to what extent the alcohol-IAT could 
reflect recoding influences rather than evaluative associations with the concept alcohol. 
One influential recoding account of the IAT in terms of salience asymmetries was proposed 
by Rothermund and Wentura (2001, 2004). More specifically, they proposed that salience 
or figure-ground asymmetries can cause IAT-effects, independent of implicit associations. 
When one of the categories of an IAT dimension is more salient than the other, the most 
salient category will attract attention. This salient category becomes the so-called figure, 
whereas the other category constitutes the (back)ground. Subsequently, when both the 
target and attribute figure are mapped onto the same response, performance will be better 
compared to when one figure and one ground category are assigned to the same 
response. Rothermund and Wentura (2001, 2004), in addition, argue that negative and 
unfamiliar stimuli are typically more salient than positive and familiar stimuli. Hence, in the 
alcohol-IAT, negative attributes were probably more salient than positive attributes. 
Further, it could be argued that alcohol stimuli are potentially more salient than soda 
stimuli for heavy drinkers (cf. attentional bias; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). Thus, the 
finding that alcohol (relative to soda) was more easily paired with negative stimuli than 
with positive stimuli in the IAT (e.g., Wiers et al., 2002) could be due to salience 
asymmetries causing faster performance for the consistent mapping of the salient negative 
and alcohol categories versus the non-salient positive and soda categories than for the 
reversed stimulus-response mapping. In chapter 2, it was examined whether reversing 
salience asymmetries between the alcohol and soda target categories by manipulating the 
familiarity of the target exemplars would also reverse the IAT effect. Further, in chapter 3, a 
newly introduced variant of the IAT, the IAT-RF (short for “IAT-Recoding Free”; 
Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, & Wentura, 2006) was used to measure alcohol-related 
evaluative associations. The IAT-RF aims to eliminate effects of recoding by abandoning 
the block structure of the standard IAT. In the IAT, compatible and incompatible trials are 
presented in separate blocks of the task. This structure creates an extended consistent 
mapping of categories onto responses in the compatible block, which may invite recoding 
processes. In the IAT-RF, on the other hand, compatible and incompatible response 
assignments of categories vary randomly between trials within a single block. This random 
switching of response assignments undermines any type of recoding, because efficient 
recoding requires a consistent mapping of categories onto responses (Roßnagel, 2001; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Strayer & Kramer, 1994). 
It is important to note that, even when recoding processes that are based on features 
other than the nominal features of the categories are eliminated in the IAT, participants 
could still re-construe the categories in the IAT in a way that is inconsistent with the 
nominal features of the categories as intended by researcher. Research has demonstrated 
that IAT effects arise mainly because the two combination tasks differ with respect to 
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relevant stimulus-response compatibility (De Houwer, 2001; see also De Houwer, 2003, 
in press). This means that IAT effects depend on the properties (e.g., valence) of the 
categories rather than the properties of the individual exemplars (i.e., irrelevant stimulus-
response compatibility). Specifically, the relevant feature to which participants need to 
react is the category to which a stimulus belongs. During compatible trials, the relevant 
feature of the stimulus and the to-be-emitted response will have the same valence (e.g., 
flowers and positive vs. insects and negative) due to the intrinsic meaning of the category 
concepts and the extrinsic meaning of the responses. During incompatible trials, in 
contrast, the relevant stimulus feature and the responses are less compatible because the 
extrinsic meaning of the responses will be ambiguous (e.g., flowers and negative vs. 
insects and positive). 
However, even though IAT effects are primarily driven by properties of the 
categories, properties of the individual exemplars can still influence IAT performance (e.g., 
Govan & Williams, 2004; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), probably because they affect 
how the categories are conceptualized (De Houwer, in press; Govan & Williams, 2004). 
One way in which exemplars can influence IAT performance is for instance by promoting a 
conceptualization of the evaluative attribute categories as normatively positive or negative 
It was suggested that IAT effects might reflect extrapersonal evaluative associations with the 
target concepts (e.g., normative cultural knowledge with respect to the target concepts) 
rather than personal evaluative associations that are relevant to behavior (Olson & Fazio, 
2004; see also Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Olson and Fazio (2004) argue that the 
accessibility of normative information in the IAT is increased because the category labels 
“positive” and “negative” carry a normative implication which is further underscored due 
to the category exemplars which are typically normatively positive or negative, and 
because giving error feedback also suggests that there is a normatively correct response. 
Therefore, Olson and Fazio (2004) introduced the personalized IAT that may reduce 
extrapersonal contamination through three modifications of the IAT procedure. First, the 
personalized IAT eliminates normative implications associated with the labels ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ through the use of the labels ‘I like’ and ‘I dislike’. Second, it uses attribute 
stimuli that are not normatively associated with valence but that have little evaluative 
consensus (large variability) while still being attitude-evoking (e.g., football, coffee). 
Finally, no error feedback is given to participants to avoid suggesting that there is a 
normative correct response. The personalized IAT was demonstrated to reveal less racial 
prejudice and was more strongly correlated with direct measures, suggesting a reduced 
influence of extra-personal associations (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Nosek and Hansen 
(2007), in contrast, argue that the original and the personalized IAT both capture unique 
attitude-relevant aspects, reflecting the multidimensionality of attitudes. In a series of 
studies, evidence for the multidimensionality of attitudes was found and results suggested 
that both IAT versions were capturing different aspects of attitude constructs. Since 
negative evaluative associations could reflect negative extrapersonal (culturally shared) 
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associative information that is irrelevant to behavior, it was examined in chapter 4 whether 
the personalized IAT would also reveal evidence for negative evaluative associations with 
alcohol similar to the IAT. It is, however, important to note that the IAT presents stimulus 
words for which there is no evaluative consensus, but that are nevertheless the same for all 
participants. It is questionable how well an IAT that presents standard stimuli can capture 
participants’ personal associations, since standard stimuli will probably differ in the degree 
to which they are both known and liked across participants (Fadardi, Cox, & Klinger, 
2006). This is particularly true when applied to alcohol research since there is probably 
great variation in the alcoholic drinks that are known and liked by participants. Therefore, 
a personalized IAT was tested in chapter 5 that presented stimuli that were selected by 
participants as evaluatively positive or negative as well as participants own favorite 
alcoholic drinks and soft drinks. 
Relative Nature of the IAT Category Dimensions 
It is important to note that the standard IAT procedure measures the strength of two target 
concepts with two evaluative categories, positive and negative. Consequently, IAT effects 
can only indicate whether the target concepts are more associated with one of the 
evaluative categories relative to the other evaluative category. As such, this bipolarity of 
the evaluative dimension potentially precludes the assessment of evaluative associations 
that determine drinking behavior given that ambivalence is typically quite strong in the 
case of addictive behaviors (Conner & Sparks, 2002) and even at the core of some of its 
definitions (e.g., Orford, 2001). Moreover, from the perspective of dual process models, it 
is possible that both positive and negative evaluative associations exist simultaneously in 
the impulsive system (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006). Thus, previous findings with the IAT 
suggest negative evaluative associations with alcohol are stronger than positive evaluative 
associations with alcohol. However, due to the bipolarity of the attribute dimension in the 
IAT, it is theoretically possible that someone who possesses only strong negative evaluative 
alcohol associations but virtually no positive evaluative alcohol associations and someone 
who has strong evaluative positive alcohol associations and even stronger negative 
evaluative alcohol associations yield IAT scores of similar magnitude. Hence, valuable 
information is lost when evaluative associations with target concepts that are potentially 
characterized by ambivalence such alcohol are assessed in a bipolar format. Therefore, in 
the second part of this thesis, a unipolar variant of the IAT (Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003) 
was used to simultaneously assess both positive evaluative and negative evaluative 
alcohol-related associations. Specifically, the unipolar IAT enables the simultaneous 
assessment of both positive and negative evaluative associations with alcohol by 
contrasting both positive and negative attributes with attribute categories made up of 
unrelated neutral words (e.g., basic, intermediate). 
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Importantly, the IAT is also bipolar with respect to the target concepts. Consequently, 
the IAT cannot reveal evaluative associations with single target concepts such as alcohol, 
but is instead limited to measuring the relative strengths of pairs of evaluative associations. 
While this relative nature of the IAT is not a problem for most research questions as many 
attitude concepts have a complementary category that can be used as a contrast in the IAT 
(e.g., black vs. white, old vs. young), it is a problem when one is interested in implicit 
associations with a single target concept or when the target concept of interest does not 
have a natural complement as in the case of addictive behaviors. Importantly, in the case 
of addictive behaviors, the contrast category for a certain addictive substance can in fact 
be anything else that is not related to the substance (e.g., smoking versus not smoking). 
While contrasting the concept alcohol with a concept related to soft drinks such as soda 
might have a natural feel to it (although there are plenty other drinks available besides 
alcoholic drinks and soft drinks), we are nevertheless only interested in assessing individual 
differences with respect to alcohol-related evaluative associations and not individual 
differences regarding evaluative associations with soda. Hence, the relative nature of the 
IAT obscures the interpretation of previous findings with the IAT since IAT scores can reflect 
both evaluative associations with alcohol, evaluative associations with soda, or a 
combination of both. Possibly, positive evaluative associations with soda were responsible 
previously reported IAT effects and not, or to a lesser extent, negative evaluative 
associations with alcohol. Also, it should be noted that the soda contrast might have 
caused a context effect in such a way that evaluative associations with alcohol could be 
generally positive (depending on level of alcohol consumption), but rather negative when 
contrasted with soft drinks, which could be a somewhat healthier alternative to drinking 
alcohol. 
In chapter 6, alcohol-related associations were assessed with unipolar IATs in order 
to simultaneously address both positive and negative evaluative associations as well as 
both arousal and sedation associations (for example as in Wiers et al., 2002). In addition, 
alcohol-related associations were assessed relative to soda as well as relative to a different 
contrast category made up of neutrally evaluated animals in order to examine the 
influence of the contrast category soda that is typically used in the alcohol-IAT. Finally, 
associations with the concept ‘alcohol’ could be affected by negative cultural connotations 
(cf. Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) or might even be behavior-irrelevant since the alcohol 
consumption of the participants included in the studies reported here (i.e., general student 
population) was probably almost entirely confined to drinking beer (cf. extrapersonal 
associations; chapter 3 and chapter 4). Therefore, it was also examined whether unipolar 
IATs that assessed associations with the target concept ‘alcohol’ and unipolar IATs that 
measured associations with the target concept ‘beer’ would yield similar results. Since 
salience asymmetries might be an important contributing factor to effects in the unipolar 
IAT (possibly, the ‘neutral’ attribute categories were always less salient than the positive, 
negative, arousal, and sedation categories), salience asymmetries between the target and 
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attribute categories used in the unipolar IATs were objectively assessed with visual search 
tasks in order to explore whether salience asymmetries might have been responsible for 
observed IAT effects. 
While comparing IAT results with different contrast categories as in chapter 6 can be 
useful, using the IAT to assess implicit associations with single target concepts that are not 
part of a natural dichotomy remains problematic. In chapter 7 and 8, this issue was further 
addressed by applying a non-relative indirect measure to the study of alcohol-related 
associations: the Single-Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland & van Knippenberg, 
2006). Wigboldus et al. (2006) developed the Single Target IAT (ST-IAT) which is 
structurally similar to the IAT with the difference that only one target category is used. 
Participants are instructed to classify both this target and one attribute category (e.g., 
alcohol and negative) with one response key and the other attribute category (e.g., 
positive) with the second response key. Unlike the IAT, the ST-IAT measures associations 
between only one target concept and the attributes without a second contrasting target 
category. Similarly, Karpinski and Steinman (2006) introduced the Single Category Implicit 
Association Test (SC-IAT) which is conceptually similar to the ST-IAT, differing only in minor 
procedural details. Karpinski and Steinman provided initial support for the reliability and 
validity of the SC-IAT and demonstrated that the SC-IAT, like the ST-IAT, can yield 
additional information that is not reflected in relative IAT scores. In chapter 7 and 8, 
unipolar ST-IATs were used to study alcohol-related evaluative associations. Importantly, 
by presenting the ST-IAT in a unipolar format, similar to what was done for the IAT (cf. 
Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; chapter 6), the bipolarity of both the target and the attribute 
dimension was eliminated. Further, in chapter 7, evaluative associations were assessed 
with either the concept ‘alcohol’ or the concept ‘beer’ as in chapter 6. In chapter 8, 
unipolar IATs that assessed evaluative associations with alcohol relative to beer were 
directly compared with unipolar ST-IATs that measured single evaluative associations with 
alcohol. Moreover, single evaluative associations with soda were also measured with 
unipolar ST-IATs in order to examine the extent to which single evaluative alcohol and 
soda associations contribute to relative IAT scores. 
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ABSTRACT 
K. Rothermund and D. Wentura (2004) showed how Figure-Ground (FG) asymmetries 
produce effects on the Implicit Association Task (IAT), independent of associations. Here, 
the FG account was tested for the robust finding that drinkers show a negative alcohol-IAT 
effect while being positive on explicit measures. FG asymmetries were manipulated 
through familiarity of alcohol-IAT target categories and assessed with visual search tasks. 
Supporting the FG account, the familiarity manipulation influenced the IAT effect in the 
expected direction and the IAT effect correlated with FG asymmetries. Contrary to the FG 
account, however, the IAT effect was not reversed, and IAT effects were predicted by 
alcohol use but not by FG asymmetries. Hence, the FG account only partly explains the 
negative alcohol-IAT effect. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the seven years since its initial publication, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) has become a widely applied instrument to indirectly assess 
associations. The IAT is a speeded classification task in which words are classified into two 
times two categories: Two target categories (e.g., alcohol vs. sodas) and two attribute 
categories (e.g., positive vs. negative). In the critical IAT phases, the categories are 
assigned to two response keys in two different combinations (e.g., alcohol-negative vs. 
soda-positive and alcohol-positive vs. soda-negative). The IAT effect is the performance 
difference between these combinations and the underlying assumption is that it is easier to 
combine concepts that are associated in memory than to combine concepts that are not or 
weakly associated (Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT owes its popularity to its flexibility, 
large effect sizes and good reliability (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; 
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006). Promising 
results were also found for its construct validity, with small but positive correlations between 
the IAT and corresponding self-report measures (see Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, 
Le, & Schmitt, 2005) and good predictive validity (e.g., Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, 
& Banaji, 2005). 
Despite its popularity, many issues surrounding the IAT remain unresolved, including 
the interpretation of IAT effects. Whereas Greenwald et al. (1998) argue that IAT effects 
reflect the strength of implicit associations in memory, Rothermund and Wentura (2004) 
have proposed a non-associative account of IAT effects, based on salience asymmetries. In 
a series of studies, they convincingly demonstrated that salience or “Figure-Ground” (FG 
hereafter) asymmetries can produce IAT effects independent of underlying associations. 
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When categories forming a dimension in the IAT differ in salience, the salient category will 
act as figure against the less salient background category. Consequently, Rothermund and 
Wentura (2004) argue that performing the IAT should be easier for consistent mappings of 
the figure categories of both IAT dimensions than when one figure and one ground 
category are assigned to one response. Furthermore, Rothermund and Wentura (2004) 
showed that visual search tasks can be used to objectively assess FG asymmetries within 
IAT dimensions and that controlling for FG asymmetries can render the predictive validity 
of the IAT nonsignificant. 
In a comment on Rothermund and Wentura (2004), Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and 
Klauer (2005) argue that Rothermund and Wentura (2004) based their evidence for the 
FG interpretation of the IAT upon non-standard procedures that diminish the validity of the 
IAT. Specifically, it is argued that Rothermund and Wentura (2004) have used artificial 
non-categories that are not representative of most IAT studies and that they used the 
conventional millisecond (ms) measure of IAT effects instead of the improved new D-
measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Greenwald et al. (2005) conducted two 
experiments using IATs that were closely modeled after the ones used by Greenwald et al. 
(1998), to further examine the validity of the FG asymmetry theory. Also, salience 
asymmetries were assessed with three measures modeled after the visual search task used 
by Rothermund and Wentura (2004). Inconsistent with the FG hypothesis, the results did 
not show faster performance for consistent mappings of salient categories or correlations 
between the IAT and salience asymmetry measures. Greenwald et al. (2005) conclude that 
FG asymmetries are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce IAT effects. 
In response to Greenwald et al. (2005), Rothermund, Wentura, and De Houwer 
(2005) state that using non-standard IAT procedures is in fact necessary to examine how 
the IAT functions in standard cases and to experimentally dissociate the influence from FG 
effects and associations which are typically confounded in standard IAT procedures. In 
addition, Rothermund et al. (2005) argue that reanalysis of the data reported by 
Rothermund and Wentura (2004) with the D-measure yielded the same pattern of results 
as the analysis with the conventional ms measure. Rothermund et al. (2005) also state that 
the null findings reported by Greenwald et al. (2005) are probably due to the task 
irrelevance of their salience manipulations and to the use of visual search tasks that 
differed from the one developed by Rothermund and Wentura (2004). 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study tested the FG interpretation for a puzzling, yet robust IAT finding in 
alcohol research. Several alcohol-IAT studies have demonstrated that participants find it 
easier to combine alcohol and negative words in the IAT than to combine alcohol and 
positive words (De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004; Wiers, van de 
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Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005; Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & 
de Jong, 2002). Interestingly, the same participants indicated that they expected positive 
effects from drinking alcohol on explicit expectancy measures (Wiers et al., 2002). This 
negative alcohol-IAT effect could be meaningful and representative of, for example, early 
negative experiences with alcohol (Rudman, 2004) or problems related to alcohol use 
(Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 2006). Alternatively, this IAT effect could be 
an artifact of FG asymmetries in the IAT. According to Rothermund and Wentura (2004), 
negative stimuli generally act as figures against a positive background. Consequently, if 
alcohol is more salient than soda (which often forms the contrast target category in the 
alcohol-IAT), FG theory predicts faster performance for the combined mapping of alcohol 
and negative words than for the combination of alcohol and positive words, irrespective of 
meaningful associations. 
This FG account of the alcohol-IAT was tested in two ways. First, two positive-negative 
IAT versions were designed in which salience asymmetries between the alcohol and soda 
target categories were directly manipulated through familiarity of the category exemplars. The 
familiar alcohol IAT contrasted familiar alcoholic drinks with unfamiliar sodas, while the 
unfamiliar alcohol IAT presented unfamiliar alcoholic drinks vs. familiar sodas. This 
manipulation should produce a salience asymmetry with the unfamiliar categories being 
more salient than the familiar categories (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Accordingly, FG 
theory predicts faster performance for the combination of alcohol with negative words 
compared to the combination of alcohol with positive words in the unfamiliar alcohol IAT. 
However, in the familiar alcohol IAT, the FG account predicts a reversal of this IAT effect with 
faster performance for the combination of alcohol with positive words relative to the 
combination of alcohol with negative words. If, however, the negative alcohol-IAT effect 
reflects a meaningful association, the salience manipulation should not cause such a reversal 
of the IAT effect and performance should be faster for the combination of alcohol with 
negative than for the combination of alcohol and positive in both IAT versions. 
Second, visual search tasks (identical to the one used by Rothermund & Wentura, 
2004) were used to independently assess salience asymmetries within IAT dimensions. 
Negative words were expected to act as figure against a positive background in both IATs 
while the alcohol and soda categories were expected to be figure only when they consisted 
of unfamiliar exemplars. The FG account predicts an influence of the central familiarity 
manipulation on IAT effects and expects a correlation between IAT effects and FG 
asymmetries. In addition, according to the FG account, FG asymmetries should predict IAT 
effects above self-reported alcohol use and alcohol-related problems and they should 
attenuate or eliminate the relationship between self-reported behavior and the IAT. The 
associative interpretation of the IAT predicts the same IAT effect in both familiarity 
conditions and does not expect an attenuation of the relationship between alcohol use and 
IAT effects by FG asymmetries. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-six students of Maastricht University (11 men, 35 women; mean age = 21.6 years, 
SD = 2.25) participated in the study for course credit. On the Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993), 
participants’ mean score was 9 (SD = 4.54) which is comparable to American college 
students (Fleming, Barry, & MacDonald, 1991). About 60% of the participants scored 8 or 
higher on the AUDIT, and about 30% scored 11 or higher, which are the respective cut-off 
scores for being a hazardous drinker and for the screening of alcohol problems (Saunders 
et al., 1993). On average, participants drank alcohol about once a week, with 3 to 4 
alcoholic drinks on each occasion and had a binge almost once a month. 
Materials and Measures 
Alcohol use and problems. Alcohol use and alcohol-related problems were 
assessed with the AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993). The AUDIT consisted of 10 questions in 
a multiple choice format. The first three questions related to alcohol use (α= .80), the 
other seven to alcohol-related problems (α= .83). 
 
Implicit Association Task.  The selection of the IAT alcohol and soda targets 
was based on a pilot study with the same participants approximately a week before the test. A 
number of alcoholic drinks and sodas were rated on familiarity on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
never seen/heard about, 7 = very often seen/heard about). The five most familiar and the 
five most unfamiliar alcoholic drinks (M = 5.31, SD = 1.17 and M = 2.34, SD = .76, 
respectively) were selected for the unfamiliar and familiar alcohol categories. The same 
procedure was followed for the soda categories (familiar sodas: M = 5.85, SD = .87; 
unfamiliar sodas: M = 2.06, SD = .73). Evaluative ratings, obtained from a subsample of 
the participants in the present study (N= 17), showed that both unfamiliar alcohol and 
unfamiliar soda stimuli were evaluated as neutral (M = 3.61, SD = .67, and M = 4.06, SD 
= .88, respectively). Familiar alcohol stimuli were also evaluated as neutral (M = 4.41, SD 
= .99) while familiar soda stimuli were more positively evaluated (M = 5.28, SD = 1.02). 
Paired samples t-tests confirmed that there was no significant difference in valence between 
the familiar alcohol and the unfamiliar soda category, t(16) = 1.24, p = .235, while the 
familiar soda category was evaluated as significantly more positive than the unfamiliar 
alcohol category, t(16) = -5.507, p < .001. Valence words were identical to those used by 
Wiers et al. (2002). All stimuli are presented in the Appendix. 
Participants performed one of two IAT versions: The IAT with familiar alcohol vs. 
unfamiliar soda or the IAT with unfamiliar alcohol vs. familiar soda. Both IATs were 
programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996), modeled after the IAT by Greenwald et al. 
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(1998). Both IAT versions consisted of five blocks. Participants first received 20 trials of target 
discrimination practice in which all targets were presented twice. Next, they performed 20 
trials of attribute classification practice. The third block was the combination block during 
which both target and attribute stimuli were presented for 40 trials. Next, participants 
practiced the reversed attribute discrimination, followed by the reversed combination block. 
The intertrialinterval was 250 milliseconds. Feedback (‘wrong’, ‘too fast’ [< 300 ms] and 
‘too slow’ [> 3000 ms]) was presented. Internal consistencies, calculated as in Greenwald et 
al. (2003), were .84 for the familiar alcohol IAT, and .87 for the unfamiliar alcohol IAT. 
 
Visual Search Task. Participants performed two visual search tasks: One visual 
search task assessed salience asymmetries between the alcohol and soda categories and the 
other between the valence categories. Participants performed the visual search tasks with the 
same stimuli as in the IAT. Visual search tasks were programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 
1996), exactly following Rothermund and Wentura (2004). First, participants received 20 
categorization trials to practice the assignment of stimuli to their respective categories. 
Immediately after the practice block, the corresponding visual search task was performed, 
consisting of 12 practice trials and 64 experimental trials. During each trial, four stimuli were 
presented. On half of the trials, all stimuli belonged to the same category (“same” trials), 
whereas in the other half, three stimuli belonged to one category and the fourth stimulus 
belonged to the other category (“different” trials). Participants were instructed to indicate with 
two response keys whether all stimuli on screen belonged to the same category or whether 
one of the stimuli belonged to a different category. On half of the trials, the majority of the 
stimuli (three or four out of four) belonged to the first category of the respective dimension, 
on the other half, the majority of the stimuli belonged to the second category. Stimuli were 
presented in the corners of either a virtual square or a virtual diamond. During different trials, 
the stimulus that differed appeared twice at each of the four possible locations. Each trial 
started with a ready signal (‘X’) in the middle of the screen, which was replaced by a cue (‘*’) 
when participants pressed the space bar. After an interval of 500 ms, the stimuli were 
presented around the cue in black against a grey background. Response labels (same or 
different) were presented in the upper right and left corner of the computer screen. Stimulus 
words remained on screen until the correct response was given. Feedback (‘ERROR—press 
correct key and continue’) was presented until the correct response was given. 
 
Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire.. The alcohol expectancy questionnaire 
consisted of 10 items of which 5 items referred to positive expectancies (α = .87) and 5 
items represented negative expectancies (α = .84). Positive and negative expectancies 
were negatively correlated, r(46) = -.39, p = .008. Each item asked participants to 
indicate on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statement: “After drinking alcohol, I feel . . .” which was completed with the 
same positive and negative words as presented during the IAT. 
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Design and Procedure 
After signing the informed consent form, participants randomly performed the familiar 
alcohol IAT or the unfamiliar alcohol IAT. The assignment of the alcohol and sodas target 
categories to the response keys was balanced across participants. Half of the participants 
received the alcohol-negative combination (compatible response assignment) first and 
then the alcohol-positive combination (incompatible response assignment) (CR condition), 
and half received the reversed order of combination tasks (RC condition; see Greenwald et 
al., 1998). Next, participants performed the two visual search tasks. The response 
assignment of same and different trials was balanced across participants as well as the 
order of the visual search tasks. Participants then filled out the alcohol expectancy 
questionnaire and the AUDIT. 
RESULTS 
Implicit Association Task 
IAT effects were calculated with both the conventional measure in ms (Greenwald et al., 
1998) and the new D600 measure (Greenwald et al., 2003)1. First, for each participant, 
mean response latencies were calculated separately for the compatible and incompatible 
response assignments. Next, the conventional ms measure of IAT effects was calculated as 
the difference between these two means in such a way that higher IAT scores indicated 
faster performance for the compatible (alcohol + negative vs. soda + positive) than for 
the incompatible (alcohol + positive vs. soda + negative) combination task. The D600 
measure of IAT effects was calculated in the same direction as the conventional ms IAT 
measure. Further, following the formula presented by Greenwald et al. (2003), practice 
blocks were now included, error penalties (600 ms) were given in case of a wrong 
response, and results were standardized at the level of the participant. 
Both IAT effect measures were entered in a 2 (familiarity) x 2 (order of combination 
tasks: CR or RC) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results for the D600 measure 
showed a significant order effect, F(1, 42) = 6.35, p = .016, η = .13, but no significant 
effect of familiarity, F(1, 42) = 1.90, p = .176, in the absence of a significant interaction 
(p > .80). For the conventional ms measure, results showed both a significant effect of 
familiarity, F(1, 42) = 4.81, p = .034, η = .10, and of order, F(1, 42) = 11.29, p = 
 
 
1 We analyzed both the conventional scoring algorithm (ms) and the new D600 algorithm and report results with 
both measures of IAT effects. There are three reasons for doing this: First, the new D600 measure had been found to 
yield different results than the conventional ms measure (e.g., Wiers et al., 2005). Second, there is no consensus 
regarding the optimal measure for IAT effects (see Greenwald et al., 2005 vs. Rothermund et al., 2005). Third, using 
the ms measure enables comparison with earlier IAT research and methods. 
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.002, η =.21, in the absence of an interaction effect (p > .80). Next, IAT effects were 
analyzed separately for both orders of combination tasks and separately for both familiarity 
conditions with one-sample t-tests. Mean response latencies for compatible and 
incompatible combination tasks and mean IAT effects are presented per combination task 
order and per familiarity version in Table 1. In the CR condition, both the D600 and the 
ms measure of the IAT effect were highly significant, t(20) = 5.31, p < .001, d = 1.16 
and t(20) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 1.14, respectively, indicating that performance was 
faster for the combination of alcohol and negative than for the combination of alcohol 
and positive. In the RC condition, this IAT effect was smaller, but still significant for the 
conventional ms measure, t(24) = 2.22, p = .036, d = .45, while borderline significant 
for the D600 measure, t(24) = 1.82, p = .081, d = .36. Next, IAT effects were analyzed 
per familiarity condition. Results showed that IAT effects measured with both the D600 and 
the conventional ms measure were significant in the unfamiliar alcohol IAT condition, t(21) 
= 4.08, p = .001, d = .87 and t(21) = 5.20, p < .001, d = 1.11, respectively, and 
were smaller but still significant in the familiar alcohol IAT condition, t(23) = 2.46, p = 
.022, d = .50, and t(23) = 2.27, p = .033, d = .46, respectively. These results indicate 
that, in both familiarity conditions, performance was faster when alcohol and negative 
were mapped onto the same response than when alcohol and positive shared a response. 
In sum, results with both IAT scoring algorithms indicate that performance was faster for 
the combination of alcohol and negative words compared with the combination of alcohol 
and positive words, in both combination task order conditions and in both familiarity 
conditions. 
Table 1 
Mean response latencies in compatible and incompatible combination tasks and mean IAT effects (standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses). 
Combination Task  IAT effect Variable 
Compatible Incompatible  Conventional ms 
measure 
D600 
measure 
Familiar alcohol 708.30 (153.21) 819.39 (211.00)  111.09 (240.29) .47 (.94) Familiarity 
Unfamiliar alcohol 637.81 (90.12) 886.50 (234.69)  248.69 (224.54) .83 (.96) 
CR 689.06 (124.76) 980.34 (240.28)  291.28 (255.48) 1.01 (.87) Order 
RC 662.43 (136.64) 743.25 (134.80)  80.82 (181.79) .34 (.93) 
Note. Mean response latencies and mean IAT effects are shown separately for both familiarity conditions (familiar 
alcohol and unfamiliar alcohol) and both combination task orders (CR and RC). CR = compatible combination task 
first, RC = incompatible combination task first. In the compatible combination task, alcohol and negative words 
were assigned to the same response while alcohol and positive words shared a response in the incompatible 
combination task. The conventional IAT effect measure in ms was computed as the difference between the means for 
the compatible and incompatible combination tasks. The D600 IAT effect measure was calculated by dividing this 
difference score by the standard deviation of all response latencies in both combination tasks. 
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Salience Asymmetries 
Following Rothermund and Wentura (2004), trials with erroneous responses were left out 
of the analyses. For each visual search task, mean response latencies were computed for 
trials on which the majority of the stimuli (distractors) belonged to the first or second 
category of the respective dimension (e.g., alcohol or soda). This was done separately for 
same and different trials because same trials have been found to be a more sensitive 
indicator of FG asymmetries (Rothermund and Wentura, 2004, footnote 5). Furthermore, 
mean response latencies were log-transformed before analyses.  
 
Figure 1. Log-transformed mean response latencies for each category presented in the visual search task are shown 
separately for the two familiarity conditions. Visual search tasks either examined salience asymmetries between the 
alcohol and soda target categories or between the positive and negative attribute categories. Log-transformed response 
latencies are also shown separately for same (top) en different (bottom) search trials. On same trails, participants 
responded to four stimuli that all belonged to the same category (e.g., four alcohol stimuli during an alcohol same trial), 
while on different trials, participants responded to three distractors from one category and one target from the other 
category (e.g., three alcohol stimuli and one soda stimulus during an alcohol different trial). Longer response latencies 
for a category compared to the other indicate that this category was more salient than the other category. 
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As can be seen in Figure 1, responding was significantly slower for trials with unfamiliar 
soda distractors than for trials with familiar alcohol distractors, t(23) = -10.11, p < .001, 
d = 2.06, and t(23) = -3.17, p = .004, d = .65, for same and different trials, 
respectively. Responding was also significantly slower for same trials with unfamiliar 
alcohol distractors compared with same trials with familiar soda distractors, t(21) = 2.57, 
p = .018, d = .55. However, no salience asymmetry between unfamiliar alcohol and 
familiar soda was found for the different trials, t(21) = 1.62, p = .121. Further, in the 
familiar alcohol condition, results demonstrated significantly slower responses for same 
trials with negative distractors compared to same trials with positive distractors, t(23) = 
8.48, p < .001, d = 1.73, while this salience asymmetry was borderline significant for 
different trials, t(23) = 1.98, p = .059. Similarly, in the unfamiliar alcohol condition, 
processing negative words was significantly slower than processing positive words during 
both same trials, t(21) = 7.94, p < .001, d = 1.69, and different trials, t(21) = 6.03, p 
< .001, d = 1.29. Hence, consistent with the hypotheses, the unfamiliar alcohol and soda 
target categories were more salient than the familiar alcohol and soda target categories 
while the negative attribute category was more salient than the positive attribute category. 
Before entering FG asymmetries in correlational analyses, difference scores were 
computed separately for same and different trials, by subtracting mean log-transformed 
response latencies for trials with soda and positive distractors from mean log-transformed 
response latencies for trials with alcohol and negative distractors, respectively. Therefore, 
positive difference scores indicated that alcohol and negative stimuli were more salient 
than soda and positive stimuli, respectively. To test whether the IAT was confounded with 
these FG asymmetries, partial correlations, controlled for order of IAT combination tasks, 
were computed between the IAT and FG asymmetries. Partial correlations between the IAT 
and FG asymmetries for the whole sample as well as per familiarity condition are shown in 
Table 2. Overall, a significant correlation was found between the conventional ms 
measure of IAT effects and salience asymmetries between alcohol and soda on same trials. 
When partial correlations were computed per familiarity condition, this correlation was 
more pronounced for the familiar alcohol condition than for the unfamiliar alcohol 
condition, but it did not reach statistical significance in either familiarity condition. No 
significant correlations emerged between salience asymmetries and the D600 measure of 
IAT effects. 
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Table 2 
Partial correlations between the IAT and expectancies, alcohol use and alcohol-related problems, and salience 
asymmetries, controlled for order of IAT combination tasks.  
Expectancies Alcohol Salience asymmetries Condition Variable 
positive negative use problems alcohol-soda 
same trials 
alcohol-soda 
different trials
negative-positive 
same trials 
negative-positive 
different trials 
D600 measure -.19 -.03 -.39** -.30* .18 -.08 .11 .13 All  
(N = 46) 
 
ms measure -.49** .04 -.50** -.34* .37* .07 .23 .22 
 
D600 measure 
 
-.08 
 
-.30 
 
-.61**
 
-.36 
 
.22 
 
-.04 
 
.04 
 
-.04 
Familiar 
alcohol 
condition  
(N = 24) 
 
ms measure -.29 -.22 -.61** -.43* .23 -.11 .20 .10 
 
D600 measure 
 
-.25 
 
.05 
 
-.13
 
-.24 
 
-.13 
 
-.38 
 
.11 
 
.21 
Unfamiliar 
alcohol 
condition  
(N = 22) 
ms measure -.66** .06 -.35 -.24 .16 -.07 .17 .14 
Note. Partial correlations are presented for the whole sample as well as separately for each familiarity condition.** = 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Alcohol Expectancies 
Mean scores were calculated for the positive expectancy items and the negative 
expectancy items. Participants’ mean score for the positive expectancies was significantly 
higher than the neutral midpoint of the scale, t(45) = 7.01, p < .001, d = 1.03, while 
their mean score for the negative expectancies was significantly lower than the neutral 
midpoint, t(45) = -14.76, p < .001, d = 2.18. Hence, participants expected positive 
effects from drinking alcohol on explicit measures. Partial correlations between 
expectancies and IAT effects, controlled for order of IAT combination tasks, are presented 
in Table 2. Overall, only the negative correlation between the ms measure of IAT effects 
and positive expectancies reached statistical significance, indicating that participants who 
endorsed more positive alcohol expectancies also showed a smaller IAT effect. When 
partial correlations were calculated separately for the two familiarity conditions, the 
unfamiliar alcohol IAT was found to be negatively correlated with positive expectancies, 
although this was significant only for the conventional IAT measure, and uncorrelated with 
negative expectancies. The familiar alcohol IAT correlated negatively with both positive 
and negative expectancies although this was not statistically significant for both IAT 
measures. 
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Alcohol Use and Problems 
Estimates of alcohol use and alcohol-related problems were calculated as the sum scores 
of items 1 to 3 and items 4 to 10 in the AUDIT, respectively. The alcohol-related problems 
estimate was then log-transformed to obtain normality. Partial correlations of alcohol use 
and alcohol-related problems with IAT effects, controlled for order of IAT combination 
tasks, are presented in Table 2. Overall, the IAT was correlated negatively with both 
alcohol use and problems, indicating that participants who showed a smaller IAT effect 
consumed more alcohol and experienced more alcohol-related problems. When 
correlations were analyzed separately for the two familiarity conditions, only the familiar 
alcohol IAT was significantly correlated with both alcohol use and problems. In contrast, 
positive and negative expectancies were only borderline significantly correlated with 
alcohol use, r = .28, p = .059, and r = -.25, p = .094, respectively, and were 
uncorrelated with alcohol-related problems (p > .30). 
The FG account predicts that FG asymmetries will predict IAT effects above self-
reported alcohol use and alcohol-related problems, and that the relationship between IAT 
effects and self-report measures will be attenuated by FG asymmetries. These predictions 
were tested in hierarchical multiple regression analyses. IAT effects were entered as the 
dependent variable in different regression analyses, performed separately for the two 
familiarity conditions, to examine whether entering FG asymmetries as a predictor of IAT 
effects would influence the prediction by alcohol use and alcohol-related problems. The first 
run of the hierarchical regression analysis for the familiar alcohol condition showed that self-
reported alcohol use significantly predicted IAT effects in this condition and that entering FG 
asymmetries into the equation did not eliminate or attenuate this prediction. In the second 
run of the regression analysis, all variables that were not predictive of IAT effects (p > .30) 
were left out. Results for this second run of the regression analysis again showed that alcohol 
use significantly predicted IAT effects in the familiar alcohol condition and that FG 
asymmetries between the alcohol and soda categories on same trails did not predict IAT 
effects nor did they eliminate the prediction of IAT effects by alcohol use (Table 3). In the 
unfamiliar alcohol condition, neither the self-report measures nor FG asymmetries 
significantly predicted IAT effects2. Next, it was examined whether the IAT predicted alcohol 
use above gender, age and explicit expectancies in the familiar alcohol condition. Note that 
in this hierarchical regression analysis, the IAT was entered as an independent variable 
instead of a dependent variable. This is because the hierarchical regression analyses reported 
above tested whether IAT effects were determined more by FG asymmetries than by self-
report measures in a manner similar to the analyses reported by Rothermund and Wentura 
(2004), whereas the following regression analysis examined the incremental validity of the 
familiar alcohol-IAT above explicit measures in the same way as Wiers et al. (2002).  
 
 
2 This table is not shown here, but is available upon request.  
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Table 3 
Summary of the hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of IAT effects by self-reported alcohol use and 
alcohol-related problems and FG asymmetries, in the familiar alcohol condition. 
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
First run 
1   Alcohol use -51.34 16.69 -.58 .19 -3.08 .006 
   Alcohol-related problems -15.30 58.07 -.05 .19 -.26 .795 
2   Alcohol use  -56.48 17.47 -.64 .20 -3.23 .005 
   Alcohol-related problems 13.98 63.37 .05 .21 .22 .828 
   FG alcohol-soda same 420.36 317.17 .25 .19 1.33 .203 
   FG alcohol-soda different 186.43 499.05 .07 .19 .37 .713 
   FG negative-positive same 398.96 461.04 .17 .20 .87 .399 
   FG negative-positive different -114.42 396.84 -.06 .19 -.29 .777 
Second run 
1   Alcohol use -53.12 14.93 -.60 .17 -3.56 .002 
2   FG alcohol-soda same 448.47 270.46 .27 .16 1.66 .112 
 Note. All variables that were not predictive (p > .30) of IAT effects in the first run of the regression analysis were left 
out in the second run of the analysis. Results are shown for the conventional ms IAT effect measure. Results for the 
D600 IAT effect measure were generally the same and are available upon request. For the first run of the regression 
analysis: F(2, 21) = 6.10, p = .008, R2 = .37 for step 1; Fchange(4, 17) = .77, p = .562, R
2
change
 = .10 for step 2. 
For the second run of the analysis: F(1, 22) = 12.67, p = .002, R2 = .37 for step 1; Fchange(1, 21) = 2.75, p = 
.112, R2change
 = .07 for step 2. 
In step 1 of the hierarchical regression analysis, gender significantly predicted alcohol use 
(β = -.59, p = .008) while age did not (β = -.32, p = .131), F(2, 21) = 4.35, p = .026, 
R2 = .29. Positive and negative expectancies were entered in step 2 which did not increase 
the variance explained, Fchange(2, 19) = .56, p = .580, R
2
change
 = .04. Finally, the IAT was 
entered in step 3 and significantly predicted alcohol use the above background variables, 
both when the conventional ms IAT effect measure was entered as a predictor, Fchange(1, 
18) = 8.12, p = .011, R2change
 = .21, and when the D600 measure was used, Fchange(1, 
18) = .7.89, p = .012, R2change = .20
2. 
DISCUSSION 
Previous alcohol-IAT studies have repeatedly shown the counterintuitive finding that 
drinkers are faster to combine both alcohol and negatively valenced words than alcohol 
and positively valenced words in the IAT, while they, in contrast, indicate to be positive 
about alcohol on explicit measures (e.g., Wiers et al., 2002, 2005; Houben & Wiers, 
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2006c; this study). Here, it was tested whether this puzzling finding might reflect FG 
asymmetries, rather than meaningful associations between alcohol and negative valence. 
The FG account of the negative alcohol-IAT effect was tested in two ways. First, it was 
examined whether a familiarity manipulation designed to reverse FG asymmetries between 
IAT target categories would also reverse the negative alcohol-IAT effect as predicted by the 
FG account. Second, it was tested whether the IAT effect would be correlated with 
independently assessed FG asymmetries and whether these FG asymmetries would 
diminish the relationship between the IAT and alcohol use and alcohol-related problems. 
Based on the present pattern of results it can be concluded that some aspects of the 
data corroborate the FG account of the alcohol-IAT while others do not. First, in line with 
the FG account, the familiarity manipulation influenced IAT effects in the expected 
direction: The negative alcohol-IAT effect was smaller in the familiar alcohol-IAT where 
both the (unfamiliar) soda target category and the negative attribute category were figures, 
than in the unfamiliar alcohol-IAT were the (unfamiliar) alcohol target category and the 
negative attribute category were figures. Also, the salience asymmetry between the alcohol 
and soda categories was correlated with the conventional ms measure of IAT effects, 
indicating that the ms IAT effect increased as alcohol became more salient than soda. 
Thus, conform the FG account, this correlation implies that it was easier to combine 
alcohol and negative words (which was always the figure category compared to the 
positive attribute category) in the IAT when alcohol was a figure category compared to 
soda. However, importantly and in contrast to the prediction by the FG account, the 
familiarity manipulation was insufficient to reverse the alcohol-negative IAT effect (as was 
demonstrated for other IATs by Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Furthermore, in support of 
the validity of the IAT, IAT effects in the familiar alcohol condition were predicted by self-
reported alcohol use and FG asymmetries did not render this prediction nonsignificant. 
Also, the familiar alcohol-IAT predicted alcohol use above background variables and 
explicit expectancy measures. In contrast, the unfamiliar alcohol IAT was not predictive of 
alcohol use which is not surprising since the unfamiliar alcohol (and soda) targets 
presented in this IAT were probably drinks that were never consumed by the participants. 
It is important to note that, whereas alcohol-IAT effects in the present study were 
influenced by the familiarity of the target concepts, other studies have not found noticeable 
effects of familiarity manipulations on results with ingroup-outgroup IATs (e.g., Dasgupta, 
McGhee, & Greenwald, 2000; Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001; Rudman, Greenwald, 
Melliot, & Schwartz, 1999). However, the aim of the present study was to examine the 
effect of FG asymmetries caused by differential familiarity of the target categories alcohol 
and soda on IAT effects. In contrast, Ottaway et al. (2001) contrasted either two familiar 
target categories or two unfamiliar target categories and, thus, did not create a FG 
asymmetry that was based on familiarity. Furthermore, studies by both Rudman et al. 
(1999) and Dasgupta et al. (2000) were mainly focused on examining whether IAT effects 
could be due to greater familiarity of ingroup stimuli compared to outgroup stimuli and 
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demonstrated no influence of differential familiarity on IAT scores. However, in both 
studies, familiarity measures for both target categories were combined into a relative 
familiarity measure in such a way that higher scores indicated greater familiarity with 
ingroup stimuli rather than with outgroup stimuli. Hence, it is possible that outgroup 
stimuli, although less familiar than ingroup stimuli, were not sufficiently unfamiliar to create 
a FG asymmetry. 
The difference in results with the D600 measure and the conventional ms measure is 
directly related to the ongoing discussion about the suitability of both measures as 
measures of IAT effects. In agreement with Greenwald et al. (2005), the present results 
suggest that the ms measure is more sensitive to FG effects than the D600 measure. 
However, similarly to what is argued by Rothermund et al. (2005), the present results also 
imply that the D-measure is not immune to FG effects. 
A limitation to the present results is that valence was not controlled, which can also 
be a contributor to FG asymmetries in the IAT (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Valence 
ratings of the alcohol and soda stimuli obtained from a subset of participants showed that 
there was no significant difference in valence between the familiar alcohol and unfamiliar 
soda categories, implying that salience asymmetries between this contrasted pair were 
based on the familiarity manipulation and not on valence. However, familiar soda stimuli 
were evaluated more positively than unfamiliar alcohol stimuli, implying that the unfamiliar 
alcohol category was more salient than the familiar soda category because it was both 
more unfamiliar and more negative than the familiar soda category. 
The present results are consistent with previous alcohol-IAT studies in which 
familiarity of the target categories was properly matched (well known alcoholic drinks and 
sodas): the negative-alcohol IAT effect is typically only weakly correlated with direct self-
report measures of attitudes and expectancies (e.g., Wiers et al., 2002, 2005; Houben & 
Wiers, 2006c) and has been found to be sensitive to differences in alcohol consumption 
(e.g., Wiers et al., 2002). Furthermore, with respect to the alcohol targets, the familiar 
alcohol IAT was highly similar to previous alcohol-IATs. However, the difference with 
previous alcohol-IATs concerned the now unfamiliar soda category. This manipulation 
resulted in a smaller IAT effect than reported in previous alcohol-IAT studies. In contrast, 
the unfamiliar alcohol IAT was similar to previous alcohol-IATs with respect to the (familiar) 
soda targets. Here, the IAT effect size was comparable to previous alcohol-IAT results. 
There are a number of reasons for this, including the possibility that a meaningful FG 
asymmetry could exist between the alcohol and soda categories in heavy drinkers because 
of an alcohol-related attentional bias that increases the salience of alcohol-related stimuli 
(see Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). Therefore, when using the alcohol-IAT, it is important 
to supplement the IAT with visual search tasks in order to assess possible FG asymmetries 
and to control for their influence on IAT effects. Nevertheless, the present results also show 
that FG asymmetries between the alcohol and soda target categories cannot completely 
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account for the negative-alcohol IAT effect because no reversal of the IAT effect was found 
as would be predicted by the FG account. 
Instead, the possibility was raised that the negative alcohol-IAT effect could be 
representative of problems related to alcohol use (e.g., Wiers et al., 2006). However, the 
direction of the correlation between the IAT and alcohol-related problems was not in 
agreement with this account. Also, the negative alcohol-IAT effect could reflect early, 
negative experiences with alcohol whereas explicit measures may be more related to 
recent experiences (Rudman, 2004). While this possibility was not tested in the present 
study, another study found no support for this hypothesis (Houben & Wiers, 2006c). 
Another possibility could be that the IAT effect does not reflect an association between 
alcohol and negative expected outcomes, but between alcohol and a negative antecedent 
mood state. This temporal sequence of associations is not addressed by the IAT, but can 
be examined with other techniques such as semantic and affective priming procedures (cf. 
Zack, Toneatto, & Macleod, 1999). 
Future research should further examine the validity of the FG interpretation of IAT 
effects in different areas of experimental research, including psychopathology where FG 
asymmetries might be meaningful contributors to IAT effects. Also, researchers should 
remain attentive to the possible influence of salience asymmetries on IAT effects and 
therefore, in agreement with Rothermund and Wentura (2004), it is recommended to 
supplement the IAT with visual search tasks to examine whether salience asymmetries are 
present within the IAT dimensions and to control for salience effects. 
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APPENDIX 
IAT Target Stimuli 
Alcohol (familiar): beer, wine, baileys, bacardi, martini 
Alcohol (unfamiliar): vieux, absinth, batida de coco, tia maria, fiero 
Soda (familiar): ice tea, apple juice, fanta, spa (mineral water), coke 
Soda (unfamiliar): roosvicee (syrup), karvan cevitam (syrup), water joe, breaker (yoghurt 
drink), carrot juice 
IAT Attribute Stimuli 
Positive: social, good, pleasant, nice, enjoyable 
Negative: antisocial, bad, unpleasant, stupid, obnoxious 
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CHAPTER 3 
Eliminating Recoding in the Alcohol-IAT: 
An Application of the IAT-RF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for publication as: Houben, K., Rothermund, K., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). 
Eliminating recoding in the Alcohol-IAT: An application of the IAT-RF. 
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ABSTRACT 
Research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) repeatedly demonstrated negative implicit 
alcohol associations regardless of level of alcohol use. However, since the IAT is 
susceptible to recoding influences, this finding could reflect recoding processes rather than 
implicit alcohol associations. Here, implicit alcohol associations were assessed with the 
newly developed IAT-RF (IAT-Recoding Free) that prevents recoding processes by switching 
response assignments randomly between trials rather than between blocks. Moreover, this 
study was the first to examine the IAT-RF’s predictive validity. IAT-RF effects were examined 
separately for repetition and switch trials (trials that respectively repeated or switched the 
response assignment of the preceding trial). While IAT-RF repetition trials yielded moderate 
support for negative associations with alcohol that correlated negatively with alcohol use, 
effects in IAT-RF switch trials were not significant but correlated positively with alcohol-
related problems. These results suggest that previous findings with the IAT partly reflect 
recoding processes. Importantly, recoding-free implicit alcohol associations predicted 
alcohol-related behavior above explicit alcohol-related expectancies. These findings also 
suggest that the two different IAT-RF trial types measure different underlying constructs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary models of addictive behaviors stress that cognitive processes underlying 
addictive behaviors can develop automaticity with increased substance use (e.g., Bechara, 
Noel, & Crone, 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans & Coventry, 2006). Importantly, the 
increased understanding of addictive behaviors in terms of automatic processes has 
stimulated the use of indirect measures3 which, compared to traditionally used self-report 
measures, seem better suited for assessing cognitions that can influence behavior 
automatically (e.g. De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & Moors, in press). 
One of the indirect measures that received most attention over the last years is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In the IAT, 
participants have to classify stimuli into two target categories and two attribute categories 
using two response keys. The idea is that this classification task should be easier when the 
 
 
3 Indirect measures are commonly referred to as implicit measures. However, the denotation of the term “implicit” 
remains confusing and is typically used interchangeably to denote both measurement procedures as well as 
outcomes of measurement procedures (De Houwer, 2006). For reasons of clarity, we will use the terms “indirect” 
and “direct” when referring to measurement procedures and the terms “implicit” and “explicit” to denote cognitions 
assessed with indirect and direct measures, respectively. 
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response assignment of the target and attribute categories is compatible, or corresponds 
to respondents’ implicit memory associations (e.g., “flowers” and “pleasant” vs. “insects” 
and “unpleasant”), than when the response assignment is incompatible, or does not match 
respondents’ implicit memory associations (e.g., “flowers” and “unpleasant” vs. “insects” 
and “pleasant”). Hence, the performance difference between the two response 
assignments should reflect the strength of the associations between the target categories 
and the attribute categories. Over the past years, studies that used the IAT to study implicit 
associations that might be involved in alcohol use and abuse have repeatedly 
demonstrated faster performance when the concepts “alcohol” and “negative” (vs. “soda” 
and “positive”) are assigned to the same response than when the concepts “alcohol” and 
“positive” (vs. “soda” and “negative”) share a response (e.g., De Houwer, Crombez, 
Koster, & De Beul, 2004; Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 
2005; Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002). Importantly, these IAT effects 
were at best only moderately related to drinking behavior, and in clear contrast with 
respondents’ explicit positive alcohol-related cognitions. 
Although a myriad of research has been devoted to the IAT, showing that it can offer 
both a reliable and valid measure of automatically activated associations (e.g., 
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006), uncertainty remains as to what the 
IAT exactly measures. Specifically, it was suggested that compatibility effects in the IAT are 
not necessarily based on implicit memory associations but can also be influenced by 
recoding processes (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek & Hansen, 2007; Rothermund, 
Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005; for evidence see, e.g., De Houwer, Geldof, & De Bruycker, 
2005; Mierke & Klauer, 2001, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2001, 2004). Recoding 
means that target and/or attribute stimuli are categorized based on features that do not 
match the “nominal definitions” of the target (e.g., “alcohol” vs. “soda”) and/or attribute 
categories (e.g., “positive” vs. “negative”; cf. Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, & Klauer, 2005). 
Recoding influences on IAT effects are problematic mainly because they tend to 
obscure the nature of the processes underlying compatibility effects in the IAT. It is often 
not clear whether recoding of the categorization task has actually occurred, and if so, what 
kind of recoding has taken place. It is therefore difficult to interpret the meaning of 
compatibility effects in the IAT because it is unclear with regard to which feature the target 
and attribute categories are compatible4. For example, it certainly makes a difference for 
the interpretation of an IAT effect whether the categories “alcohol” and “negative” (vs. 
“soda” and “positive”) are compatible, indicating that “negative” (“positive”) is an intrinsic 
 
 
4 Recoding does not require conscious strategies but can also reflect automatic learning of covariations between 
categories, features, and responses (cf. Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). Due to the subtlety of the recoding 
process, it is often impossible to identify the features (or combinations of features) that are responsible for a given 
compatibility effect in the IAT. 
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feature of the mental representation of the category “alcohol” (“soda”) that is 
automatically activated whenever stimuli are categorized as “alcohol” (“soda”), or whether 
familiarity, valence, salience, or any other feature was used to discriminate between both 
pairs of categories (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Rothermund et al., 2005; Wentura & 
Rothermund, in press). 
Houben and Wiers (2006a) recently demonstrated that recoding in terms of salience 
contributes to effects in the alcohol-IAT. However, it was also evident that this kind of 
recoding could not completely account for the IAT effect as reversing salience 
compatibilities only influenced the size but not the direction of the IAT effect. Nevertheless, 
these findings do not exclude the possibility that other types of recoding processes are 
operating in the alcohol-IAT. To overcome this problem of the IAT, Rothermund, Teige-
Mocigemba, and Wentura (2006) recently introduced a modified version of the IAT, which 
they termed IAT-RF (short for “IAT-Recoding Free”). Basically, the IAT-RF aims to eliminate 
effects of recoding by abandoning the block structure of the standard IAT. In the standard 
IAT, compatible and incompatible trials are presented in separate blocks of the task. This 
structure creates an extended consistent mapping of categories onto responses in the 
compatible block, which may invite recoding processes. In the IAT-RF, in contrast, 
compatible and incompatible response assignments of categories vary randomly between 
trials within a single block. This random switching of response assignments undermines any 
type of recoding, because efficient recoding requires a consistent mapping of categories 
onto responses (Roßnagel, 2001; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Strayer & Kramer, 1994). 
Rothermund et al. (2006) found that the IAT-RF efficiently eliminated artificial compatibility 
effects in a geometry IAT (Mierke & Klauer, 2003) that depend on a recoding of the target 
color categories (e.g., “red” vs. “blue”) in terms of confounded attributes (“large” vs. 
“small”). Also, the IAT-RF produced reliable compatibility effects between the target 
categories “flowers” vs. “insects” and the attribute categories “good” vs. “bad”, which 
establishes the sensitivity of the measure for assessing existing compatibilities. Together, 
these findings attest to the validity of the IAT-RF as a pure measure of compatibilities 
between nominal categories. Although they did not yet investigate the predictive validity of 
the IAT-RF empirically, Rothermund et al. (2006) proposed that the IAT-RF might be well-
suited to assess interindividual differences in the strength of compatibility effects that are 
not contaminated by recoding processes. 
Since it remains unclear to what extent recoding processes influence results with the 
alcohol-IAT, the IAT-RF might prove to be a valuable alternative to the IAT for studying the 
cognitive processes underlying alcohol use and might provide important insights regarding 
previous findings from studies that used the standard IAT. Importantly, if recoding 
processes influence performance in the alcohol-IAT, this could reduce the validity of the 
IAT as a measure of implicit alcohol-related associations as well as its predictive validity 
with respect to drinking behavior. Therefore, in this study, we examined whether the IAT-RF 
would also show a compatibility effect indicating faster performance when alcohol was 
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paired with negative stimuli (vs. soda and positive stimuli) than when alcohol was paired 
with positive stimuli (vs. soda and negative stimuli) as was previously found with the 
standard IAT. If this finding is not replicated with the IAT-RF, this would suggest that 
previously reported IAT results to some extent reflect recoding processes. In addition, we 
examined whether IAT-RF trials that repeated the response assignment of the preceding 
trial and IAT-RT trials that switched the response assignment compared to the preceding 
trial show the same pattern of results, because recoding could be more efficiently 
eliminated in response assignment switch trials than in response assignment repetition 
trials, where recoding processes could still be operating on a “micro-level”. Importantly, 
since the elimination of recoding processes in the IAT should increase its predictive validity, 
we expected a strong relationship between recoding-free implicit alcohol associations 
assessed with the IAT-RF and drinking behavior. More specifically, it was expected that 
stronger positive implicit alcohol associations (or weaker negative implicit alcohol 
associations) would predict an increase in alcohol consumption. Finally, it should be noted 
that this study was the first to empirically examine the predictive validity of the IAT-RF. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Fifty-four male students (mean age = 22 years, SD = 4.73) of Maastricht University 
participated in exchange for a gift certificate. Average alcohol consumption per week was 
17.93 (SD = 11.28) Dutch standard drinks. On the 18-items version of the Rutgers 
Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 2000), the average item score was .76 
(SD = .36), while the average item score within clinical samples is about .80 (White & 
Labouvie, 1989). On the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, 
Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993), participants’ mean score was 13.83 (SD 
= 3.83), while the proposed cut-off score for the screening of alcohol-related problems is 
11 (Saunders et al., 1993). 
Materials and Measures 
Alcohol Use & Alcohol-Related Problems. Alcohol use was measured with a 
self-report questionnaire (Wiers, Hoogeveen, Sergeant & Gunning, 1997) based on the 
timeline follow-back method (Sobell & Sobell, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate 
how many drinks of different types of alcoholic beverages they consumed during each day 
of the past week, and how many drinks they typically consumed on each day of the week. 
Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the RAPI and the AUDIT. The RAPI described 
18 alcohol-related problems or situations for which participants indicated how often they 
experienced these situations on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = never, 4 = very often) 
CHAPTER 3 
 52 
(Cronbach’s α = .72). The AUDIT consisted of 10 questions in a multiple choice format (α 
= .70). The first three questions were related to alcohol use, the other seven to alcohol-
related problems. 
 
The IAT-RF. The two target categories in the IAT-RF consisted of 5 alcohol (“alcohol”) 
and 5 soda (“soda”) stimuli5. The two attribute categories consisted of 5 positive words 
that were also rated high on arousal (“active”) and 5 negative words that were also rated 
low on arousal (“miserable”)6. All stimuli are presented in the Appendix. The IAT-RF was 
programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996) and consisted of three blocks. In the first 
block, participants practiced the attribute classification using a left and a right response 
key (e.g., “active” vs. “miserable”). In second block, participants received 20 trials of 
target discrimination practice during which response assignments (e.g., “alcohol” vs. 
“soda” and “soda” vs. “alcohol”) were randomly switched between trials with the 
restriction that each target stimulus was presented once in each response assignment. 
Finally, participants received 160 combination trials during which they had to classify both 
target and attribute stimuli with switching response assignments for the target categories. 
As during the target discrimination practice, response assignments were switched randomly 
between trials with the restriction that half the trials were presented in one response 
assignment (e.g., “active” and “alcohol” vs. “soda” and “miserable”) and the other half of 
the trials in the other response assignment (“active” and “soda” vs. “miserable” and 
“alcohol”). Instructions were presented before each block. Target and attribute stimuli were 
presented on a strictly random basis in the middle of the computer screen in black against 
a grey background. Stimuli remained on screen until a response was given. Category 
labels were presented on the left and the right of the presented stimulus in accordance with 
the response assignment, so that participants would not need to make large eye 
movements to grasp the labels. Labels were presented at the start of each trial, 1500ms 
before the upcoming stimulus, and disappeared after a response was given. The 
intertrialinterval was 250 ms. Feedback was presented in red beneath the stimulus after an 
incorrect response (‘wrong’), and when responses were too fast (< 300 ms; ‘too fast’) or 
too slow (> 3000 ms; ‘too slow’). 
 
 
5 The alcohol and soda target categories were matched on familiarity (M = 5.14, SD = 1.24, and M = 4.87, SD = 
1.44, respectively; 1 = completely unfamiliar, 7 = very familiar), valence (M = 4.50, SD = .82, and M = 4.54, SD 
= .83, respectively; 1 = extremely negative, 7 = extremely positive), arousal (M = 4.38, SD = .87, and M = 4.64, 
SD = 1.00, respectively; 1 = extremely passive, 7 = extremely active), and number of syllables.  
6 We selected positive (M = 6.14, SD = .55) and negative (M = 1.54, SD = .50) attributes that respectively scored 
high (M = 6.30, SD = .45) and low (M = 1.91, SD = .54) on arousal, so that these attribute categories would 
resemble alcohol-related positive reinforcement and negative alcohol-related expectancies, respectively, which have 
been demonstrated to be important positive and negative predictors of drinking behavior, respectively (cf. Wiers et 
al., 2006).) Both attribute categories were matched on familiarity as closely as possible (M = 5.79, SD = .77, and 
M = 3.72, SD = 1.65, respectively) and number of syllables. 
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Alcohol-Related Expectancies. Explicit expectancies with respect to drinking 
alcohol were measured with an expectancy questionnaire consisting of 6 positive 
expectancy items (α = .89), and 6 negative expectancy items (α = .76). Each item asked 
participants to indicate on a 100mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed 
(0 = completely disagree, 100 = completely agree) with the statement “After drinking 
alcohol, I feel . . .”, which was completed with the same words as presented in the IAT-RF, 
including the labels. 
Procedure 
Participants performed the IAT-RF first. The response assignment of the attribute categories 
in the IAT-RF was counterbalanced. Next, participants filled out the alcohol expectancy 
questionnaire, the alcohol use questionnaire, the AUDIT and the RAPI. Finally, participants 
rated all stimuli on familiarity, valence and arousal. 
RESULTS 
Compatibility Effects in the IAT-RF 
Trials with incorrect responses (7%) were discarded from the analyses. We will focus only 
on results for the target trials, first, because we are only interested in the target 
classification and not in the attribute classification, and second, because the labels 
switched only with respect to the target categories. Trials with response latencies below 
300ms or above 3000ms were recoded to these boundaries, respectively (cf. Greenwald 
et al., 1998). Response latencies were log-transformed and aggregated for each 
participant and for each condition of the within-subjects design. Results were analyzed 
using a 2 (response assignment: compatible or incompatible) x 2 (response assignment 
shift: switch or repetition) repeated measures analysis of variance. 
Results showed a main effect for response assignment shift, F(1, 53) = 6.05, p = 
.017, but no significant compatibility effect, F(1, 53) = 1.57, p = .216. In addition, the 
interaction between compatibility of the response assignment and response assignment 
shift was significant, F(1, 53) = 5.04, p = .029 (see Figure 1). When the compatibility 
effect was examined separately for response assignment repetition and switch trials, results 
showed a borderline significant compatibility effect for response assignment repetition 
trials, F(1, 53) = 3.65, p = .061, indicating faster performance for compatible response 
assignment (“alcohol” and “miserable” vs. “soda” and “active”) compared to the 
incompatible response assignment (“soda” and “miserable” vs. “alcohol” and “active”). 
However, there was no compatibility effect for response assignment switch trials, F(1, 53) 
= .44, p = .509. 
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Figure 1. Mean response latencies for the compatible and incompatible response assignments, separately for IAT-RF 
response assignment repetition trials and IAT-RF response assignment switch trials. 
Compatibility effect scores were calculated by subtracting mean log-transformed response 
latencies during the compatible response assignment from mean log-transformed response 
latencies during the incompatible response assignment, separately for response 
assignment repetition and switch trials. Hence, positive IAT-RF scores indicate faster 
performance when “alcohol” was paired with “miserable” (vs. “soda” and “active”) than 
when “alcohol” was paired with “active” (vs. “soda” and “miserable”). As shown in Table 
1, effect scores for response assignment repetition trials and effect scores for response 
assignment switch trials were uncorrelated. 
Table 1 
Correlations of IAT-RF scoresa with explicit alcohol-related expectancies, and self-reported alcohol use and alcohol-
related problems. 
IAT-RF  
 
Variable 
Response assignment  
repetition trials 
Response assignment  
switch trials 
IAT-RF switch trials .25 - 
Positive alcohol expectancies .00 .06 
Negative alcohol expectancies -.02 .13 
Alcohol use -.28* .11 
Alcohol-related problems -.20 .30* 
Note. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed); a IAT-RF compatibility effects were scored so that positive values indicate faster responses if “alcohol” and 
“miserable” (and “soda” and “active”) were assigned the same response. 
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Relationship of the IAT-RF to Explicit Expectancies and Alcohol-
Related Behavior 
Mean expectancy scores were calculated separately for the negative (M = 23.41, SD = 
9.87) and positive (M = 68.78, SD = 11.75) items of the alcohol expectancy 
questionnaire. Similarly, we also calculated a mean score for alcohol-related attitudes (M 
= 61.36, SD = 8.85). As can be seen in Table 1, none of the effects calculated for the 
IAT-RF repetition and switch trials correlated significantly with explicit alcohol-related 
expectancies. 
An estimate of alcohol use was calculated as the weighed mean of alcohol 
consumption during the past week and average weekly alcohol consumption. Similarly, an 
estimate of alcohol-related problems was calculated as the mean of the z-transformed 
RAPI and AUDIT sum scores. These estimates of alcohol use and alcohol-related problems 
were significantly correlated, r = .47, p < .001. Correlations of alcohol use and alcohol-
related problems with IAT-RF effect scores are presented in Table 1. IAT-RF repetition trials 
were negatively related to alcohol use and unrelated to alcohol-related problems. Hence, 
increased alcohol consumption is related to weaker compatibility effects in IAT-RF 
repetition trials. Conversely, effects for IAT-RF switch trials were unrelated to alcohol use, 
while they were positively correlated with alcohol-related problems, indicating that 
participants who experienced more alcohol-related problems, more easily paired alcohol 
with negative than with positive during IAT-RF switch trials. 
Table 2 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of self-reported alcohol use by explicit alcohol-related 
expectancies and IAT-RF effect scoresa.  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .23 .13 .26 .15 1.74 .088 
 Negative alcohol expectancies -.05 .16 -.04 .15 -.30 .769 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .21 .13 .23 .14 1.61 .115 
 Negative alcohol expectancies -.09 .16 -.09 .14 -.59 .557 
 IAT-RF repetition trials -22.94 9.39 -.33 .13 -2.44 .018 
 IAT-RF switch trials 24.96 17.94 .19 .14 1.39 .170 
Note. F(2, 51) = 2.14, p = .128, R2 = . 08, for step 1; Fchange(2, 49) = 3.30, p = .045, R
2
change = .11, for step 2. 
Final model: R2 = .19, R2adjusted = .12, F(4, 49) = 2.82, p = .035; 
a IAT-RF compatibility effects were scored so that 
positive values indicate faster responses if “alcohol” and “miserable” (and “soda” and “active”) were assigned the 
same response. 
Next, we tested the incremental validity of the IAT-RF. The hierarchical regression analysis 
predicting alcohol use is shown in Table 2. Explicit alcohol-related expectancies were 
entered in step 1 and only positive alcohol-related expectancies borderline significantly 
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predicted alcohol use. In step 2, compatibility effects for IAT-RF repetition trials significantly 
predicted alcohol use whereas compatibility effects for IAT-RF switch trials did not. In the 
final model, only the IAT-RF effect for response assignment repetition trials significantly 
predicted alcohol use. The same procedure was followed for the prediction of alcohol-
related problems (see Table 3). In step 1, negative alcohol-related expectancies 
significantly predicted alcohol-related problems while positive alcohol-related expectancies 
were borderline significant predictors of alcohol-related problems. In step 2, IAT-RF 
compatibility effects in both repetition trials and switch trials significantly predicted alcohol-
related problems above alcohol-related expectancies. However, since the results from the 
hierarchical regression analyses demonstrate that effects in IAT-RF repetition trials predict 
both alcohol use and alcohol-related problems, and since alcohol use and alcohol-related 
problems were strongly correlated, it was suspected that the relationship between effects in 
repetition trials and alcohol-related problems might be mediated by alcohol use. 
Table 3 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of self-reported alcohol-related problems by explicit 
alcohol-related expectancies, IAT-RF effect scoresa, and alcohol use. 
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .24 .14 1.76 .085 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .04 .01 .48 .14 3.43 .001 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .20 .13 1.52 .135 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .04 .01 .41 .13 3.11 .003 
 IAT-RF repetition trials -1.63 .74 -.27 .12 -2.19 .033 
 IAT-RF switch trials 3.34 1.42 .30 .13 2.36 .023 
3 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .10 .12 .80 .426 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .04 .01 .45 .12 3.87 .000 
 IAT-RF repetition trials -.73 .69 -.12 .11 -1.05 .298 
 IAT-RF switch trials 2.36 1.27 .21 .11 1.86 .069 
 Alcohol use .03 .01 .46 .12 3.95 .000 
Note. F(2, 51) = 5.95, p = .005, R2 = .19, for step 1; Fchange(2, 49) = 4.12, p = .022, R
2
change = .12, for step 2; 
Fchange(1, 48) = 15.63, p < .001, R
2
change = .17, for step 3. Final model: R
2 = .48, R2adjusted = .42, F(5, 48) = 8.74, 
p < .001; a IAT-RF compatibility effects were scored so that positive values indicate faster responses if “alcohol” and 
“miserable” (and “soda” and “active”) were assigned the same response. 
Mediation was tested following the steps described by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Importantly, when alcohol use was also entered as a predictor in the hierarchical 
regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems (in step 3; see Table 3), 
results confirmed that the relationship between effects in IAT-RF repetition trials and 
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alcohol-related problems was completely mediated by alcohol use as effects for IAT-RF 
repetition trials were no longer a significant predictor of alcohol-related problems when 
controlling for alcohol use. In the final model, alcohol-related problems were significantly 
predicted by both negative expectancies and alcohol use and borderline significantly 
predicted by effects for IAT-RF switch trials. 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to examine whether previously reported results with the 
alcohol-IAT, demonstrating that alcohol is more easily paired with negative stimuli than with 
positive stimuli (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005), were due to 
recoding effects rather than implicit associations with alcohol. We therefore examined 
whether these results could be replicated with the IAT-RF, which is designed to eliminate 
recoding processes by varying compatible and incompatible response assignments randomly 
on a trial-by-trial basis instead of in separate blocks (Rothermund et al., 2006). The present 
study was also the first to empirically examine the predictive validity of the IAT-RF. 
First, the present results suggest that previous findings with the alcohol-IAT at least 
partly reflected recoding processes. Whereas previous studies found robust and strong IAT 
effects due to faster performance when alcohol was paired with negative attributes compared 
to positive attributes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005), the present 
results, at best, only demonstrate moderate effects in the same direction. Specifically, IAT-RF 
effects calculated from response assignment repetition trials were only borderline significant 
while IAT-RF effects calculated from response assignment switch trials were not significant. 
Together, results suggest that the alcohol-IAT used in previous studies was to some extent 
influenced by recoding processes which increased the size of IAT compatibility effects. 
Elimination of these recoding processes caused compatibility effects in this study to decrease 
(IAT-RF repetition trials) and even disappear (IAT-RF switch trials), which could indicate that 
participants on average did not have any associations between alcohol and valence 
(neutral). Alternatively, these results could indicate that alcohol can simultaneously be 
associated with both positive and negative valence. Consistent with this interpretation, recent 
studies in which IAT attribute categories were presented in a unipolar format (e.g., “pleasant” 
vs. “neutral”), have demonstrated that positive and negative associations with alcohol can 
co-exist (e.g., Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; Houben & Wiers, 2006c, 2006d). 
Second, IAT-RF effects in repetition trials were negatively related to alcohol use and 
predicted alcohol use better than explicit alcohol-related expectancies. The same relationship 
between alcohol-related associations and alcohol use was also demonstrated when IAT 
effects were controlled for recoding in terms of salience asymmetries (Houben & Wiers, 
2006a). These results suggest that stronger positive alcohol associations, or weaker negative 
alcohol associations, are associated with increased alcohol use. Importantly, recent research 
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in which unipolar IATs were used to measure alcohol-related associations suggests that 
increased levels of alcohol use are associated with stronger positive associations with alcohol 
while negative associations with alcohol are unrelated to alcohol consumption (Houben & 
Wiers, 2006c, 2006d). In contrast, compatibility effects in IAT-RF switch trials were unrelated 
to alcohol use but positively related to alcohol-related problems and also predicted alcohol-
related problems above explicit measures. These results are consistent with the idea that 
negative alcohol-related cognitions increase with the experience of alcohol-related problems 
but do not influence drinking until a certain threshold is reached, which was supported with 
respect to explicit alcohol-related cognitions (Jones & McMahon, 1996), but not yet with 
respect to implicit alcohol-related cognitions although there is indirect supportive evidence 
(cf. Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 2006). 
Finally, it is important to note that IAT-RF repetition trials and IAT-RF switch trials 
showed different patterns of results in this study, especially with respect to their relationship 
with drinking behavior. To explain this difference, one could assume that recoding was 
efficiently eliminated in IAT-RF switch trials but still present to some extent in repetition trials 
possibly due to recoding taking place on a “micro-level” (i.e., whenever response 
assignments are repeated, the consistency of the mapping might allow for some recoding). If 
recoding processes were still operating in IAT-RF repetition trials, this could explain why IAT-
RF repetition trials, but not IAT-RF switch trials, yielded compatibility effects, which were 
reduced but in the same direction as effects reported with the standard alcohol-IAT. For now 
it seems safe to conclude that the two different types of trials in the IAT-RF, namely response 
assignment repetition trials and response assignment switch trials, possibly measure different 
underlying cognitive constructs. Therefore, an important implication of these results is that it is 
useful to analyze IAT-RF repetition and switch trials separately. Finally, given the potential 
value of the unipolar IAT for assessing compatibilities for concepts for which ambivalence is 
likely to be high (e.g., addictive substances) it would be interesting for future research to 
examine how recoding influences the unipolar IAT and whether the unipolar IAT, like the IAT, 
can be adapted to be free from recoding effects. 
In conclusion, the present findings indicate that recoding processes can influence IAT 
effects and thereby decrease the validity of the task as a measure of implicit associations that 
may be involved in alcohol abuse. Importantly, preventing or controlling for recoding 
processes in the IAT increases the validity of the IAT, making it a useful tool for studying 
cognitive processes underlying alcohol use and misuse. Here, it was demonstrated that 
stronger implicit alcohol associations with positive arousing effects are related to increased 
alcohol consumption. Hence, these results indicate that intervention strategies aimed at 
reducing hazardous drinking may be more successful when they simultaneously target both 
explicit alcohol-related cognitive processes and implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes. 
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APPENDIX 
Target Stimuli 
Alcohol: beer, wine, whisky, drink, vodka 
(Dutch words; Alcohol: bier, wijn, whisky, borrel, vodka) 
Soda: Fanta, Coke, Sprite, sinas (lemonade), ice-tea 
(Dutch words; Frisdrank: Fanta, Cola, Sprite, sinas, ice-tea) 
Attribute Stimuli 
Active: cheerful, energetic, lively, excited, chatty 
(Dutch words; Actief: vrolijk, energiek, levendig, opgewonden, spraakzaam) 
Miserable: cheerless, horrible, nauseous, unhappy, listless 
(Dutch words; Beroerd: somber, ellendig, misselijk, ongelukkig, lusteloos) 
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CHAPTER 4 
Are Drinkers Implicitly Positive about 
Drinking Alcohol? Personalizing the 
Alcohol-IAT to Reduce Negative 
Extrapersonal Contamination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted version of: Houben, K., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). Are Drinkers Implicitly Positive 
about Drinking Alcohol? Personalizing the Alcohol-IAT to Reduce Negative Extrapersonal 
Contamination. Accepted for publication pending revisions. 
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ABSTRACT 
Aims: The advent of indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association test (IAT), has 
stimulated the interest in implicit cognitions that may automatically steer addictive 
behaviors such as alcohol abuse. Counter intuitively, recent IAT research demonstrated 
that alcohol is implicitly associated with negative valence, regardless of level of alcohol 
consumption. However, because the IAT is susceptible to extrapersonal contamination, this 
study examined whether previous findings reflect contamination of IAT effects by negative 
extrapersonal knowledge rather than personal associations that are relevant to drinking 
behavior. Methods: Implicit alcohol associations were measured with a personalized 
alcohol-IAT, designed to reduce extrapersonal contamination. It was examined whether 
alcohol associations measured with the personalized IAT would predict drinking behavior 
above the variance explained by self-reported alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes. 
Results: In contrast to previous findings with the IAT, the personalized IAT yielded positive 
associations. Moreover, positive alcohol associations predicted drinking behavior above 
self-reported alcohol expectancies and attitudes, demonstrating the incremental validity of 
the personalized IAT. Conclusions: The present findings support the hypothesis that 
previous findings with the alcohol-IAT at least partly reflect negative extrapersonal alcohol-
related knowledge and that behavior-relevant implicit alcohol associations are positive 
rather than negative. 
INTRODUCTION 
The past years, the advent of indirect measures has stimulated a growing interest in the 
role of implicit cognitions in the etiology and maintenance of addictive behaviors such as 
alcohol abuse. The reason is that, with increased substance abuse, cognitive processes 
underlying the addictive behavior develop automaticity and these automatic or implicit 
processes subsequently determine behavior more than explicit, more controlled cognitive 
processes (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Stacy, 1997). Importantly, these automatic 
processes that determine alcohol use are difficult, though not impossible, to assess with 
direct self-report measures. Moreover, direct measures can be influenced by biasing 
factors such as self-presentation (e.g., Holtgraves, 2004; Paulhus, 1984). In contrast, 
indirect measures, which infer cognitive processes indirectly from behavior other than self-
report, seem more resistant to self-presentation biases and may be uniquely suited to tap 
the automatic influence of alcohol-related cognitions on behavior (e.g. De Houwer, 2006; 
De Houwer & Moors, in press). 
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In a few years, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 
1998) has become one of the most frequently applied indirect measures in many areas of 
research including addiction research. The IAT is a speeded classification task that involves 
participants classifying stimuli into two target categories and two attribute categories using 
two response keys. The idea is that this classification task should be easier when the 
response assignment of the target and attribute categories is compatible, or corresponds 
to respondents’ implicit associations (e.g., flowers and positive vs. insects and negative), 
than when the response assignment is incompatible, or does not match respondents’ 
implicit associations (e.g., flowers and negative vs. insects and positive). Hence, the 
performance difference between the two response assignments is assumed to reflect the 
strength of the associations of the target categories with the attribute categories. Wiers, 
van Woerden, Smulders, and de Jong (2002) were the first to apply the IAT to study 
implicit alcohol-related cognitions in light and heavy drinkers. Wiers et al. found that both 
light and heavy drinkers responded faster when alcohol shared a response with negative 
(vs. soda and positive) than when alcohol was paired with positive (vs. soda and negative), 
indicating that both light and heavy drinkers associated alcohol with negative valence in 
the IAT. Importantly, these IAT scores contrasted with participants’ self-reported positivity 
about drinking alcohol. Since then, these results have been also replicated in heavy 
drinkers (Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005) and in 
drinkers (De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004). 
Though the IAT can offer both a reliable and valid measure of implicit associations 
(e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006; Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005), recent research suggests that the IAT is not only influenced by implicit 
associations but by any information that can facilitate IAT performance (e.g., De Houwer, 
Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005; Mierke & Klauer, 2003; Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, & 
Wentura, 2006; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004; for the alcohol-IAT see also Houben, 
Rothermund, & Wiers, 2006; Houben & Wiers, 2006a). Related to this issue, it was 
recently demonstrated that the IAT is sensitive to extrapersonal associations that are 
available in memory but that do not form the basis of one’s attitudes and that are 
irrelevant to behavior. Extrapersonal associations can stem from cultural norms (Karpinski 
& Hilton, 2001) but also from other sources of information, including the media and other 
people (Olson & Fazio, 2004; Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006). Although such extrapersonal 
associations may affect how participants solve the mapping problem posed by the IAT, 
they have to be distinguished from personal associations which, unlike extrapersonal 
associations, guide behavior once they are automatically activated (Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
The implication is that findings with the alcohol-IAT indicating that alcohol is implicitly 
associated with negative valence could at least partly reflect negative extrapersonal 
knowledge about drinking alcohol that is unrelated to drinking decisions. Since 
information about the negative effects of substance abuse is currently abundantly available 
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in our society it is plausible that the alcohol-IAT at least partly reflects negative 
extrapersonal knowledge rather than personally relevant associations. Negative 
extrapersonal information about drinking alcohol is probably readily available in drinkers’ 
memory but does not necessarily have to converge with one’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
associations and can be irrelevant to decision about drinking alcohol. 
According to Olson and Fazio (2004), three features of the IAT procedure in 
particular contribute to contamination by extrapersonal associations. First, it is argued that 
the category labels “positive” and “negative” carry a normative implication. Second, 
category exemplars are typically normatively positive or negative. Finally, giving error 
feedback also suggests that there is a normatively correct response. Therefore, Olson and 
Fazio introduced the personalized IAT which reduces extrapersonal contamination by 
replacing the labels “positive” and “negative” with the labels “I like” and “I dislike”, by 
using exemplars that are not normatively associated with valence but that have little 
evaluative consensus (e.g., football, coffee) and by refraining from giving error feedback. 
Thus, the personalized IAT attempts to personalize responses by allowing participants to 
classify stimuli without reference to normative information. The present study explores 
whether previous findings with the alcohol-IAT could be due to negative extrapersonal 
contamination rather than negative implicit alcohol associations. Alcohol-related 
cognitions were therefore measured with an IAT that was personalized as in Olson and 
Fazio (2004). It was expected that this personalized IAT would show positive rather than 
negative implicit associations with alcohol, supporting the hypothesis that negative alcohol 
associations, as previously found with the IAT, were for a large part due to extrapersonal 
contamination. In addition, the personalized IAT was expected to predict alcohol use and 
alcohol-related problems above explicit alcohol-related attitudes and expectancies. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-two male students of Maastricht University (mean age = 21 years, SD = 4.5) 
voluntarily participated in exchange for a gift certificate. Average alcohol consumption per 
week was 25.05 (SD = 13.23) Dutch standard drinks. On the 18-items version of the 
Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 2000), participants had an 
average item score of .73 (SD = .37). The average item score within clinical samples is 
about .80 (White & Labouvie, 1989). On the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test 
(AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993), participants’ mean 
score was 12.67 (SD = 3.43), while the proposed cut-off score for the screening of 
alcohol-related problems is 11. 
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Materials and Measures 
Alcohol Use. Alcohol use was measured with a self-report questionnaire (Wiers, 
Hoogeveen, Sergeant, & Gunning, 1997) based on the timeline follow-back method 
(Sobell & Sobell, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate how many drinks of different 
types of alcoholic beverages they consumed during each day of the past week, and how 
many drinks they typically consumed on each day of the week. 
 
Alcohol-Related Problems. Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the RAPI 
and with the AUDIT. The RAPI described 18 alcohol-related problems or situations for 
which participants indicated how often they experienced these situations on a 5-point Likert 
scale (0 = never, 4 = very often) (Cronbach’s α = .74). The AUDIT consisted of 10 
questions (α = .62), of which the first three were related to alcohol use, and the other 
seven to alcohol-related problems. 
 
Personalized IAT. In the personalized IAT, two target categories were presented, one 
consisting of 5 alcoholic drinks (label “alcohol”) and the other of 5 soft drinks (label 
“soda”). The alcohol and soda categories were matched on familiarity (M = 5.22, SD = 
1.29, and M = 5.64, SD = 2.12, respectively; 1 = completely unfamiliar, 7 = very 
familiar), valence (M = 4.42, SD = .92, and M = 4.44, SD = .88, respectively; 1 = very 
negative, 7 = very positive), arousal (M = 4.20, SD = .80, and M = 4.32, SD = .84, 
respectively; 1 = very passive, 7 = very active) and number of syllables. Further, one set of 
10 stimuli was presented which had to be classified into two attribute categories that were 
labeled “I like”, and “I dislike”. The attribute stimuli (familiarity: M = 4.99, SD = 1.03; 
arousal: M = 4.47, SD = .50) were evaluated as neutral on valence but with a large 
standard deviation (M = 4.41, average SD = 1.56), suggesting that they had little 
evaluative consensus (cf. Olson & Fazio, 2004). All stimuli are listed in the Appendix. 
The personalized IAT was programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996) and consisted 
of 5 blocks. Participants first practiced the target discrimination with a right and a left 
response key (e.g., “alcohol” vs. “soda”). All target stimuli were presented resulting in 20 
trials. In the second block, they practiced the classification of the attribute dimension (e.g., 
“I like” vs. “I dislike”) with the same response keys. Again, all attribute stimuli were 
presented twice for a total of 20 trials. The third block consisted of 40 trials and this was 
the first combination block during which both target and attribute stimuli were presented 
twice (e.g., “alcohol” and “I like” vs. “soda” and “I dislike”). Next, participants received 20 
trials during which they practiced the reversed attribute discrimination, followed by the 
reversed combination block (e.g., “alcohol” and “I dislike” vs. “soda” and “I like”) which 
consisted of 40 trials. Target and attribute stimuli were always presented randomly in 
alternating order. Stimuli were presented in the middle of the computer screen, in black 
against a grey background. Instructions were presented before each task. During the task, 
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the labels of the categories assigned to the left and right response key were presented in 
the corresponding upper corner of the computer screen. Stimuli remained on screen until a 
response was given. The intertrialinterval was 250 ms. No feedback was presented. 
 
Explicit Expectancies and Attitudes.  Explicit alcohol-related expectancies were 
measured with an expectancy questionnaire that consisted of 6 positive expectancy items 
(α = .84), and 6 negative expectancy items (α = .86). Each item asked participants to 
indicate on a 100 mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed (0 = 
completely disagree, 100 = completely agree) with the statement: “After drinking alcohol, 
I feel . . .” which was completed with the following words: pleasant, happy, sociable, 
funny, amusing, and outgoing for the positive expectancy items, miserable, sad, lonely, 
gloomy, unpleasant and unhappy for the negative expectancy items. Explicit attitudes 
toward alcohol were assessed with an attitude questionnaire which consisted of 4 semantic 
differentials: Participants indicated on a 100mm VAS how much they considered drinking 
alcohol to be unpleasant-pleasant, bad-good, boring-fun, and stupid-smart. The first and 
third item formed an affective attitude component (α = .65), the other two items a 
cognitive attitude component (α = .68). 
Procedure 
After filling out an informed consent form, participants performed the personalized IAT. The 
response assignment of the target categories as well as the order of the two combination 
tasks was counterbalanced. Afterwards, participants filled out the expectancy questionnaire 
and the attitude questionnaire. Finally, participants received the alcohol use questionnaire, 
the AUDIT and the RAPI and they judged all IAT stimuli on familiarity, valence and arousal. 
RESULTS 
Implicit Alcohol Associations 
IAT effects were calculated with the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003). Following the formula presented by Greenwald et al. (2003), practice blocks were 
included, error penalties (600 ms) were given, and results were standardized at the level of 
the participant. The D600 measure was calculated as the performance difference between 
the two combination tasks so that higher scores indicate faster performance when “alcohol” 
was paired with “I dislike” (vs. “soda” and “I like”) than when “alcohol” and “I like” were 
assigned to the same response (vs. “soda” and “I dislike”). Preparatory analyses revealed no 
influential outliers on IAT data. Results yielded a borderline significant IAT effect, t(41) = -
1.96, p = .056, indicating that participants associated alcohol more with positive valence 
than with negative valence. 
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Explicit Alcohol-Related Expectancies and Attitudes 
Mean scores were calculated separately for positive and negative expectancy items. A 
comparison of mean positive expectancy scores (M = 66.62, SD = 10.22) and mean 
negative expectancy scores (M = 22.60, SD = 10.94), showed that participants agreed 
significantly more with positive expectancies than with negative expectancies, t(41) = 16.36, 
p < .001. Mean scores were also calculated separately for the affective and cognitive 
alcohol attitude component. Results showed that participants’ mean affective attitude score 
(M = 74.11, SD = 12.14) deviated significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t(41) = 
12.87, p < .001, indicating that participants had a positive attitude towards alcohol. Mean 
cognitive attitude scores (M = 47.79, SD = 14.17), however, did not deviate from the 
midpoint of the scale, t(41) = -1.01, p = .317. We then examined the relationship of the 
personalized IAT with alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes. The personalized IAT was 
significantly correlated with negative expectancies, r = .33, p = .031, and borderline 
significantly correlated with both positive expectancies, r = -.29, p = .067, and the affective 
attitude component, r = -.30, p = .056. The personalized IAT was uncorrelated with the 
cognitive attitude component, r = .03, p = .873. 
Relationship of Implicit Associations to Alcohol Use and Related 
Problems 
Alcohol consumption during the past week and average weekly alcohol consumption were 
estimated from the alcohol use questionnaire. These two estimates were then log-transformed 
and the mean of these two estimates was calculated as a measure of alcohol use. An estimate 
for mean alcohol-related problems was computed as the mean of the z-transformed RAPI and 
AUDIT log-transformed sum scores. These two estimates were significantly correlated, r = .49, 
p = .001, indicating that participants with increased levels of alcohol consumption also 
experienced more alcohol-related problems. The personalized IAT correlated significantly with 
both alcohol use, r = -.43, p = .005, and alcohol-related problems, r = -.39, p = .012. 
Next, we tested the predictive validity of the explicit measures and the personalized IAT. 
The hierarchical regression analysis predicting alcohol use is shown in Table 1. Inspection of 
the Cook’s distances showed one influential case. This participant was therefore excluded from 
the hierarchical regression analysis. Explicit alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes were 
entered in step 1 of the regression analysis while the personalized IAT was entered in step 2. In 
step 1, only the affective attitude component significantly predicted alcohol use. In step 2, the 
personalized IAT was found to significantly predict alcohol use above the variance explained 
by the affective attitude component. The same procedure was also followed for the prediction 
of alcohol-related problems (see Table 2). None of the explicit measures entered in step 1 
significantly predicted alcohol-related problems whereas entering the personalized IAT in step 
2 significantly increased the variance explained. Results demonstrated that only the 
personalized IAT significantly predicted alcohol-related problems. 
CHAPTER 4 
 68 
Table 1 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of self-reported alcohol use by explicit alcohol-related 
cognitions and effect scoresa of the personalized IAT.  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies -.02 .01 -.37 .22 -1.65 .109 
 Negative alcohol expectancies -.00 .01 .05 .17 .27 .785 
 Affective attitude component .03 .01 .62 .22 2.83 .008 
 Cognitive attitude component -.00 .01 -.03 .17 -.18 .858 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies -.02 .01 -.36 .21 -1.72 .095 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .12 .17 .70 .490 
 Affective attitude component .03 .01 .51 .21 2.39 .022 
 Cognitive attitude component -.00 .01 -.03 .16 -.18 .861 
 Personalized IAT -.38 .17 -.36 .16 -2.28 .029 
 Note. F(4, 36) = 2.09, p = .103, R2 = .19, for step 1; Fchange(1, 35) = 5.18, p = .029, R
2
change = .11, for step 2. 
Final model: R2 = .29, R2 adjusted = .19, F(5, 35) = 2.90, p = .027; 
a Compatibility effects in the personalized IAT 
were scored so that positive values indicate faster responses if “alcohol” was paired with “I dislike” and “soda” with 
“I like”. 
Table 2 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of self-reported alcohol-related problems by explicit 
alcohol-related cognitions and effect scoresa of the personalized IAT.  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies -.02 .02 -.21 .21 -.97 .337 
 Negative alcohol expectancies -.01 .01 -.16 .17 -.92 .366 
 Affective attitude component .03 .01 .38 .20 1.95 .059 
 Cognitive attitude component -.01 .01 -.09 .17 -.52 .606 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies -.02 .02 -.24 .21 -1.15 .256 
 Negative alcohol expectancies -.01 .01 -.07 .17 -.44 .666 
 Affective attitude component .02 .01 .33 .19 1.73 .092 
 Cognitive attitude component -.01 .01 -.08 .16 -.49 .630 
 Personalized IAT -.51 .25 -.33 .16 -2.05 .047 
Note. F(4, 37) = 1.37, p = .264, R2 = .13, for step 1; Fchange(1, 36) = 4.21, p = .047, R
2
change
 = .09, for step 2. 
Final model: R2 = .22, R2adjusted = .11, F(5, 36) = 2.03, p = .098; 
a Compatibility effects in the personalized IAT 
were scored so that positive values indicate faster responses if “alcohol” was paired with “I dislike” and “soda” with 
“I like”. 
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DISCUSSION 
Previous studies that used the IAT to examine implicit alcohol-related cognitions repeatedly 
demonstrated negative associations with alcohol, regardless of level of alcohol 
consumption (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). Recent research, 
however, suggests that the IAT does not necessarily reflect implicit associations but can 
also be affected by extrapersonal knowledge (e.g., Han et al., 2006; Olson & Fazio, 
2004). Hence, previous findings with the alcohol-IAT could at least partly reflect negative 
extrapersonal information about drinking alcohol that is attitude-irrelevant. Therefore, in 
the present study, implicit alcohol associations were measured with a personalized 
alcohol-IAT designed to eliminate extrapersonal contamination in the IAT (cf. Olson & 
Fazio, 2004). The personalized IAT revealed positive implicit associations with alcohol that 
predicted alcohol-related behavior above explicit attitudes toward drinking alcohol. Hence, 
these results suggest that previous evidence for negative implicit alcohol associations was 
at least partly caused by behavior-irrelevant extrapersonal contamination in the alcohol-
IAT and that behavior-relevant implicit alcohol associations are positive rather than 
negative. 
The personalized IAT yielded a significant IAT effect, indicating that alcohol was 
associated more with positive than with negative valence. In addition, these alcohol 
associations were related to and predicted self-reported alcohol consumption and alcohol-
related problems. These results are in line with the idea that the traditional IAT is 
contaminated by negative extrapersonal knowledge about drinking alcohol and that this 
contamination is reduced in the personalized IAT. These results are also consistent with 
studies that have assessed implicit alcohol-related cognitions in a unipolar format. More 
specifically, when alcohol associations were no longer tested in a bipolar format (e.g., 
positive vs. negative) as is typically done in IAT research, but in a unipolar format (e.g., 
positive vs. neutral and negative vs. neutral), it became evident that alcohol is not only 
implicitly associated with negative valence, but also with positive valence (Houben & 
Wiers, 2006c, 2006d; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). Importantly, these studies also 
showed that positive implicit alcohol associations were at least moderately related to 
alcohol-related behavior whereas negative implicit alcohol associations were not. 
Together, these results suggest that alcohol could be more easily paired with a negative 
attribute category than with a positive attribute category (in a bipolar IAT) or with a neutral 
attribute category (in the unipolar IAT) because of negative extrapersonal knowledge that 
does not influence drinking behavior. Importantly, when such extrapersonal contamination 
is reduced in the bipolar IAT, for example by personalizing the IAT, or when implicit 
alcohol associations are tested in a unipolar format, it becomes clear that implicit 
associations with alcohol are positive (or possibly ambivalent) and that positive implicit 
alcohol associations are meaningfully related to drinking behavior. 
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Finally, it is important to note that De Houwer et al. (2004) also personalized the IAT 
by using the attribute labels “liked” and “disliked” and by using individually selected liked 
and disliked attribute stimuli, but still found support for negative associations with alcohol 
(in alcoholics). However, the IAT used by De Houwer et al. (2004) differs from the 
personalized IAT used in this study as well as from the personalized IAT as developed by 
Olson and Fazio (2004) in two aspects: First, in the IAT used by De Houwer et al. (2004) 
presented attribute stimuli that were individually selected instead of idiosyncratic attribute 
stimuli which were the same for all participants. Second, De Houwer et al. (2004) did not 
use attribute category labels that unambiguously directed participants’ focus to their own 
evaluation of the target concepts. Importantly, Han et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
primarily the use of such personalized labels reduces extrapersonal contamination in the 
IAT. Hence, it could be argued that the IAT in the study by De Houwer et al. (2004) was 
probably still susceptible to extrapersonal contamination, which could explain why they 
were unable to find support for positive associations with alcohol. Alternatively, negative 
experiences following alcohol use may have caused stronger negative associations in 
alcoholics in treatment (Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 2006, cf. Jones & 
McMahon, 1996). 
In conclusion, the present study not only increases our understanding of automatic 
cognitive processes that are involved in alcohol use and misuse, but also carries 
implications with respect to interventions. Specifically, the present results suggest that it 
might be useful for future interventions to simultaneously target both explicit and implicit 
alcohol-related cognitions. Current interventions are typically aimed at changing explicit 
alcohol-related cognitions, making people aware of the negative consequences of their 
addictive behavior and devaluating the positive consequences. However, if implicit 
alcohol-related cognitions, and more specifically implicit positive associations with alcohol, 
are not also subject to change during such interventions, they will continue to 
automatically steer the addictive behavior in the future. It is therefore interesting for future 
research to search for new ways to reduce the strength or the impact of positive implicit 
alcohol associations as well as to examine whether personally relevant implicit negative 
associations with alcohol can be created that reduce consumption. 
PERSONALIZING THE ALCOHOL-IAT 
 71 
APPENDIX 
Target Stimuli 
Alcohol: beer, wine, whisky, drink, vodka 
Soda: Fanta, Coca Cola, Sprite, sinas (lemonade), ice-tea 
Attribute Stimuli 
Coffee, spinach, garlic, art, soccer, jogging, secret, cleaning, disco, museum 
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Personalizing the Alcohol-IAT with 
Individualized Stimuli: Relationship with 
Drinking Behavior and Drinking-Related 
Problems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted version of: Houben, K., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). Personalizing the Alcohol-IAT with 
Individualized Stimuli: Relationship with Drinking Behavior and Drinking-Related Problems. 
Accepted for publication pending revisions. 
CHAPTER 5 
 74 
ABSTRACT 
Research aimed at uncovering implicit cognitive processes involved in alcohol use and 
abuse has demonstrated that implicit attitudes toward alcohol are negative and unrelated 
to drinking behavior. Here, it was examined whether these findings could be due to 
contamination of the IAT by extrapersonal associations that are irrelevant to behavior. 
Participants performed a traditional alcohol-IAT as well as a personalized IAT, which has 
been demonstrated to reduce extrapersonal contamination. Additionally, the personalized 
IAT presented individualized stimuli, which should further reduce extrapersonal 
contamination. Consistent with this hypothesis, significantly weaker IAT effects emerged in 
the personalized IAT compared to the traditional IAT. However, both the traditional and 
personalized IAT still indicated implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol. Incremental 
predictive validity was demonstrated for both tasks. Importantly, these findings underscore 
the importance of implicit attitudes toward alcohol as determinants of alcohol use and 
abuse. 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, psychologists have been interested in the role of alcohol-related 
cognitions in alcohol use and abuse. Most of this research has been conducted with self-
report measures of alcohol-related cognitions. This may be an important limitation since 
self-report measures are susceptible to self-presentation and because self-report measures 
might not be well suited to index automatic processes that play a role in alcohol use and 
abuse. Therefore, researchers have recently started using indirect measures of alcohol-
related cognitions which are more resistant to self-presentation biases and which might 
reveal implicit cognitive processes that cannot be easily assessed with self-report measures. 
Implicit cognitions can be defined as cognitions that are activated automatically and that 
can influence behavior automatically, outside conscious awareness (Gawronski, Hofmann, 
& Wilbur, 2006; De Houwer & Moors, in press). As such, indirect measures could lead to 
important new insights in the study of alcohol-related cognitions involved in alcohol use 
and abuse. 
In order to reveal implicit cognitive processes that influence alcohol use and abuse, 
Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, and de Jong (2002) used the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) as an indirect measure of implicit alcohol-
related cognitions in light and heavy drinkers. In the IAT, the participants’ task is to quickly 
and accurately classify stimuli into two target categories and two attribute categories using 
two response keys. The underlying logic is that classification performance should be better 
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when associated target concepts and attribute categories share a response (i.e., 
compatible response assignment) than when target categories are paired with 
unassociated attribute categories (i.e., incompatible response assignment). Using the IAT, 
Wiers et al. found that both light and heavy drinkers were faster when alcohol and 
negative attributes were assigned to the same response, and soda and positive attributes 
to the other response than when alcohol shared a response with positive attributes and 
soda with negative attributes. Hence, these results indicate that both light and heavy 
drinkers had implicit negative evaluative associations with alcohol, or implicit negative 
attitudes toward alcohol. Wiers et al. did find a differentiation between light and heavy 
drinkers with a second IAT: Heavy drinkers were faster when alcohol shared a response 
with arousal and soda with sedation, than when alcohol and sedation were assigned to 
one response and soda and arousal to the other. This effect, however, was absent in light 
drinkers. Wiers et al. hypothesized that these results were in line with the incentive-
sensitization theory of Robinson and Berridge (1993) according to which addictive 
behaviors such as alcohol use are related more to “wanting” (i.e., sensitized arousal) the 
addictive substance than to “liking” of the substance. These results were also replicated in 
a sample of heavy drinkers (Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 
2005) as well as in a sample of patients undergoing treatment (De Houwer, Crombez, 
Koster, & De Beul, 2004). Thus, these findings suggest that implicit alcohol associations 
with arousal may exert an automatic influence on alcohol use and abuse, while implicit 
attitudes toward alcohol do not appear to be involved in alcohol-related behavior. 
It is, however, possible that results with the alcohol-IAT do not reflect implicit 
negative attitudes toward alcohol but instead culturally shared associative knowledge 
about drinking alcohol and its negative consequences, which does not influence behavior. 
In line with such a conclusion, it was demonstrated that the IAT is sensitive to so-called 
extrapersonal associations that do not form the basis of one’s attitudes and that are 
irrelevant to behavior. Such extrapersonal associations may stem from cultural norms 
(Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) or from other sources of information, such as the media and 
other people (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Although such extrapersonal associations may affect 
IAT performance, they need to be distinguished from personal associations that, unlike 
extrapersonal associations, are automatically activated and guide behavior (Olson & 
Fazio, 2004). Olson and Fazio (2004) argue that contamination of the IAT by 
extrapersonal associations is promoted due to normative implications of the attribute labels 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ as well as the use of normatively positive and negative attribute 
exemplars. In addition, giving error feedback in the IAT also suggests that there is a 
normatively correct answer. Therefore, they developed the personalized IAT which reduces 
contamination by extrapersonal associations because all references to normative 
information are eliminated: The labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are replaced with the 
labels ‘I like’ and ‘I dislike’, stimuli are used that are not normatively associated with 
valence but that have little evaluative consensus (e.g., football, coffee), and no error 
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feedback is presented. Houben and Wiers (2006b) recently examined whether the alcohol-
IAT is affected by extrapersonal contamination using the personalized IAT as developed by 
Olson and Fazio (2004). In line with the hypothesis, the personalized IAT revealed implicit 
positive attitudes toward alcohol and was strongly correlated with alcohol use and alcohol-
related problems, suggesting a reduced influence of extrapersonal associations. 
However, as has also been pointed out by Fadardi, Cox, and Klinger (2006), the 
personalized IAT presents stimulus words for which there is no evaluative consensus, but 
these stimuli are nevertheless the same for all participants. It is questionable how well an 
IAT that presents standard stimuli can capture participants’ personal associations, since 
standard stimuli will probably differ in the degree to which they are both known and liked 
across participants. This is particularly true when applied to alcohol research since there is 
probably great variation in the alcoholic drinks that are known and liked by participants. In 
line with this idea, Houben and Wiers (2006e) have demonstrated that implicit attitudes 
toward beer, in contrast to more general implicit attitudes toward alcohol, were related to 
alcohol consumption in a sample of participants who drank beer on a regular basis. 
Hence, it might be useful to personalize the IAT, not only by removing all reference to 
normative information, but also by using individualized words (e.g., participants’ favorite 
drinks). This possibility was examined in the present study. Participants’ scores on a 
standard alcohol-IAT, similar to those used in previous studies, were compared to their 
scores on a personalized IAT that presented stimuli that were individualized for each 
participant. More specifically, each participant reported his or her favorite alcoholic drinks 
and sodas, which were then used as the stimuli for the target categories in the 
personalized IAT that was performed by that participant. The target categories were 
labeled ‘my drink’ and ‘my soda’, respectively. Further, all participants also listed positive 
and negative words that were subsequently used as the stimuli for the attribute categories ‘I 
like’ and ‘I dislike’, respectively. Finally, no error feedback was presented during the 
personalized IAT. It was expected that the standard IAT would show support for implicit 
negative attitudes toward alcohol, replicating previous findings. In contrast, it was expected 
that the personalized IAT would yield evidence for implicit positive attitudes toward 
alcohol. Importantly, it was expected that the personalized IAT would show a stronger 
relation to self-reported alcohol use and alcohol-related problems compared to the 
standard IAT, suggesting a reduced contamination by extrapersonal associations in the 
personalized IAT. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-six students of Maastricht University (31 females, 15 males; mean age = 21.33 
years, SD = 1.84) voluntarily participated in exchange for a gift certificate. Average 
alcohol consumption per week was 15.63 (SD = 14.49) Dutch standard drinks7. On the 
18-items version of the Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 2000), 
participants’ mean item score was .51 (SD = .38) while the average item score in clinical 
samples is about .80 (White & Labouvie, 1989). On the Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993), 
participants’ mean score was 11.11 (SD = 5.38), while the proposed AUDIT cut-off score 
for the screening of alcohol-related problems is 11 (Saunders et al., 1993). 
Materials and Measures 
Alcohol Use. Alcohol use was measured with a self-report questionnaire (Wiers, 
Hoogeveen, Sergeant & Gunning, 1997) based on the timeline follow-back method 
(Sobell & Sobell, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate how many drinks of different 
types of alcoholic beverages they consumed during each day of the past week, and how 
many drinks they typically consumed on each day of the week. 
 
Alcohol-Related Problems.  Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the RAPI 
and with the AUDIT. The RAPI described 18 alcohol-related problems or situations for 
which participants indicated how often they experienced these situations on a 5-point Likert 
scale (0 = never, 4 = very often) (Cronbach’s α = .82). The AUDIT consisted of 10 
questions (α = .85), of which the first three were related to alcohol use, and the other 
seven to alcohol-related problems. 
 
Implicit Association Test.  In the traditional IAT, two target categories were 
presented, one consisting of 5 alcoholic drinks (label “alcohol”) and the other of 5 soft 
drinks (label “soda”). The alcohol and soda categories were matched on familiarity (M = 
5.20, SD = 1.64, and M = 5.67, SD = 1.35, respectively; 1 = completely unfamiliar, 7 
= very familiar), valence (M = 4.08, SD = 1.15, and M = 4.43, SD = .96, respectively; 
1 = extremely negative, 7 = extremely positive), arousal (M = 3.84, SD = .97, and M = 
4.25, SD = 1.02, respectively; 1 = extremely passive, 7 = extremely active), and number 
of syllables. Further, in the traditional IAT, the two attribute categories consisted of 5 
positive (label “pleasant”; M = 6.45, SD = .61), and 5 negative (label “unpleasant”; M = 
 
 
7 A standard alcoholic drink in Holland contains less alcohol than a standard English or American alcoholic drink: 
10 vs. 14g, respectively. 
CHAPTER 5 
 78 
1.43, SD = .56) stimuli. The attribute categories were matched, as closely as possible, on 
familiarity (M = 6.21, SD = .88, and M = 5.29, SD = 1.64, respectively), arousal (M = 
4.22, SD = 1.10, and M = 3.84, SD = .84, respectively), and number of syllables. All 
stimuli that were presented in the traditional IAT are listed in the Appendix. For the 
personalized IAT, all stimuli were selected through a questionnaire completed by the 
participants before the onset of the study. On this questionnaire, participants listed their 
five most favorite alcoholic drinks as well as their five most favorite sodas, which were 
subsequently used as stimuli for the alcohol and soda target categories, respectively. Also, 
participants listed five things they associated with positive feelings, and five things they 
associated with negative feelings. These positive and negative stimuli were then used as 
stimuli for the positive and negative attribute categories, respectively. The target categories 
were labeled ‘my drink’ (alcohol) and ‘my soda’ (soda), while the attribute categories were 
labeled ‘I like’ (positive) and ‘I dislike’ (negative). 
The traditional IAT and the personalized IAT were programmed in ERTS 3.18 
(Beringer, 1996) and consisted of 5 blocks. Participants first practiced the target 
discrimination with a right and a left response key (e.g., ‘alcohol’ vs. ‘soda’). All target 
stimuli were presented twice, resulting in 20 target practice trials. In the second block, 
participants received 20 trials during which they practiced the classification of the attribute 
dimension (e.g., ‘unpleasant’ vs. ‘pleasant’ or ‘I dislike’ vs. ‘I like’) with the same response 
keys. Again, all attribute stimuli were presented twice. The third block was the first 
combination block during which both target and attribute stimuli were presented twice, 
resulting in 40 trials (e.g., ‘alcohol’ + ‘unpleasant’/‘I dislike’ vs. ‘soda’ + ‘pleasant’/‘I 
like’). Next, participants received 20 trials in which they practiced the reversed attribute 
discrimination (e.g., ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘unpleasant’ or ‘I like’ vs. ‘I dislike’), followed by the 
reversed combination block, which consisted of 40 trials (e.g., ‘alcohol’ + ‘pleasant’/‘I 
like’ vs. ‘soda’ + ‘unpleasant’/‘I dislike’). 
Target and attribute stimuli were always presented randomly in alternating order. 
Stimuli were presented in the middle of the computer screen, in black against a grey 
background. Instructions were presented before each task. During the task, the labels of 
the categories assigned to the left and right response key were presented in the 
corresponding upper corner of the computer screen. Stimuli remained on screen until a 
response was given. The intertrialinterval was 250 ms. During the traditional IAT, feedback 
was presented in red beneath the stimuli after an incorrect response (‘wrong’), and when 
responses were too fast (< 300 ms; ‘too fast’) or too slow (> 3000 ms; ‘too slow’). No 
feedback was presented during the personalized IAT. 
 
Explicit Expectancies and Attitudes.  Explicit alcohol-related expectancies were 
measured with an expectancy questionnaire that consisted of 6 positive expectancy items 
(α = .83), and 6 negative expectancy items (α = .84). Each item asked participants to 
indicate on a 100 mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed (0 = 
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completely disagree, 100 = completely agree) with the statement: “After drinking alcohol, 
I feel . . .” which was completed with the following words: active, lively, impulsive, 
spontaneous, talkative, and sociable for the positive expectancy items, miserable, sad, 
lonely, unhappy, unpleasant, and gloomy for the negative expectancy items. Explicit 
attitudes toward alcohol were assessed with an attitude questionnaire which consisted of 2 
semantic differentials: Participants indicated on a 100mm VAS how much they considered 
drinking alcohol to be unpleasant-pleasant, boring-fun (α = .92). 
Procedure 
First, participants filled out an informed consent form. Participants then performed the 
traditional IAT and the personalized IAT in balanced order. Also, the response assignment 
of the target categories, as well as the order of the combination tasks were balanced 
across participants and remained the same during both the traditional IAT and the 
personalized IAT. Next, participants filled out the alcohol expectancy questionnaire, the 
alcohol attitude questionnaire, the alcohol use questionnaire, the AUDIT and the RAPI. 
Finally, participants rated all stimuli on familiarity, valence and arousal. 
RESULTS 
Implicit Alcohol Associations 
IAT effects were calculated with both the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003) and with the conventional log measure (Greenwald et al., 1998) because 
the two algorithms can show markedly different results (e.g., Wiers et al., 2005) and 
because there is no consensus yet on which measure is optimal (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, 
Banaji, & Klauer, 2005 vs. Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005). Therefore, results 
with the D600 measure are reported and where differences were found with the 
conventional measure, these will be indicated. First, trials with response latencies below 
300 ms or above 3000 ms were recoded to 300 ms and 3000 ms, respectively. Mean 
response latencies were calculated for the two combination tasks separately for the 
traditional IAT and the personalized IAT. Next, the conventional measure was calculated as 
the difference between these two log-transformed means so that higher IAT scores indicate 
faster performance for the compatible response assignment (‘alcohol’ + ‘unpleasant’/‘I 
dislike’ vs. ‘soda’ + ‘pleasant’/‘I like’) than for the incompatible response assignment 
(‘alcohol’ + ‘pleasant’/‘I like’ vs. ‘soda’ + ‘unpleasant’/‘I dislike’). The D600 measure 
was calculated in the same direction. Further, following the formula presented by 
Greenwald et al., practice blocks were included, error penalties (600 ms) were given, and 
results were standardized at the level of the participant. 
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Preparatory analyses revealed no influential outliers on IAT data. Results revealed a 
significant difference between the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT, t(45) = 2.20, p 
= .0338. Consistent with previous findings, the IAT effect in the traditional IAT was 
significant, t(45) = 6.61, p < .001, indicating that participants were faster when alcohol 
shared a response with the negative attribute category than when alcohol was paired with 
the positive attribute category. In the personalized IAT, the IAT effect was also significant, 
t(45) = 3.26, p = .002, and in the same direction as the IAT effect in the traditional IAT. 
Hence, results demonstrate that participants associated alcohol more with negative than 
with positive in the traditional IAT, and to a lesser extent also in the personalized IAT. 
Explicit Alcohol-Related Expectancies and Attitudes 
Mean scores were calculated separately for the positive and negative expectancy items. 
Results showed that participants agreed significantly more with positive expectancies (M = 
65.02, SD = 16.80) than with negative expectancies (M = 18.70, SD = 12.41), t(45) = 
13.66, p < .001. Further, mean attitude scores were also calculated from the alcohol 
attitude questionnaire. Results showed that participants’ mean attitude score (M = 72.25, 
SD = 18.44) deviated significantly from the midpoint of the scale, t(45) = 8.18, p < 
.001, indicating that participants had a favorable attitude towards alcohol. We then 
examined the relationship of the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT with alcohol-
related expectancies and attitudes (see Table 1). None of the correlations between the two 
IAT versions and explicit alcohol-related cognitions reached conventional levels of 
significance. 
Relationship of Implicit Associations to Alcohol Use and Related 
Problems 
Alcohol consumption during the past week and average weekly alcohol consumption were 
estimated from the alcohol use questionnaire. These two estimates were then log-
transformed and the mean of these two estimates was calculated as a measure of alcohol 
use. An estimate for mean alcohol-related problems was computed as the mean of the z-
transformed RAPI and AUDIT log-transformed sum scores. These two estimates were 
significantly correlated, r = .74, p < .001, indicating that participants with increased 
levels of alcohol consumption also experienced more alcohol-related problems. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT both correlated significantly 
with alcohol use. 
 
 
8 When results were analyzed using the conventional IAT effect measure, the difference between the traditional IAT 
and the personalized IAT was borderline significant, t(45) = 1.70, p = .097, but in the same direction. 
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Table 1 
Correlations of both the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT with explicit alcohol-related expectancies and 
attitudes, alcohol use, and alcohol-related problems. 
IAT  Expectancies   
Variable Traditional Personalized  Positive Negative  
Attitude 
Personalized IAT .39** -  - -  - 
Positive expectancies -19 .09  - -  - 
Negative expectancies -.15 -.11  -.22 -  - 
Attitude toward alcohol -.10 -.17  .47** -.55**  - 
Alcohol use -.37* -.31*  .33* -.17  .48** 
Alcohol-related problems -.23 -.24  .44* -.17  .46** 
Note. ** =Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * =Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
Next, we tested the predictive validity of the explicit measures and the incremental validity 
of the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT using hierarchical regression analysis. 
Regression analyses were performed separately for the prediction of alcohol use and 
alcohol-related problems. Explicit alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes toward 
alcohol were always entered in step 1. In order to examine the incremental validity of both 
the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT, regression analyses were performed twice, 
once with the traditional IAT entered in step 2 and the personalized IAT entered in step 3, 
and once with the two IAT versions entered in the reversed order. The hierarchical 
regression analysis predicting alcohol use is shown in Table 2. In step 1 of the regression 
analysis, attitudes toward alcohol significantly predicted alcohol use. When the traditional 
IAT was entered in step 2, results showed that the traditional IAT significantly predicted 
alcohol use above explicit attitudes toward alcohol. However, when the personalized IAT 
was then entered in step 3, the variance explained was not significantly increased. When 
the personalized IAT was entered in step 2 and the traditional IAT in step 3, results showed 
that the personalized IAT predicted alcohol use at borderline significance above explicit 
attitudes toward alcohol in step 2 while entering the traditional IAT in step 3 did not 
increase the variance explained9. The hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of 
alcohol-related problems is shown in Table 3. In step 1, explicit positive expectancies 
 
 
9 When IAT effects were calculated using the conventional IAT effect measure, entering the personalized IAT in step 2 
of the hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol use significantly increased the variance explained, 
F(1, 41) = 5.88, p = .020, R2change
 = .09, and the personalized IAT significantly predicted alcohol use above explicit 
attitudes toward alcohol, β = -.34, p = .020. Entering the traditional IAT in step 3 did not increase the variance 
explained, F(1, 40) = 1.41, p = .242. 
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predicted alcohol-related problems at borderline significance, while explicit attitudes 
toward alcohol significantly predicted alcohol-related problems. Neither the traditional IAT 
nor the personalized IAT significantly predicted alcohol-related problems above explicit 
alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes10. 
Table 2 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol use by alcohol-related expectancies and 
attitudes (step 1), and IAT effect scores of the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT (step 2 and 3).  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .13 .15 .87 .391 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .13 .16 .78 .439 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .48 .18 2.74 .009 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .08 .15 .56 .581 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .04 .16 .24 .811 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .43 .17 2.51 .016 
 Traditional IAT -.46 .20 -.30 .13 -2.26 .029 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .19 .15 1.27 .212 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .05 .16 .30 .770 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .37 .18 2.02 .050 
 Personalized IAT -.33 .18 -.26 .14 -1.88 .068 
 3 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .13 .15 .85 .399 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .01 .16 .04 .969 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .37 .18 2.05 .047 
 Traditional IAT -.36 .22 -.24 .14 -1.66 .104 
 Personalized IAT -.21 .19 -.17 .15 -1.13 .265 
Note. IAT effects for both the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT were scored so that positive values indicate 
faster responses if the alcohol category was assigned to the same response as the negative attribute category (and 
soda to the same response as the positive attribute category). F(3, 42) = 4.74, p = .006, R2 = .25, for step 1; 
When the traditional IAT was entered in step 2 and the personalized IAT in step 3, F(1, 41) = 5.12, p = .029, 
R2change
 = .08, for step 2 and F(1, 40) = 1.28, p = .265, R2change
 = .02, for step 3. Final model (step 2): R2 = .34, 
R2adjusted = .27, F(4, 41) = 5.18, p = .002. When the personalized IAT was entered in step 2 and the traditional IAT 
in step 3, F(1, 41) = 3.52, p = .068, R2change
 = .06, for step 2 and F(1, 40) = 2.76, p = .104, R2change
 = .04, for 
step 3. Final model (step 2): R2 = .31, R2adjusted = .25, F(4, 41) = 4.65, p = .003. 
 
 
10 When IAT effects were calculated using the conventional IAT effect measure, entering the personalized IAT in step 
2 of the hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems borderline significantly 
increased the variance explained, F(1, 41) = 3.50, p = .069, R2change
 = .06, and the personalized IAT predicted 
alcohol-related problems at borderline significance above explicit attitudes toward alcohol, β = -.26, p = .069. 
Entering the traditional IAT in step 3 did not increase the variance explained, F(1, 40) = .06, p = .812. 
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Table 3 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems by alcohol-related 
expectancies and attitudes (step 1), and IAT effect scores of the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT (step 2 and 
3).  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .28 .15 1.88 .068 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .10 .16 .61 .548 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .38 .17 2.18 .035 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .26 .15 1.70 .096 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .06 .16 .345 .732 
 Attitude toward alcohol .02 .01 .35 .18 2.01 .051 
 Traditional IAT -.18 .18 -.14 .14 -.99 .328 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .33 .15 2.20 .034 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .03 .16 .19 .851 
 Attitude toward alcohol .01 .01 .28 .18 1.56 .128 
 Personalized IAT -.24 .15 -.22 .14 -1.58 .122 
 3 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .31 .16 2.01 .051 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .02 .16 .12 .907 
 Attitude toward alcohol .01 .01 .28 .18 1.54 .133 
 Traditional IAT -.09 .20 -.06 .15 -.43 .670 
 Personalized IAT -.22 .17 -.19 .15 -1.28 .208 
Note. IAT effects for both the traditional IAT and the personalized IAT were scored so that positive values indicate 
faster responses if the alcohol category was assigned to the same response as the negative attribute category (and 
soda to the same response as the positive attribute category). F(3, 42) = 5.40, p = .003, R2 = .28, for step 1; 
When the traditional IAT was entered in step 2 and the personalized IAT in step 3, F(1, 41) = .98, p = .328, R2change
 
= .02, for step 2 and F(1, 40) = 1.64, p = .208, R2change
 = .03, for step 3. When the personalized IAT was entered 
in step 2 and the traditional IAT in step 3, F(1, 41) = 2.50, p = .122, R2change
 = .04, for step 2 and F(1, 40) = .18, 
p = .670, R2change
 = .00, for step 3. Final model (step 1): R2 = .28, R2adjusted = .23, F(3, 42) = 5.40, p = .003. 
DISCUSSION 
Alcohol-IAT studies have repeatedly demonstrated the counterintuitive finding that drinkers 
display implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol that do not have a strong impact on 
alcohol-related behavior (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). Here, 
it was examined whether support for implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol might be 
due to contamination of IAT effects by negative extrapersonal information about drinking 
alcohol that is attitude-irrelevant. To test this hypothesis, we compared a traditional IAT 
with a personalized IAT (cf. Olson & Fazio, 2004) that presented individualized stimuli that 
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were selected by participants themselves instead of standard stimuli (cf. Fadardi et al., 
2006). This was done because standard target (and attribute) concepts do not necessarily 
evoke the same attitudes in all participants. Results with the standard IAT yielded support 
for implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol, replicating previous findings. As expected, 
support for implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol was significantly reduced in the 
personalized IAT. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, we found no support for implicit 
positive attitudes toward alcohol with the personalized IAT. Instead, the personalized IAT 
demonstrated markedly reduced but still significant IAT effects indicative of implicit 
negative attitudes toward alcohol. Moreover, both the traditional and the personalized IAT 
were related to alcohol-related behavior and predicted behavior above explicit alcohol-
related expectancies and attitudes. 
Consistent with the extrapersonal contamination hypothesis, evidence for implicit 
negative attitudes toward alcohol was significantly reduced in a personalized IAT that 
presented individualized stimuli compared to a standard IAT. However, in contrast to the 
hypothesis, the personalized IAT did not show evidence for implicit positive attitudes toward 
alcohol. Houben and Wiers (2006b), on the other hand, demonstrated implicit positive 
attitudes toward alcohol in a personalized IAT that presented standard stimuli without 
reference to normative feedback. Thus, these results suggest that the personalized IAT used 
in the present study eliminated extrapersonal contamination to a lesser extent than the 
personalized IAT used by Houben and Wiers (2006b). Possibly, the individualized attribute 
stimuli selected by participants in the present study were in fact normatively associated with 
valence (e.g., love, peace, war, weapons). Hence, a personalized IAT that presents 
standard stimuli could be more effective in reducing extrapersonal contamination than an 
individualized personalized IAT because it allows for more controlled selection of stimuli 
that are not normatively associated with valence. Nonetheless Han, Olson, and Fazio 
(2006) recently demonstrated that primarily the category labels in the traditional IAT cause 
vulnerability to extrapersonal contamination and that personalizing the labels in the IAT is 
sufficient to reduce the impact of extrapersonal associations. 
Alternatively, the difference in results with the personalized IAT between the present 
study and the study by Houben and Wiers (2006b) could be due to differences in the 
samples of participants. On average, participants in the study by Houben and Wiers 
(2006b) drank 25 alcoholic consumptions per week whereas in the present study, 
participants on average consumed less than 16 alcoholic drinks a week. Hence, if implicit 
positive attitudes towards alcohol are stronger for participants with increased levels of 
alcohol consumption, as suggested by the findings of Houben and Wiers (2006b), the 
lower alcohol consumption of participants in the present study compared to participants in 
the Houben and Wiers (2006b) study can explain why participants in the present study on 
average demonstrated implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol rather than implicit 
positive attitudes toward alcohol. 
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Importantly, in this study, both the standard and the personalized IAT were related to 
alcohol-related behavior. Results showed that stronger implicit positive attitudes toward 
alcohol (or weaker negative attitudes toward alcohol) were related to an increase in 
alcohol consumption. Moreover, implicit attitudes toward alcohol assessed with both the 
traditional IAT and the personalized IAT predicted alcohol use above explicit alcohol-
related cognitions. Thus, in line with findings reported by Houben and Wiers (2006b), 
these results demonstrate incremental predictive validity for the personalized IAT. In 
addition, incremental predictive validity was also established for the traditional IAT. These 
findings are consistent with recent studies that also found support for a role of implicit 
attitudes toward alcohol in alcohol use and abuse with a slight modification of the IAT 
procedure. When alcohol associations were tested in a unipolar format (e.g., positive vs. 
neutral and negative vs. neutral) rather than in a bipolar format (e.g., positive vs. negative) 
so that implicit positive attitudes and implicit negative attitudes could be assessed 
separately, evidence was found for implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol in addition to 
strong implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol (Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia & 
Earleywine, 2003). Moreover, implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol were at least 
moderately related to alcohol use while implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol did not 
show a relationship to alcohol-related behavior (Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia & 
Earleywine, 2003). Together, these findings suggest that strong implicit negative attitudes 
toward alcohol typically overshadow implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol in an 
alcohol-IAT that presents positive and negative evaluative categories in a bipolar format. 
The present results suggest that implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol at least 
partly reflect extrapersonal associative knowledge that is unrelated to drinking decisions. In 
addition, negative evaluative associations with alcohol could also be triggered by the 
choice of the contrasting target concept soda, which is typically used in alcohol-IATs. 
Recent studies using a different task than the IAT, namely varieties of the Extrinsic Affective 
Simon Task (EAST, De Houwer, 2003) that can be used to assess implicit attitudes toward 
single target concepts, demonstrated positive rather than negative evaluative associations 
with alcohol that were related to alcohol consumption (De Houwer & De Bruycker, in 
press) or indicated implicit ambivalent evaluative associations with alcohol that showed a 
positive relation to alcohol-related behavior (de Jong, Wiers, van de Braak, & Huijding, in 
press). In addition, Houben and Wiers (2006d) recently demonstrated both implicit positive 
attitudes toward alcohol as well as implicit negative alcohol attitudes with a unipolar Single 
Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006) that assessed single 
implicit attitudes toward alcohol while a unipolar IAT that assessed implicit alcohol 
attitudes relative to soda only yielded implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol. 
Importantly, Houben and Wiers (2006d) found that single implicit positive attitudes toward 
alcohol and implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda uniquely predicted 
alcohol use. 
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In sum, consistent across studies that have examined single implicit attitudes toward 
alcohol using variations of the IAT in order to overcome some of the limitations of the 
standard IAT procedure as well as variations of the EAST, it has been demonstrated that 
implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol are an important determinant of alcohol use and 
abuse (present study; De Houwer & De Bruycker, in press; de Jong et al., in press; Houben 
& Wiers, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). Hence, testing 
implicit alcohol attitudes in a non-comparative format with respect to both the target 
concept as well as the evaluative categories and using personalized IAT variants in order 
to eliminate extrapersonal contamination of IAT effects, increases the probability of finding 
behavior-relevant implicit attitudes toward alcohol. 
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APPENDIX 
Target Stimuli in the Traditional IAT 
Alcohol: beer, wine, whisky, drink, brandy 
Soda: Fanta, Coca Cola, Sprite, sinas (lemonade), ice-tea 
Attribute Stimuli in the Traditional IAT 
Pleasant: love, sunshine, warmth, peace, hug 
Unpleasant: sorrow, war, depression, pain, disease 
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PART II 
BIPOLAR TARGET AND ATTRIBUTE 
DIMENSIONS IN THE ALCOHOL-IAT: 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
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CHAPTER 6 
Assessing Implicit Alcohol Associations 
with the Implicit Association Test: 
 Artifact? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: Houben, K., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). Assessing Implicit Alcohol Associations 
with the Implicit Association Test: Fact or Artifact? Addictive Behaviors, 31, 1346-1362. 
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ABSTRACT 
Studies using bipolar Implicit Association Tests (IATs) found that heavy drinkers have 
negative and arousal associations with alcohol relative to soda. Study 1 examined whether 
these results were due to the label ‘alcohol’ and the choice of the contrast category ‘soda’. 
Four unipolar IATs assessed alcohol associations with positive and negative valence, 
arousal, and sedation, while varying the target dimension: alcohol or beer versus soda or 
animals. Results showed that drinkers had the strongest associations between alcohol and 
negative valence with the exact strength depending on the choice of the target categories. 
They also showed associations between alcohol and positive valence, arousal, and to a 
lesser extent sedation, which were uninfluenced by composition of the target dimension. 
These findings indicate ambivalence in both the valence and arousal-sedation dimension, 
underscoring the importance of using unipolar alcohol-IATs. Further, study 2 showed that 
“Figure-Ground” asymmetries could not account for these IAT results. These findings 
provide support that implicit alcohol associations are not merely IAT artifacts and that they 
can be assessed in a meaningful way with unipolar IATs. 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade, alcohol expectancies have been shown to be powerful predictors of 
drinking and it is now believed that they act as a common pathway for the influence of 
more distal risk factors for alcohol abuse (e.g., Goldman, 1999). Further, 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) research demonstrated that there are two basic 
dimensions underlying alcohol expectancies: a positive-negative and an arousal-sedation 
dimension. While expectancies in the arousal-sedation dimension have been found to 
discriminate between drinking levels, no relation has been found between expectancies in 
the valence dimension and drinking (e.g., Rather & Goldman, 1994). This explanatory 
power of expectancy theory inspired researchers to develop a variety of expectancy 
measurement instruments that almost exclusively rely on self-report. Self-report measures, 
however, have been criticized because of their susceptibility to self-presentation biases and 
the possibility that cognitive processes mediating alcohol abuse are not accessible through 
introspection (McCusker, 2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Stacy, 1997). Therefore, alcohol 
research is now exploring the value of implicit measures, such as the now widely used 
Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), that assess 
cognitions indirectly, without asking people to reflect and report on the motivations for 
their behavior. 
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The IAT is a double categorization task during which stimuli are classified into two 
times two categories with two response keys. Typically, two categories represent the target 
concepts (e.g., alcohol versus soda) and two categories correspond to the poles of an 
attribute dimension (e.g., positive versus negative). During the critical IAT trials, the target 
and attribute categories are assigned to two response keys in two different combinations. 
The assumption is that performance will be superior when associated concepts are 
assigned to the same response key (compatible combination), than when concepts sharing 
a response key are not or only weakly associated (incompatible combination). The 
performance difference between the two combination tasks, or the IAT effect, reflects the 
strength of implicit associations between the target and the attribute categories (Greenwald 
et al., 1998). 
IMPLICIT ALCOHOL ASSOCIATIONS 
Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, and de Jong (2002) used the IAT to examine heavy and 
light drinkers’ implicit alcohol associations with outcomes in both the arousal and valence 
expectancy dimension. Results showed that heavy drinkers, but not light drinkers, had 
implicit alcohol-arousal associations, paralleling results from MDS expectancy research. 
Surprisingly, and in contrast to MDS research, both light and heavy drinkers strongly 
associated alcohol with negative outcomes. These findings with the alcohol-IAT have been 
replicated in a sample of heavy drinkers (Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, 
& Smulders, 2005) and in a sample of patient drinkers (De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & 
De Beul, 2004). 
Wiers et al. (2002) linked the finding of implicit alcohol-arousal associations to the 
incentive-sensitization theory of addiction which states that addictive substances sensitize 
brain systems mediating processes responsible for motivating behavior and determining 
incentive salience (“wanting”), but not brain systems mediating the hedonic effects of 
addictive substances (“liking”). Once sensitized, this “wanting” system can be implicitly 
activated and automatically increases attention, arousal, and goal-directed behavior 
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 2003). With respect to the finding of negative alcohol 
associations, three plausible explanations are available. First, Jones and McMahon (1996) 
argue that negative alcohol expectancies increase with consumption but without 
influencing drinking behavior until a certain threshold is reached. Second, implicit negative 
associations possibly reflect past, negative experiences whereas explicit cognitions may 
stem from more recent, positive experiences. Preliminary support for this account has 
already been obtained in relation to smoking (Rudman, 2004; Rudman and Heppen, 
2003). Third, the negative-alcohol IAT effect could be due to an artifact of the IAT 
procedure. 
CHAPTER 6 
 94 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE IAT 
With respect to the IAT target dimension, there are two main problems. First, De Houwer 
(2001) argues that the IAT primarily measures associations at category level and that 
category labels determine IAT effects more strongly than exemplars (i.e., the ‘label effect’). 
Additionally, IAT effects are prone to contamination by culturally shared associative 
knowledge (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004). Hence, IAT results can be 
caused by cultural connotations carried by the category labels and superior IAT performance 
when alcohol and negative are mapped together could thus be due to negative cultural 
connotations of the label ‘alcohol’11. Second, the IAT is a relative measure: it compares the 
strength of implicit associations of one target category to those of the contrast category. As a 
result, faster performance when alcohol and negative (and soda and positive) are paired may 
be due to negative alcohol associations, positive soda associations or a combination of both. 
Another problem with the IAT is that the attribute dimension is bipolar and that the test 
is therefore unfit for assessing ambivalent associations. This could be especially problematic 
when assessing implicit alcohol associations, since attitudes towards alcohol have been 
found to be highly ambivalent (Conner & Sparks, 2002). Therefore, Jajodia and Earleywine 
(2003) modified the IAT by contrasting positive and negative categories with neutral ones. 
When attribute categories were tested in this unipolar format, performance was facilitated for 
both the combination of alcohol and positive words and the pairing of alcohol and negative 
words relative to the combination of mammals and neutral words. However, since the 
positive expectancy IAT was always performed before the negative expectancy IAT, order 
effects could have influenced results. It is a common finding that IAT effects are considerably 
larger the first time the task is performed and decrease with experience (Geenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003; Wiers et al., 2005). 
Finally, IAT effects could reflect non-associative factors rather than implicit associations. 
Rothermund and Wentura (2004) proposed such a non-associative account of IAT effects 
that is based on salience. In a series of studies, they showed that salience or figure-ground 
asymmetries can produce IAT effects independent of implicit associations. When categories 
of an IAT dimension differ in salience, the salient category will act as figure against the less 
salient (back)ground category. Consequently, performing the IAT should be easier for 
consistent mappings of the figure categories of both IAT dimensions than when one figure 
and one ground category are assigned to the same response. 
Two studies were designed that explored whether previous results with the alcohol-IAT 
could have been caused by these limitations. Study 1 examined the effect of using a contrast 
 
 
11 Public health campaigns in The Netherlands (and many other countries) typically stress the negative consequences 
of drinking alcohol whereas advertisements generally emphasize the positive and pleasant effects of drinking different 
brands of beer. 
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category other than soda on results with the alcohol-IAT as well as the effect of the label 
‘alcohol’. Also, the value of assessing implicit alcohol associations in a unipolar format was 
further explored. Study 2 examined whether the IAT results of study 1 could reflect salience 
asymmetries, instead of, or in addition to, implicit alcohol associations. To rule out such an 
alternative explanation, salience asymmetries between categories that formed an IAT 
dimension in study 1 were examined with visual search tasks which, according to Rothermund 
and Wentura (2004), can be used to objectively assess salience asymmetries. 
STUDY 1 
Four IAT versions were compared that differed with respect to the target dimension: alcohol 
vs. soda (cf. Wiers et al., 2002), alcohol vs. animals (cf. Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003)12, beer 
vs. soda, or beer vs. animals. Further, the attribute categories positive, negative, arousal and 
sedation were tested against neutral attribute categories to examine the utility of unipolar 
alcohol-IATs. The IAT was expected to show both a strong negative attitude and a weak 
positive attitude towards alcohol whereas the opposite was expected for beer11. Also, it was 
hypothesized that alcohol would be associated with arousal and that these associations 
would be related to alcohol use and problems, reflecting the activation of a sensitized 
“wanting” system. In addition, the relationship between these IAT effects and alcohol-related 
attitudes and expectancies was examined as well as the relation to recent and early alcohol-
related experiences and social messages about alcohol use. IAT effects were expected to be 
related to both early alcohol experiences and social messages while self-reported attitudes 
and expectancies were expected to correlate with recent alcohol experiences. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Ninety-six students of Maastricht University (48 males; mean age = 20.4 years, SD = 2.51) 
participated in return for course credit or a gift certificate of 10€. Participants at least 
occasionally drank alcohol, including beer with an average weekly alcohol consumption of 
15.07 (SD = 10.55) Dutch standard drinks13. Participants had an mean score of 9.90 (SD = 
3.73) on the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De 
 
 
12 Unlike in the study of Jajodia and Earleywine (2003), the animals category used here did not exclusively consist of 
positively evaluated mammals but instead of atypical animals, which were evaluated as neutral. 
13 A standard alcoholic drink in Holland contains less alcohol than a standard English or American alcoholic drink: 
10 vs. 14g, respectively. 
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la Fuente, & Grant, 1993), which is comparable to American college students (Fleming, 
Barry, & MacDonald, 1991), and an average item score of .47 (SD = .33) on the 18-items 
version of the Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 2000). The average 
item score in clinical samples is about .80 (White & Labouvie, 1989). 
Materials and Measures 
Alcohol Use. Alcohol use was assessed with a self-report questionnaire based on the 
timeline follow-back method (Sobell & Sobell, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate how 
many drinks of different types of alcoholic drinks they consumed on each day of the past 
week, and for each day of the week, how many drinks they typically consumed on this day. 
 
Alcohol-Related Problems. Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the RAPI 
and the AUDIT. The RAPI described 18 alcohol-related problem situations and participants 
indicated how often they experienced these situations on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = never, 
4 = often) (Cronbach α = .67). The AUDIT consisted of 10 multiple choice questions. The 
first three questions related to alcohol use, the other seven to alcohol-related problems (α 
= .76). 
 
Implicit Alcohol Associations. Participants performed either an alcohol-soda IAT, 
an alcohol-animals IAT, a beer-soda IAT or a beer-animals IAT. All (Dutch) target 
categories were matched on familiarity, valence, arousal and number of syllables. Each 
IAT version assessed associations in four evaluative dimensions: positive vs. neutral, 
negative vs. neutral, arousal vs. neutral, and sedation vs. neutral. The positive (label 
‘pleasant’) and negative (label ‘unpleasant’) categories consisted of positive and negative 
nouns (cf. Greenwald et al., 1998) to assess general attitudes towards the target concepts. 
The arousal (label ‘active’14) and sedation (label ‘quiet’14) categories consisted of outcome 
expectancies (cf. Wiers et al., 2002) to assess associations with drinking outcomes. The 
(Dutch) positive, negative and their paired (in balanced order) neutral categories were 
matched on familiarity, arousal (neutral on arousal) and number of syllables. Likewise, the 
(Dutch) arousal, sedation and their paired (in balanced order) neutral categories were 
matched on familiarity, valence (neutral on valence) and number of syllables. All stimuli 
are presented in the Appendix. Internal consistencies, calculated as in Greenwald et al. 
(2003), were .46 for the positive dimension, .44 for the negative dimension, .52 for the 
arousal dimension, and .46 for the sedation dimension. 
All IAT versions were programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996) and consisted of 
seventeen blocks. Participants first received 24 trials of target discrimination practice using 
 
 
14 The labels ‘active’ and ‘quiet’ were chosen for the arousal and sedation category, respectively, because there are 
no suitable terms to denote ‘arousal’ and ‘sedation’ in Dutch. 
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a right and a left response key. All target stimuli were presented twice. In the second block, 
the attribute classification (e.g., pleasant vs. neutral) was practiced with the same response 
keys. All attribute stimuli were presented twice. The third block was a combination block 
during which both target and attribute stimuli were presented twice for a total of 48 trials. 
Next, participants practiced the reversed attribute discrimination, followed by the reversed 
combination block. Blocks 2 to 5 were then repeated for the other three attribute 
dimensions. Stimuli were presented randomly with the restriction that targets and attributes 
were presented in alternating order (Greenwald et al., 1998). Stimuli appeared in the 
middle of the computer screen, in black against a grey background. Instructions were 
presented before each task. Category labels were presented in the upper corners of the 
computer screen in agreement with the required response and remained there during the 
task. Stimuli remained on screen until a response was given. Feedback (‘wrong’, ‘too fast’ 
[< 300 ms] and ‘too slow’ [> 3000 ms]) was presented in red beneath the stimuli. The 
intertrialinterval was 250 ms. 
 
Thought-Listing. The thought-listing task (Rudman & Heppen, 2003) asked 
participants to report five thoughts that came to mind quickly and easily about recent and 
early alcohol-related experiences and social messages about alcohol. Participants then 
indicated for each thought whether it was positive or negative on a 6-point Likert scale (-3 
= extremely negative, +3 = extremely positive) They also rated the personal importance 
of all recent and early alcohol experiences on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all 
important, 5 = extremely important) and they estimated how often they encountered the 
social messages they listed on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = seldom, 5 = all the time). 
 
Explicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions. Explicit alcohol-related cognitions were 
assessed with an expectancy questionnaire, an attitude questionnaire and a feeling 
thermometer. The alcohol expectancy questionnaire consisted of 6 positive (α = .85), 6 
negative (α = .91), 7 arousal (α = .65) and 7 sedation expectancy items (α = .65). Each 
item asked participants to indicate on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed 
or disagreed with the statement: “After drinking alcohol, I feel . . .”. For the positive and 
negative items, this statement was completed with the words unhappy, depressive, sad, 
lonely, moody, down, pleasant, happy, sociable, friendly, enjoyable, and likable. For the 
arousal and sedation statements, the same words as presented during the IAT were used, 
including the labels. The alcohol attitude questionnaire consisted of 4 semantic differentials 
which asked participants to indicate on a VAS how much they considered drinking alcohol to 
be unpleasant-pleasant, bad-good, boring-fun, and stupid-smart. The first and third item 
formed an affective attitude component (α = .90), the other two items formed a cognitive 
attitude component (α = .77). Finally, two feeling thermometers, labeled in 10 degree 
increments ranging from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm), asked participants how favorable they felt 
about the target concepts (depending on condition: alcohol/beer and soda/animals). 
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Procedure 
Participants first filled out an informed consent form. Next, they performed one of the four IAT 
versions. The response assignment of the target categories was balanced across participants. 
The presentation order of the attribute dimensions was partially balanced with a Latin square, 
resulting in 4 orders. Participants first performed the IAT with alcohol/beer paired with the 
relevant attribute category (positive, negative, arousal and sedation) and then with 
alcohol/beer paired with the neutral category. Participants then received the thought-listing 
questionnaire, the feeling thermometer, the alcohol attitude questionnaire and the alcohol 
expectancy questionnaire. These questionnaires referred to either alcohol or beer, depending 
on the IAT condition. Finally, participants received the alcohol use questionnaire, the AUDIT 
and the RAPI, and rated all IAT stimuli on familiarity, valence and arousal. 
RESULTS 
Implicit Alcohol Associations 
First, it was examined whether there were differences in reported alcohol use and problems 
between IAT conditions using 2 (target: alcohol or beer) x 2 (contrast: soda or animals) 
univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA). Results showed no effect of target (p > .25) or 
contrast (p > .90) on reported alcohol use and a borderline significant effect of target (p = .06) 
but no effect of contrast (p > .90) on reported alcohol-related problems15. Next, IAT effects 
were calculated with the new D600 algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) in such a way that 
higher IAT scores reflect a stronger association between alcohol/beer and positive, negative, 
arousal, or sedation. Then, the effect of target and contrast category on IAT effects for each 
evaluative dimension (positive, negative, arousal and sedation) was examined with a 2 (target: 
alcohol or beer) x 2 (contrast: soda or animals) ANOVA16. No significant effect of target was 
found for the positive, arousal and sedation dimension (p > .90). For the positive and sedation 
dimension, the effect of contrast category was also not significant (p > .15), while borderline 
significant for the arousal dimension, F(1, 91) = 3.11, p = .081. For the negative dimension, 
there was a significant effect of both target, F(1, 91) = 4.28, p = .041, and contrast category, 
F(1, 91) = 14.14, p < .001. The interaction between target and contrast category was 
borderline significant, F(1, 91) = 3.76, p = .056. In sum, the target label and the choice of the 
contrast category only influenced results for the negative IAT dimension. 
 
 
15 There was a borderline significant trend that showed higher reporting of alcohol-related problems in the alcohol 
condition compared with the beer condition. Therefore, the factor target (alcohol vs. beer) was entered in the hierarchical 
regression analysis of alcohol problems in step 1. Results showed that the pattern of results remained the same. 
16 Preparatory analyses revealed the presence of an influential outlier who scored more than 4 standard deviations 
above the mean for the conventional measure on the arousal IAT dimension. This participant was excluded from the 
analyses. Outcomes were checked for the original sample including the outlier and results were generally the same. 
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For the positive, arousal and sedation dimension, the IAT effects were as follows 
(averaged across target and contrast categories): performance was faster when alcohol and 
positive words were assigned to the same response, t(94) = 7.67, p < .001 (d = .78), when 
alcohol and arousal were mapped onto the same response, t(94) = 7.15, p < .001 (d = .73), 
and when alcohol and sedation were paired, t(94) = 4.61, p < .001 (d = .47) compared to 
when alcohol and neutral words shared a response. These findings demonstrate that drinkers 
hold strong implicit alcohol associations with positive valence, and with arousal and also to a 
lesser extent with sedation. For the negative evaluative dimension, planned comparisons 
between the four IAT versions showed that the IAT effect was significantly smaller in the beer-
animals IAT than in both the beer-soda IAT, t(46) = 4.25, p < .001 and the alcohol-animals 
IAT, t(45) = 3.01, p = .004. No significant differences emerged between the alcohol-soda and 
the alcohol-animals IAT, t(45) = 1.23, p = .227, nor between the alcohol-soda IAT and the 
beer-soda IAT, t(46) = .087, p > .50. These results show that the IAT effect was smaller in the 
beer-animals IAT than in the other IAT versions. Nevertheless, IAT performance was faster when 
alcohol and negative words shared a response than when alcohol and neutral words shared 
response in all four IAT versions: t(23) = 10.03, p < .001 (d = 2.05) for the alcohol-soda IAT, 
t(22) = 9.48, p < .001 (d = 1.98) for the alcohol-animals IAT, t(23) = 11.06, p < .001 (d = 
2.26) for the beer-soda IAT and t(23) = 5.89, p < .001 (d = 1.2) for the beer-animals IAT. 
These results indicate that drinkers strongly associate alcohol with negative valence and that the 
size of this implicit association is sensitive to the wording of both the target and contrast 
category. IAT effects for all evaluative dimensions per IAT version are shown in Figure 1. Paired 
samples t-tests showed that IAT effects for the negative and the arousal dimension were 
significantly larger than IAT effects for the positive, t(94) = 5.41, p < .001, and the sedation 
dimension, t(94) = 2.60, p = .011, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean IAT effects (D600) separately for each evaluative IAT dimension and IAT version. 
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Explicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions 
Participants’ mean score for positive and arousal alcohol expectancies significantly 
deviated from the neutral midpoint of the scale (55), M = 73.29, SD = 13.88, t(94) = 
12.84, p < .001 (d = 1.32), and M = 59.59, SD = 12.29, t(94) = 3.63 , p < .001 (d 
= .37) respectively, indicating that they agreed with positive and arousal expectancies. 
Participants also significantly disagreed with negative and with sedation expectancy 
statements, M = 18.75, SD = 15.35, t(94) = -23.02, p < .001 (d = 2.36), and M = 
41.32, SD = 13.62, t(94) = -9.79, p < .001 (d = 1.01), respectively. Analysis of mean 
scores on the VAS for both the affective and cognitive alcohol attitude component showed 
that participants had a positive attitude towards alcohol, M = 80.57, SD = 14.02, t(94) 
= 14.65, p < .001 (d = 1.50), while knowing that drinking alcohol is unwise, M = 
46.33, SD = 17.07, t(94) = -4.95, p < .001 (d = .51). With respect to the feeling 
thermometers, paired samples t-tests showed that feelings towards animals (M = 77.92, 
SD = 15.05) were more favorable than feelings towards both alcohol (M = 66.88, SD = 
14.79), t(23) = -2.14, p = .044, and beer (M = 65.21, SD = 16.38), t(23) = -3.31, p 
= .003. Feelings towards soda (M = 65.32, SD = 14.23), in contrast, did not differ from 
feelings toward alcohol, t(23) = -.19, p > .50, or beer, t(22) = .42, p >.50. Before 
performing correlational analyses, all explicit measures and implicit D600 IAT scores were 
z-transformed per IAT condition (i.e. beer or alcohol vs. soda or animals). As can be seen 
in Table 1, IAT effects for both the positive and arousal dimension were significantly 
correlated with the affective attitude component and with feelings towards the target 
category, while a significant negative correlation emerged with feelings towards the 
contrast category. Also, IAT effects for both the positive and sedation dimension correlated 
positively with the cognitive attitude component. None of other correlations reached 
significance17. 
Alcohol Use and Related Problems 
Estimates of alcohol consumption during the past week and of average weekly alcohol 
consumption were calculated from the alcohol use questionnaire. The weighed mean of 
these two z-transformed estimates and the z-transformed sum score of the first three AUDIT 
items was calculated as an estimate of mean alcohol use. Correlations between this 
alcohol use estimate and implicit and explicit measures are presented in Table 1. The 
alcohol use estimate correlated positively with the arousal IAT, with positive and arousal 
expectancies, with both the affective and cognitive attitude component and with feelings 
toward the target category. Alcohol use was also negatively correlated with negative 
expectancies. 
 
 
17 When the non-standardized explicit and implicit measures were used in the analysis, the pattern of results was generally the same. 
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 The alcohol use estimate was then entered into a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. 
All z-transformed explicit measures and implicit associations were entered in the first run of 
the regression analysis. All variables that did not predict (p > .30) alcohol use were left 
out in the second run of the regression analysis. Results of the second run of the regression 
analysis for the prediction of alcohol use are shown in Table 217. In step 1, only gender 
was entered which significantly predicted alcohol use (men drink more than women). In 
step 2, the explicit arousal expectancies, affective attitude component and target feeling 
thermometer were entered which significantly increased the variance explained. Both 
arousal expectancies and the affective attitude component significantly predicted alcohol 
use. In step 3, entering implicit positive and arousal associations significantly increased the 
variance explained. Implicit arousal associations significantly predicted alcohol use while 
implicit positive associations were borderline significant predictors. 
Table 2 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for explicit and implicit measures predicting alcohol use. 
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Gender -.40 .17 -.24 .10 -2.43 .017 
2 Gender -.27 .14 -.16 .08 -1.94 .056 
 Arousal expectancies .18 .07 .22 .09 2.52 .013 
 Affective attitude .28 .10 .33 .12 2.81 .006 
 Target feeling thermometer  .17 .10 .20 .11 1.79 .076 
3 Gender -.26 .14 -.16 .09 -1.84 .069 
 Arousal expectancies .16 .07 .20 .09 2.32 .023 
 Affective attitude .27 .10 .33 .11 2.87 .005 
 Target feeling thermometer .19 .10 .22 .12 1.91 .060 
 Implicit positive associations -.14 .08 -.16 .09 -1.81 .073 
 Implicit arousal associations .15 .07 .18 .09 2.07 .041 
Note. F(1, 93) = 5.88, p = .017, R2 = .06 for step 1; Fchange(3, 90) = 18.14, p < .001, R
2
change
 = .35; Fchange(2, 88) 
= 3.25, p = .043, R2change
 = .04 for step 3. Final model R2 = .45, R2adjusted = .42, F(6, 94) = 12.21, p < .001. 
An estimate of alcohol-related problems was computed as the weighed mean of the z-
transformed RAPI sum score and the z-transformed sum score of the last seven AUDIT 
items. Because this estimate was not normally distributed, the RAPI and AUDIT sum scores 
were log-transformed before z-transformation. Correlations between the alcohol-related 
problems estimate and implicit and explicit measures are presented in Table 1. Alcohol-
related problems correlated positively with arousal and sedation IAT scores, positive and 
arousal expectancies, the affective attitude component, and feelings toward the target 
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category. The alcohol-related problems estimate was entered into a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis, using the same procedure as described above. Results of the second 
run of the regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems are shown in 
Table 317. In step 1, gender was entered which did not predict alcohol-related problems. 
In step 2, arousal and negative expectancies, and the affective attitude component were 
entered, which significantly increased the variance explained. Both arousal expectancies 
and the affective attitude component predicted alcohol-related problems. Entering implicit 
sedation associations in step 3 significantly increased the variance explained. 
Table 3 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for explicit and implicit measures predicting alcohol-related problems. 
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Gender -.27 .19 -.15 .10 -1.48 .142 
2 Gender -.18 .18 -.10 .10 -1.01 .315 
 Arousal expectancies .20 .09 .22 .10 2.19 .031 
 Negative expectancies .14 .09 .16 .10 1.57 .120 
 Affective attitude .26 .10 .29 .11 2.64 .010 
3 Gender -.17 .17 -.09 .10 -.95 .345 
 Arousal expectancies .22 .09 .24 .10 2.44 .016 
 Negative expectancies .09 .09 .10 .10 1.01 .315 
 Affective attitude .21 .10 .23 .11 2.20 .030 
 Implicit sedation associations .24 .09 .26 .10 2.73 .008 
Note. F(1, 93) = 2.20, p = .142, R2 = .02 for step 1; Fchange(3, 90) = 5.91, p = .001, R
2
change
 = .16; Fchange(1, 89) 
= 7.42, p = .008, R2change
 = .06 for step 3. Final model R2 = .25, R2adjusted = .20, F(5, 94) = 5.83, p < .001. 
Thought-Listing 
Indices were formed by multiplying valence scores of every recent and early thought with its 
assigned personal significance. For social messages, indexes were calculated by 
multiplying each message’s valence with its frequency. Mean indices were then computed 
for recent experiences, earliest experiences and social messages. Recent experiences were 
more positive than both early experiences, t(95) = 5.50, p < .001, and social messages, 
t(95) = 5.99. No difference was found between the valence of early experiences and 
social messages, t(95) = 1.08, p = .283. Correlations of z-transformed thought indices 
and implicit and explicit measures are presented in Table 417. Recent and early alcohol 
experiences correlated positively with positive IAT scores, the two attitude components and 
feelings towards alcohol. Also, recent alcohol experiences correlated positively with 
positive expectancies and negatively with negative expectancies, whereas early alcohol 
CHAPTER 6 
 104 
experiences correlated positively with both arousal IAT scores and alcohol use. 
Unexpectedly, social messages correlated positively with both the cognitive attitude 
component and negative IAT scores. 
Table 4 
Correlations between reported thoughts and implicit and explicit measures. 
 Recent experiences Early experiences Social messages 
Positive IAT .27** .33** .02 
Negative IAT .00 -.15 .22* 
Arousal IAT .14 .23* -.04 
Sedation IAT .09 .20 .13 
Positive expectancies .34** .18 -.07 
Negative expectancies -.23* -.08 -.10 
Arousal expectancies .11 .13 -.05 
Sedation expectancies .01 .02 .01 
Affective attitude  .33** .39** .07 
Cognitive attitude .22* .24* .24* 
Feelings target .36** .32** -.03 
Feelings contrast -.09 -.19 .14 
Alcohol use .16 .23* -.08 
Alcohol problems .08 .19 -.07 
Note. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
DISCUSSION 
The present results show that drinkers hold strong implicit associations between alcohol and 
negative valence (d > 1), with the exact size of this effect depending on the choice of the 
target categories (alcohol or beer vs. animals or sodas). Additionally, drinkers held significant 
(but weaker) associations between alcohol and positive valence, arousal, and to a lesser 
extent sedation, and these associations did not depend on the choice of the target 
categories. These findings indicate ambivalence in both the valence and the arousal-sedation 
dimension, underscoring the need to assess implicit alcohol associations in a unipolar 
format. Also, these results provide support that implicit alcohol associations are not merely 
IAT artifacts related to choice of the contrast target category and the target category labels. 
Nevertheless, the strong negative alcohol associations found in the IAT still contrast sharply 
with the scores on self-report measures. An alternative explanation for the present results is 
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that the IAT reflects non-associative factors, instead of alcohol associations. This explanation 
is not implausible given that negative words typically acts as figure (Rothermund & Wentura, 
2004) and that alcohol may be more salient in heavy drinkers (attentional bias). 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 assessed salience asymmetries between categories that formed an IAT dimension in 
study 1 with the visual search task. This task simultaneously presents four stimuli and 
participants have to decide if all stimuli belong to the same category or not. Since it takes 
longer to process salient stimuli than non-salient stimuli, responses will be slower when the 
majority of stimuli (i.e., distractors) belong to the figure category than when they belong to 
the ground category (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Hence, salience asymmetries are 
assessed by comparing performance when distractors belong to one category of an IAT 
dimension with performance when distractors belong to the other category of that dimension. 
METHOD 
Participants 
A sample of 39 participants of study 1 (15 male; mean age = 20.5 years, SD = 2.31), 
participated in return for course credit or a gift certificate of 7.5€. 
Materials and Measures 
Visual Search Tasks. Participants performed eight visual search tasks, one for each 
IAT dimension presented in study 1. Four visual search tasks assessed salience 
asymmetries between the target categories, the other four measured salience asymmetries 
between attribute categories. Visual search tasks were programmed in ERTS 3.18 
(Beringer, 1996), following Rothermund and Wentura (2004). Before each visual search 
task, participants received 20 trials of a simple categorization task to practice the 
categorization of the stimuli. During these practice trials, each stimulus was presented 
twice. Participants were instructed to classify these stimuli with two response keys as quickly 
and as accurate as possible. After a wrong response, feedback was displayed beneath the 
stimulus (‘ERROR—press correct key and continue’) and the stimulus remained on the 
screen until the correct response was given. The intertrialinterval was 250 ms. 
Next, the corresponding visual search task was performed. Each visual search task 
consisted of 12 practice and 64 test trials. During each trial, four stimuli were presented 
simultaneously. On half the trials, all four stimuli belonged to the same category (‘same’ 
trials), on the other half, three stimuli belonged to one category and the fourth (i.e., 
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target) stimulus belonged to the other category (‘different’ trials). Participants indicated 
with two response keys whether all stimuli belonged to the same category or not. On 
half of the trials, distractors (three or four out of four stimuli) belonged to the first 
category of the respective dimension, on the other half of the trials, the distractors 
belonged to the second category. Stimuli were presented in the form of a square on half 
of the trials, and in the form of a diamond on the other half of the trials. During the 
different trials, the target appeared twice at each of the four possible locations. Each 
trial started with a ready signal (‘X’) displayed in the middle of the screen which was 
replaced by a cue (‘*’) when participants pressed the space bar. After 500 ms, four 
stimuli were presented around the cue. Stimuli were always presented in black against a 
grey background. Instructions were presented before each visual search task. Response 
labels (same or different) were presented in the upper corners of the computer screen, in 
accordance with the response assignment and remained there for the duration of the 
task. Stimuli remained on screen until the correct response was given. In case of an 
error, feedback (‘ERROR—press correct key and continue’) was presented in red 
beneath the stimuli until the correct response was given. 
Procedure 
After filling out an informed consent form, participants performed all visual search 
tasks. The order of visual search tasks was partially balanced with a Latin square, resulting 
in 8 orders. The response assignment of same and different trials was balanced. 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Similar to Rothermund and Wentura (2004), trials with erroneous responses were left out of 
the analyses. For each visual search task, same and different trials were analyzed together, by 
computing mean reaction times for trials with distractors of the first category of the dimension 
(e.g., alcohol) and for trials with distractors of the other category (e.g., soda). No significant 
differences in responding were found between the target categories: t(38) = 1.67, p = .103 
for the alcohol-soda dimension, t(38) = -.92, p = .363 for the alcohol-animals dimension, 
t(38) = -1.61, p = .115 for the beer-soda dimension, and t(38) = -1.28, p = .210 for the 
beer-animals dimension. Thus, there was no evidence for salience asymmetries within the 
target dimensions. For the attribute dimensions, results indicated that responding to neutral 
distractors was significantly slower than responding to positive, t(38) = -3.86, p < .001, 
negative, t(38) = -2.21, p = .033, and sedation distractors, t(38) = -2.87, p = .007. No 
such effect was found for the arousal-neutral dimension, t(38) = -.76, p = .452. Hence, the 
neutral attribute categories appeared to be more salient than the positive, negative and 
sedation category. It should be noted, however, that the neutral stimuli possibly constituted a 
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more heterogeneous sets than the positive, negative, arousal and sedation categories which 
could also have impaired performance during neutral trials. Nevertheless, no salience 
asymmetry was found for the arousal dimension. The present findings, consequently, imply 
that salience asymmetries cannot account for the IAT effects found in study 1. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present research aimed at replicating and extending previous results with bipolar 
alcohol-IATs that showed that alcohol, relative to soda, is associated with both negative 
valence and arousal (De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). Here, negative 
alcohol associations were replicated with unipolar IATs that contrasted negative words with 
neutral words. Moreover, testing alcohol associations in a unipolar format also revealed 
positive alcohol associations, demonstrating that implicit alcohol associations are 
ambivalent. Further, as hypothesized, the labeling of the target category (alcohol or beer) 
and the choice of the contrast category (animals or sodas) influenced the strength of 
negative alcohol associations. Nevertheless, in all IAT versions, strong negative alcohol 
associations emerged, suggesting that they reflect something ‘real’ in the memory of 
drinkers rather than an IAT artifact. Possibly, negative implicit alcohol associations rise with 
alcohol use until some threshold is reached after which they begin to influence behavior 
(Jones & McMahon, 1996). Here, however, no support was found for an increase in 
implicit negative alcohol associations with increased alcohol use. Alternatively, implicit 
negative alcohol-related cognitions could stem from early (negative) alcohol experiences 
and explicit positive alcohol-related cognitions from recent (positive) experiences. The 
present pattern of results, however, was not fully consistent with this hypothesis, implying 
that the distinction between implicit and explicit cognitions and their origins is not as clear-
cut for alcohol as for smoking (cf. Rudman, 2004). Hence, the question remains what 
these robust negative alcohol associations really mean. A remaining possibility is that they 
reflect negative reinforcement expectancies. Since targets and attributes alternate in the 
IAT, targets both precede and follow attributes. An observed association between alcohol 
and an attribute can therefore reflect both an association with an expected outcome (e.g., 
alcohol-positive: alcohol causes a positive mood) or with an antecedent mood state (e.g., 
positive-alcohol: in a positive mood, drink alcohol). 
Second, assessing alcohol associations in a unipolar format also revealed implicit 
alcohol associations with both arousal and sedation. Importantly, arousal associations 
predicted alcohol use while sedation associations predicted alcohol-related problems, 
above explicit measures. Further, implicit arousal associations were paralleled by explicit 
arousal expectancies and both were predictive of alcohol use. These results both replicate 
and extend previous findings (e.g., Wiers et al. 2002, 2005) and provide additional 
evidence for the development of arousal associations with drinking experience. The present 
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results may reflect the operation of a “wanting” (sensitized arousal) system that becomes 
sensitized with repeated alcohol use and shows a progressive increase in the psychomotor 
activating response to alcohol (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003). Alcohol-related 
problems, on the other hand, were best predicted by implicit sedation associations, which 
could be related to research demonstrating that negative reinforcement motivations are 
strong predictors of alcohol-related problems (e.g., Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 
1995). Together, these findings suggest that especially drinkers who consume alcohol to 
cope with negative affect are at risk of experiencing alcohol-related problems and 
developing a maladaptive drinking pattern. 
A second study examined whether the present findings with unipolar IATs could be 
explained by figure-ground asymmetries. This was generally not the case, and certainly not 
for the alcohol-arousal associations. In sum, the present results underscore the usefulness 
of assessing alcohol associations in a unipolar fashion, support an explanation of implicit 
alcohol associations as meaningful memory constructs and refute artifact explanations in 
terms of target bipolarity, label effects and figure-ground effects. 
Strengths and Limitations of the IAT and Issues for Future Research 
The IAT is useful for examining implicit associations but it does not come without 
limitations (cf. De Houwer, 2002). The present research showed that some of these 
limitations are not necessarily insuperable by demonstrating that the IAT, with minor 
revisions, can be used to assess ambivalent alcohol associations. However, it should be 
noted that the unipolar alcohol-IATs that were used here showed smaller internal 
consistencies than those reported for the bipolar alcohol-IAT (about .80; Wiers et al., 
2005). Further, careful consideration should be given to the choice of the contrast target 
category. The present results show that contrasting alcohol with either soda or animals 
makes little difference. However, it should be noted that soda is a natural contrast to 
alcohol whereas the category animals is not. When a target category does not have a 
clear contrast (e.g., smoking), using such a neutral contrast may be useful, yet difficult (cf. 
Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001). This issue should be examined in future studies, 
but in the meantime, testing alternative association measures that do not require two 
contrasting target concepts could be a useful strategy (e.g., De Houwer, 2003; Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001). Finally, using visual search tasks as a supplement to the IAT is 
recommended to examine confounding due to salience asymmetries. 
In conclusion, implicit alcohol associations can be assessed in a meaningful way with 
unipolar IATs. This research strategy can be used in future studies on the role of implicit and 
explicit cognitions in the etiology and maintenance of alcohol abuse. Hopefully, further 
research on assessment issues of implicit alcohol-related cognitions will lead to a better 
understanding of automatic processes in addictive behaviors and their treatment. 
FACT OR ARTIFACT 
 109 
APPENDIX 
IAT Target Stimuli 
Alcohol: wine, Bacardi, whisky, Heineken, Hoegaarden, Amstel (the last three are beer 
brands). 
Beer: trappist, pint, Jupiler, Heineken, Hoegaarden, Amstel 
Soda: Spa (sparkling water), Fanta, Coca Cola, Sprite, apple juice, sinas (lemonade) 
Animals: cricket, duck, lizard, rhino, ostrich, hedgehog 
IAT Valence Attribute Stimuli 
Pleasant: love, sunshine, warmth, peace, hug, rainbow 
Unpleasant: war, depression, pain, fight, disease, sorrow 
Neutral valence 1: paper, circle, ballpoint, factory, truck, magnet 
Neutral valence 2: letter, square, page, machine, scissors, window 
IAT Arousal/Sedation Attribute Stimuli 
Active: talkative, jovial, restless, alert, unrestrained, rambunctious 
Quiet: silent, listless, sleepy, passive, relaxed, calm 
Neutral arousal 1: constant, wide, brown, digital, recent, usual 
Neutral arousal 2: oval, compact, related, central, daily, steep 
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ABSTRACT 
Previous studies demonstrated that implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol, assessed with 
unipolar Implicit Association Tests (IATs), are involved in drinking behavior while implicit 
negative alcohol attitudes are not. However, because the IAT is a relative measure, the 
present study aimed at replicating these findings with non-relative unipolar Single Target-
IATs (ST-IATs). Further, ST-IATs were performed with either alcohol or beer as the target 
concept to examine whether previous results could be due to extrapersonal contamination 
of the IAT caused by cultural connotations of the concept alcohol. It was expected that 
beer ST-IATs would be less affected by extrapersonal contamination since all participants 
included in the study were regular beer drinkers. Consistent with previous findings, both 
alcohol and beer ST-IATs supported the coexistence of implicit positive and implicit 
negative alcohol-related attitudes. Importantly, positive beer ST-IAT scores were related to 
drinking behavior, while positive alcohol ST-IAT scores were not. Hence, the present results 
suggest that the positive beer ST-IAT assessed more personally relevant implicit attitudes 
that play a role in drinking behavior compared to the positive alcohol ST-IAT. 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade, there has been a surge of interest in implicit cognitive processes involved in 
addictive behaviors. This research interest was primarily fueled by the advent of indirect 
measures that are designed to minimize controlled responding. Additionally, research 
suggests that indirect measures can assess implicit cognitions that influence behavior 
automatically (e.g. Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006) and can, therefore, provide 
unique insights into the cognitive processes underlying addictive behaviors. Counter 
intuitively, several studies using the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) to study implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes demonstrated that 
heavy (and light) drinkers display implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol, suggesting that 
implicit alcohol attitudes are not a driving force behind drinking behavior (e.g., De Houwer, 
Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004; Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002). 
However, the bipolarity of the evaluative dimension in the IAT (i.e., positive vs. negative) 
could have prevented these studies from finding behavior-relevant implicit alcohol attitudes, 
given that attitudes toward alcohol could be highly ambivalent. In line with this idea, studies 
using IATs with the evaluative categories in a unipolar format (e.g., positive vs. neutral), 
demonstrated that implicit positive alcohol attitudes are an important determinant of drinking 
behavior (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). Implicit negative 
alcohol attitudes, on the other hand, did not show a relationship with drinking behavior. 
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However, the relationship between IAT scores and drinking behavior could have 
been deflated in previous studies due to procedural limitations of the IAT. First, given its 
relative nature, the alcohol-IAT can reflect both implicit alcohol attitudes and/or implicit 
soda attitudes. Therefore, the present study aimed to replicate previous findings using the 
non-relative Single-Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006) 
which is structurally similar to the IAT with the difference that it measures implicit attitudes 
toward single target concepts. Here, we used unipolar ST-IATs to assess implicit alcohol 
attitudes. Further, research suggests that alcohol-IAT scores could at least partly reflect 
extrapersonal associations with alcohol that are irrelevant to behavior (Houben & Wiers, 
2006b). Therefore, unipolar ST-IATs were used to measure implicit attitudes toward 
alcohol or beer. Since only participants who regularly drank beer were included in the 
study, it was expected that unipolar beer ST-IATs would be less contaminated by 
extrapersonal associations and would, thus, correlate more strongly with drinking behavior 
compared to unipolar alcohol ST-IATs. 
METHOD 
Participants were 48 students who drank beer on a regular basis (24 male; mean age = 
20.25 years, SD = 2.23). Alcohol use was measured with the timeline follow-back method 
(Sobell & Sobell, 1990). In the week prior to the study, participants on average consumed 
16.67 (SD = 13.09) standard servings, including 12.71 (SD = 12.59) beer 
consumptions. Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the 18-item Rutgers Alcohol 
Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 1989; mean item score = .46, SD = .27) and 
the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la 
Fuente, & Grant, 1993; mean score = 10.04, SD = 3.25). Participants were randomly 
divided into an alcohol condition or a beer condition. Implicit attitudes toward alcohol or 
beer (depending on condition) were assessed with a positive and a negative ST-IAT. All 
stimuli are listed in the Appendix. The positive and negative ST-IATs consisted of 4 blocks 
(see Table 1) and were modeled after the ST-IAT by Wigboldus et al. (2006). Explicit 
expectancies with respect to alcohol or beer (depending on condition) were assessed with 
an expectancy questionnaire. Participants indicated on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how 
much they agreed (0 = completely disagree, 100 = completely agree) with 6 positive and 
6 negative expectancy items. Each item consisted of the statement: “After drinking alcohol 
(beer), I feel . . .”, which was completed with the following words: pleasant, happy, 
sociable, friendly, enjoyable, and likable for the positive expectancy items, and unhappy, 
depressive, sad, lonely, moody, and down for the negative expectancy items. Explicit 
attitudes toward alcohol or beer (depending on condition) were assessed with an attitude 
questionnaire and a feeling thermometer. The attitude questionnaire consisted of 4 
semantic differentials: Participants indicated on a VAS how much they considered drinking 
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alcohol (beer) to be unpleasant-pleasant, boring-fun, bad-good, and stupid-smart (the first 
two items formed an affective attitude component while the last two items formed a 
cognitive component). On the feeling thermometer, participants indicated how favorable 
they felt toward alcohol (beer) (0 = very cold, 100 = very warm). 
Table 1 
Overview of ST-IAT phases. 
Block Trials Function Left key Right key 
1 24 Attribute practice pleasant neutral 
2 24 Compatible combination task alcohol 
pleasant 
 
neutral 
3 24 Reversed attribute practice neutral pleasant 
4 24 Incompatible combination task alcohol 
neutral 
 
pleasant 
Note. Blocks are shown for the positive alcohol ST-IAT. In the beer condition, the alcohol target category was 
replaced by the beer target category. To keep the number of right and left responses equal, stimuli of the two 
categories that shared a response were presented twice, while stimuli of the unpaired neutral category were 
presented four times. Blocks 1 to 4 were repeated in the negative ST-IAT with the attribute categories ‘unpleasant’ 
and ‘neutral’. The order of the positive and negative ST-IATs and the response assignment of the target category 
were balanced across participants. The response assignment of the attribute categories was counterbalanced so that 
half the participants always received the compatible combination task before the incompatible combination task 
whereas the other half received the reversed task order. 
RESULTS 
ST-IAT effects were calculated with the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003) so that higher ST-IAT scores indicate stronger evaluative (positive or 
negative) associations with alcohol or beer. No difference emerged between the alcohol 
condition and the beer condition on positive ST-IAT scores, t(46) = .29, p = .773, or 
negative ST-IAT scores, t(46) = .45, p = .653. Results showed implicit positive attitudes 
toward both alcohol, t(23) = 4.57, p < .001, and beer, t(23) = 5.34, p < .001, as well 
as implicit negative attitudes toward both alcohol, t(23) = 5.87, p < .001, and beer, t(23) 
= 4.84, p < .001. With respect to explicit measures, results indicated that participants, to 
the same extent, expected positive effects, but not negative effects, from drinking alcohol 
and beer and that attitudes toward alcohol and soda were equally favorable (see Table 2). 
Except for a correlation between positive ST-IAT scores and cognitive attitude scores, in the 
alcohol condition, none of the correlations between implicit and explicit cognitions 
reached significance (see Table 3 & 4). 
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Table 2 
Mean values for explicit positive and negative expectancies, the affective and cognitive attitude component, and the 
feeling thermometer, separately for the alcohol and beer conditions. 
 Alcohol Beer  
 M SD  M SD  t p 
Positive expectancies 76.56 13.49 73.28 13.66 .83 .412 
Negative expectancies 18.65 13.81 17.85 15.20 .19 .851 
Affective attitude 86.06 11.76 79.33 22.98 1.27 .210 
Cognitive attitude 47.00 14.48 47.11 19.38 -.02 .983 
Feeling thermometer 72.08 10.21 65.00 17.97 1.67 .102 
 
An alcohol use estimate was calculated as the mean of log-transformed average alcohol 
consumption in the past week and log-transformed average weekly alcohol consumption. An 
estimate of alcohol-related problems was computed as the mean of z-transformed RAPI and 
AUDIT sum scores. Alcohol use and alcohol-related problems were significantly correlated, r = 
.60, p = .002. In the alcohol condition, explicit alcohol-related cognitions, but not ST-IAT 
scores, were significantly related to drinking behavior. Specifically, participants who held stronger 
positive attitudes toward alcohol and weaker negative expectancies consumed more alcohol (see 
Table 3). In the beer condition, alcohol use was related to both explicit beer-related cognitions 
and positive ST-IAT scores, indicating that participants who displayed stronger positive attitudes 
toward beer, both implicitly and explicitly, consumed more alcohol (see Table 4). 
Table 3 
Correlations between ST-IAT scores, explicit expectancies and attitudes, and alcohol use and alcohol-related 
problems in the alcohol condition. 
Alcohol ST-IAT Alcohol expectancies Alcohol attitude Variable 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Affective Cognitive
Feelings 
toward 
alcohol 
Negative alcohol ST-IAT  .27 -      
Positive alcohol expectancies .00 -.16 -     
Negative alcohol expectancies -.18 -.15 -.62** -    
Affective alcohol attitude .12 -.22 .46* -.57** -   
Cognitive alcohol attitude .51* .23 -.08 -.21 .26 -  
Feelings toward alcohol .34 .01 .42* -.51* .69** .39 - 
Alcohol use -.05 -.16 .18 -.54** .63** .17 .43* 
Alcohol-related problems -.24 -.04 .18 -.19 .47* -.07 .40 
Note. ** =Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * =Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Correlations between ST-IAT scores, explicit expectancies and attitudes, and alcohol use and alcohol-related 
problems in the beer condition. 
Beer ST-IAT Beer expectancies Beer attitude Variable 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Affective Cognitive
 Feelings 
toward beer 
Negative beer ST-IAT  .12 -       
Positive beer expectancies -.03 .06 -      
Negative beer expectancies -.15 -.06 -.20 -     
Affective beer attitude .18 .05 .42* .05 -    
Cognitive beer attitude .15 .26 .25 .08 .63** -   
Feelings toward beer .32 .12 .56** -.07 .72** .44*  - 
Alcohol use .42* .23 -.02 -.11 .47* .37  .25 
Alcohol-related problems .19 .24 .04 -.02 .20 .27  .03 
Note. ** =Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * =Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
DISCUSSION 
Previous studies using unipolar IATs suggest that implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol 
play a role in drinking behavior whereas implicit negative alcohol attitudes do not (e.g., 
Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). The present study, we measured 
single implicit attitudes toward alcohol or beer with unipolar ST-IATs to examine to what 
extent previous findings were affected by the relative nature of unipolar IATs as well as 
extrapersonal contamination of unipolar IAT scores. Specifically, it was expected that beer 
ST-IATs would be less affected by extrapersonal contamination and would, thus, assess 
behavior-relevant implicit attitudes to a greater extent compared to alcohol ST-IATs, since 
all participants were regular beer drinkers. Results showed no indication that alcohol ST-
IAT scores and beer ST-IAT scores were differentially affected by extrapersonal 
contamination and the coexistence of implicit positive attitudes and implicit negative 
attitudes toward both alcohol and beer was demonstrated. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
however, positive beer ST-IAT scores were related to alcohol use while positive alcohol ST-
IAT scores were not. Negative alcohol and beer ST-IAT scores were unrelated to drinking 
behavior. Hence, the present results replicate previous findings with the unipolar IAT, 
indicating that implicit positive alcohol-related attitudes, but not implicit negative attitudes, 
play a role in drinking behavior (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia & Earleywine, 
2003) and show that these results were not due to the relative nature of the IAT. 
Importantly, the current results also extend previous findings by demonstrating that, 
in the present sample, beer ST-IATs, but not alcohol ST-IATs, assessed personally relevant 
implicit attitudes that were also important determinants of drinking behavior. Importantly, 
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participants’ alcohol consumption was almost completely confined to drinking beer rather 
than different kinds of alcoholic drinks. Thus, these findings imply that, in the (ST-)IAT, 
target categories should be as specific as possible given the behavior that needs to be 
explained. Consistent with this implication, Fadardi, Cox, and Klinger (2006) have argued 
that it is questionable to what extent an IAT that presents standard stimuli can capture 
participants’ personal implicit attitudes, since standard stimuli will probably differ in the 
degree to which they are both known and liked across participants. While the current 
findings indicate that it is useful to customize the target category of interest, it might be 
even more valuable to personalize individual target stimuli as well, in order to make sure 
that (ST-)IAT scores reflect personally endorsed implicit attitudes that are relevant to 
behavior. 
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APPENDIX 
ST-IAT Target Stimuli 
Alcohol category (label ‘alcohol’): wine, Bacardi, whisky, Heineken, Hoegaarden, Amstel 
(the last three are beer brands). 
Beer category (label ‘beer’): Trappist, Pils, Jupiler, Heineken, Hoegaarden, Amstel 
ST-IAT Attribute Stimuli 
Positive category (label ‘pleasant’): love, sunshine, warmth, peace, hug, rainbow 
Negative category (label ‘unpleasant’): war, depression, pain, fight, disease, sorrow 
Neutral category 1 (label ‘neutral’): paper, circle, ballpoint, factory, truck, magnet 
Neutral category 2 (label ‘neutral’): letter, square, page, machine, scissors, window 
 
The positive and negative attribute categories were paired with the neutral attribute 
categories in balanced order. The (Dutch) attribute categories were matched on familiarity, 
arousal, and number of syllables. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Implicit Positive Alcohol Attitudes as 
Determinants of Alcohol Consumption: 
Beyond the Soda Contrast in the IAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for publication as: Houben, K., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). Implicit positive alcohol 
attitudes as determinants of alcohol consumption: Beyond the soda contrast in the IAT. 
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ABSTRACT 
Research using unipolar Implicit Association Tests (IATs), has demonstrated that implicit 
positive alcohol attitudes but not implicit negative alcohol attitudes are involved in drinking 
behavior. However, the relative nature of the IAT with respect to target concepts (i.e., 
alcohol vs. soda) obscures the interpretation of IAT scores and their relationship to 
behavior. Here, unipolar alcohol-soda IATs were contrasted with unipolar Single Target 
IATs (ST-IAT) for alcohol alone. While the alcohol-soda IATs yielded only implicit negative 
alcohol attitudes, both positive and negative implicit alcohol attitudes emerged in the 
alcohol ST-IATs. Moreover, alcohol-soda IATs were uncorrelated with both alcohol ST-IATs 
and unipolar soda ST-IATs, suggesting that single implicit attitudes assessed with the ST-
IAT are qualitatively different from implicit attitudes assessed with the IAT. Importantly, 
implicit positive alcohol attitudes assessed with both the alcohol-soda IAT and the alcohol 
ST-IAT predicted alcohol use above explicit alcohol-related cognitions. Together, the 
present findings demonstrate that the unipolar IAT which measures implicit attitudes toward 
alcohol relative to soda, and the ST-IAT which assesses single implicit attitudes toward 
alcohol, provide unique contributions to the prediction of drinking behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent research suggests that indirect measures can be used to register implicit cognitions 
that are activated automatically and which can influence behavior outside conscious 
awareness (e.g., Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). Indirect measures can thus 
provide unique insights in cognitive processes involved in addictive behaviors such as 
alcohol use and abuse since these underlying processes are likely to develop automaticity 
with increased substance use (e.g., Evans & Coventry, 2006; Stacy, 1997). Many studies 
that have addressed the role of implicit cognitions involved in alcohol use and abuse have 
done so using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The 
reason that the IAT is the most commonly used indirect measure is that it is easy to 
administer, produces large and robust effects and has been shown to provide a reliable 
and valid measure of implicit cognitions (e.g., Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006; Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005). The underlying logic of the IAT is that it should be easier to classify stimuli 
into two target concepts (e.g., flowers and insects) and two attribute categories (e.g., 
positive and negative) when associated concepts are assigned to the same response (e.g., 
flowers + positive and insects + negative) than when associated concepts are assigned to 
different responses (e.g., flowers + negative and insects + positive). 
BEYOND THE SODA CONTRAST 
 123 
Evidence from the first studies that examined implicit alcohol-related cognitions using 
the IAT suggested that implicit evaluative associations with alcohol, or implicit attitudes, 
did not appear to be involved in drinking behavior. More specifically, Wiers, van 
Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong (2002) demonstrated that both light and heavy drinkers 
more easily paired alcohol with a negative evaluative category and soda with a positive 
evaluative category than vice versa. Differentiation between light and heavy drinkers, 
however, was established with a second IAT that assessed implicit associations between 
alcohol and arousal: Heavy drinkers were faster when alcohol shared a response with 
arousal and soda with sedation than in the reversed combination. Importantly light 
drinkers did not show this IAT effect. Moreover, these findings were replicated both in a 
sample of heavy drinkers (Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 
2005) as well as in a sample of patients undergoing treatment (De Houwer, Crombez, 
Koster, & De Beul, 2004). Hence, in line with the incentive-sensitization account (Robinson 
& Berridge, 1993), Wiers et al. (2002) suggested that implicit attitudes toward alcohol, or 
“liking”, were not an important determinant of drinking behavior, at least not as important 
as implicit alcohol associations with arousal which presumably reflected the operation of a 
sensitized “wanting” system. 
However, it is important to note that the standard IAT procedure measures the 
strength of the target concepts with two evaluative categories, positive and negative. 
Consequently, IAT effects only indicate whether target concepts are more associated with 
one evaluative category relative to the other evaluative category. As such, this bipolarity of 
the evaluative dimension potentially precludes the assessment of behavior-relevant implicit 
attitudes toward alcohol given that attitudes toward alcohol can be highly ambivalent (e.g., 
Conner & Sparks, 2002). In line with this idea, recent studies that have eliminated the 
bipolarity of the evaluative dimension in the alcohol-soda IAT, suggest a more important 
role of implicit attitudes in alcohol use and abuse. Specifically, in unipolar IATs, both 
evaluative categories are tested against neutral categories so that a positive unipolar IAT 
can assess the strength of implicit positive attitudes toward the target concepts and a 
negative unipolar IAT can measure the strength of implicit negative attitudes toward the 
target concepts. Importantly, results with unipolar alcohol-soda IATs demonstrated that 
implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol were at least moderately related to drinking 
behavior while implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol were not (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 
2006c; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). Hence, these findings suggest that implicit positive 
attitudes play a role in alcohol use and abuse, but that they are overshadowed by strong 
implicit negative evaluative associations with alcohol in a standard bipolar IAT. In 
addition, these strong implicit negative evaluative associations with alcohol could reflect 
extrapersonal associations with alcohol that are not part of one’s personal attitudes toward 
alcohol and that are irrelevant to behavior (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006b). 
Although the available evidence seems to support the role of implicit positive 
attitudes toward alcohol in drinking behavior and not of implicit negative alcohol attitudes, 
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it should be noted that the IAT procedure has another important limitation that 
compromises this interpretation of alcohol-IAT effects and their relationship with behavior. 
Specifically, the IAT procedure cannot reveal implicit evaluative associations with single 
target concepts such as alcohol, but is instead limited to measuring the relative strengths of 
pairs of implicit associations. While this relative nature of the IAT is not a problem for most 
research questions as many attitude concepts have a complementary category that can be 
used as a contrast in the IAT (e.g., black vs. white, old vs. young, self vs. other), it is a 
problem when one is interested in implicit associations with a single target concept or 
when the target concept of interest does not have a natural complement. More 
importantly, the relative nature of the IAT obscures the interpretation of IAT scores. For 
example, with respect to the alcohol-soda IAT, IAT scores can reflect both implicit 
associations with alcohol and/or implicit associations with soda. Hence, in case of the 
negative unipolar alcohol-soda IAT, high IAT scores could indicate strong implicit negative 
alcohol attitudes, but also weak negative attitudes toward soda in which case it would not 
be surprising that these IAT scores do not relate to alcohol consumption. Further, with 
respect to the positive unipolar alcohol-soda IAT, this ambiguity of IAT scores potentially 
deflates the validity of the IAT as a measure of implicit positive alcohol associations well as 
its predictive validity with respect to drinking behavior. Consequently, there is clearly a 
need for indirect measures that can assess implicit attitudes toward single target concepts. 
The current study examines the application of such a non-relative indirect measure: the 
Single Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006). 
The ST-IAT is structurally similar to the IAT with the difference that only one target 
category is presented during the task. Thus, unlike the IAT, the ST-IAT measures implicit 
associations with single target concepts, without the need of a complementary contrast 
category. Consequently, it was hypothesized that an alcohol ST-IAT could provide a more 
specific measure of implicit alcohol attitudes than the alcohol-soda IAT. It should be noted, 
however, that the ST-IAT procedure, like the standard IAT procedure, is limited in the sense 
that evaluative associations are assessed in a bipolar format with respect to the attribute 
dimension. In the present study, the ST-IAT was therefore presented in a unipolar format 
similar to what was previously done successfully with the IAT (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 
2006c; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). The goal of the present study was to examine 
whether unipolar alcohol ST-IATs measure qualitatively different implicit alcohol attitudes 
compared to unipolar alcohol-soda IATs. To this end, we assessed implicit alcohol 
attitudes with both a positive and a negative alcohol-soda IAT and with both a positive and 
a negative alcohol ST-IAT. In this way, we were able to examine whether assessing single 
implicit alcohol attitudes yields different results compared to measuring implicit attitudes 
toward alcohol relative to soda. Moreover, if assessing implicit alcohol attitudes with the 
ST-IAT yields additional information compared to measuring implicit alcohol attitudes with 
the alcohol-soda IAT, alcohol ST-IAT scores should predict alcohol-related behavior above 
alcohol-soda IAT scores. In addition, we also measured implicit soda attitudes with a 
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positive and a negative soda ST-IAT to examine the contributions of both single implicit 
alcohol attitudes and single implicit soda attitudes to IAT scores. Finally, we also examined 
the relationship of all indirect measures with explicit alcohol-related and soda-related 
expectancies and attitudes. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-two female students of Maastricht University participated in this study in return for 
course credit or a gift certificate of 10€. On average, participants consumed 6.71 (SD = 
7.00) European standard alcoholic drinks18 per week. On the 18-items version of the 
Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 2000), participants had an 
average item score of .26 (SD = .34), while participants’ mean score on the Alcohol Use 
Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 
1993) was 7.11 (SD = 4.52). 
Materials and Measures 
Alcohol Use. Alcohol use was measured through a self-report questionnaire (Wiers, 
Hoogeveen, Sergeant & Gunning, 1997) based on the timeline follow-back method 
(Sobell & Sobell, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate how many drinks of different 
types of alcoholic beverages they consumed during each day of the past week, and for 
each day of the week, how many drinks they typically consumed on this day of the week. 
 
Alcohol-Related Problems. Alcohol-related problems were assessed with the RAPI 
and with the AUDIT. The RAPI described 18 alcohol-related problems or situations for 
which participants indicated how often they experienced these situations on a 5-point Likert 
scale (0 = never, 4 = very often) (Cronbach α = .86). The AUDIT consisted of 10 
questions in a multiple choice format. The first three questions were related to alcohol use, 
the other seven to alcohol-related problems (α = .83). 
 
Implicit Measures of Alcohol and Soda Attitudes. In both the positive IAT and 
the negative IAT, two target categories were presented, the first consisting of 5 alcoholic 
drinks (label ‘alcohol’) and the other of 5 sodas (label ‘soda’). Further, the alcohol target 
category was also presented in both the positive and the negative alcohol ST-IAT, while the 
soda target category was also used in both the positive and the negative soda ST-IAT. The 
 
 
18 A standard European alcoholic drink contains somewhat less alcohol than a standard English or American 
alcoholic drink: 10-12g vs. 14g. 
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two (Dutch) target categories were matched on number of syllables. In the positive IAT as 
well as in the positive alcohol ST-IAT and the positive soda ST-IAT, a positive attribute 
category (label ‘pleasant’) was presented, whereas in the negative IAT and in both the 
negative alcohol ST-IAT and the soda ST-IAT, a negative attribute category (label 
‘unpleasant’) was presented. Further, the positive and negative attribute categories were 
paired with 4 neutral attribute categories (label ‘neutral’) in balanced order19. All attribute 
categories were matched on number of syllables. All stimuli are listed in the Appendix. 
All tasks were programmed in ERTS 3.18 (Beringer, 1996). The positive IAT and the 
negative IAT followed the standard IAT procedure (see Greenwald et al., 1998) with the 
modification that both IATs were presented so that they appeared to form one single task. 
Participants always first practiced the target discrimination because it remained constant 
across the positive IAT and negative IAT. Next, participants completed the positive IAT and 
the negative IAT in balanced order, each consisting of 4 blocks. In each block, all stimuli 
of the respective categories were presented twice. The alcohol and soda ST-IATs followed 
the procedure of the ST-IAT developed by Wigboldus et al. (2005). However, as in the IAT, 
participants performed the positive and negative ST-IAT in balanced order with each ST-
IAT consisting of 4 blocks. Further, during attribute practice blocks, all stimuli were 
presented twice whereas in the combination blocks, stimuli of the two categories that 
shared a response were presented twice, while stimuli of the unpaired neutral category 
were presented four times in order to keep the number of right and left responses equal. 
The assignment of the alcohol category and the soda category to the response keys was 
balanced across participants and remained constant across all IAT and ST-IAT versions. 
Further, the response assignment of the attribute categories was also counterbalanced so 
that half the participants in each task performed the compatible combination task before 
the incompatible combination task whereas the other half always performed the 
incompatible combination task before the compatible combination task. An overview of 
IAT and ST-IAT blocks is shown in Table 1. 
During all tasks, target and attribute stimuli were presented in the middle of the 
computer screen, in black against a grey background. Instructions were presented before 
each task. During the task, the labels of the categories assigned to the left and right 
response key were presented in the corresponding upper corners of the computer screen. 
Stimuli remained on screen until a response was given. The intertrialinterval was 250 ms. 
Feedback was presented in red beneath the stimuli after an incorrect response (‘wrong’), 
 
 
19 For half the participants, two neutral categories that consisted of heterogeneous sets of neutral words were paired 
in balanced order with the positive and negative category, whereas for the other half of the participants the positive 
and negative category were paired in balanced order with two neutral categories that consisted of homogeneous 
sets of neutral words which were all synonyms of the word ‘neutral’. The composition (heterogeneous or 
homogenous) of the neutral categories did not influence any of the results reported here. 
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and when responses were too fast (< 300 ms; ‘too fast’) or too slow (> 3000 ms; ‘too 
slow’). 
Table 1 
Overview of IAT and ST-IAT phases. 
IAT  ST-IAT 
Block Trials Function Left key Right key  Block Trials Function Left key Right key 
1 24 Target practice alcohol soda       
2 24 Attribute practice pleasant neutral  1 24 Attribute practice pleasant neutral 
3a 24 Compatible 
combination 
practice 
alcohol 
pleasant 
soda 
neutral 
 2a 24 Compatible 
combination 
practice 
alcohol 
pleasant 
 
neutral 
3b 24 Compatible 
combination 
test 
alcohol 
pleasant 
soda 
neutral 
 2b 24 Compatible 
combination 
test 
alcohol 
pleasant 
 
neutral 
4 24 Reversed attribute 
practice 
neutral pleasant  3 24 Reversed attribute 
practice 
neutral pleasant 
5a 24 Incompatible 
combination 
practice 
alcohol 
neutral 
soda 
pleasant 
 4a 24 Incompatible 
combination 
practice 
alcohol 
neutral 
 
pleasant 
5b 24 Incompatible 
combination 
test 
alcohol 
neutral 
soda 
pleasant 
 4b 24 Incompatible 
combination 
test 
alcohol 
neutral 
 
pleasant 
Note. Blocks are shown for the positive alcohol-soda IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT. In the positive soda ST-
IAT, the alcohol category was replaced by the soda category. Blocks 2 to 5 were repeated in the negative IAT and 
ST-IATs with the attribute categories ‘unpleasant’ and ‘neutral’. The order of the positive and negative task versions 
was balanced across participants. The response assignment of the target categories was counterbalanced and 
remained constant across all tasks. The response assignment of the attribute categories was also counterbalanced so 
that half the participants always received the compatible combination task before the incompatible combination task 
whereas the other half always received the incompatible combination task before the compatible combination task. 
Explicit Measures of Alcohol and Soda Cognitions. Participants filled out two 
expectancy questionnaires, one relating to alcohol and the other to soda, which consisted 
of 6 positive expectancy items (α = .93, α = .92, respectively), and 6 negative expectancy 
items (α = .81, α = .92, respectively). Each item asked participants to indicate on a 
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) how much they agreed (0=completely disagree, 
100=completely agree) with the following statement: “After drinking alcohol/soda, I feel . 
. .”. This statement was completed with the same words as presented during the IAT and 
ST-IATs, including the labels. 
Attitudes toward alcohol and soda were assessed with two attitude questionnaires 
which consisted of 5 positive (α = .86, α = .89, respectively) and 5 negative items (α = 
.91, α = .91, respectively). In both questionnaires, participants indicated on a 100 mm 
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VAS whether they agreed (0=completely disagree, 100=completely agree) with the 
statement: “I think drinking alcohol/soda is . . .”, which was completed with the following 
words good, fun, smart, positive, and pleasant for the positive items and the words bad, 
stupid, boring, negative, and unpleasant for the negative items. 
Procedure 
After signing the informed consent form, participants performed the positive and negative 
IAT, the positive and negative alcohol ST-IAT and the positive and negative soda ST-IAT. 
Half the participants performed the IATs before the alcohol and soda ST-IATs, while this 
task order was reversed for the other half. Further, the order of the alcohol ST-IATs and the 
soda ST-IATs was also counterbalanced. Next, participants received the alcohol and soda 
expectancy and attitude questionnaires in balanced order, followed by the questionnaires 
on alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems. 
RESULTS 
IAT and ST-IAT Data Reduction 
IAT effects and ST-IAT effects were calculated with the D600 scoring algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Mean response latencies were calculated for the two 
combination tasks of the positive and negative IAT, the positive and negative alcohol ST-
IAT, and the positive and negative soda ST-IAT. For the positive and negative IAT, the 
D600 measure was calculated as the difference between these means so that higher 
scores indicate faster performance when alcohol was paired with positive attributes or 
negative attributes, respectively, and soda with neutral attributes than when alcohol shared 
a response with neutral attributes and soda with positive attributes or negative attributes, 
respectively. With respect to the positive and negative alcohol ST-IAT and the positive and 
negative soda ST-IAT, higher D600 scores reflect faster performance when either of the 
target concepts was paired with positive attributes or negative attributes, respectively, and 
neutral attributes were assigned to the other response than for the reversed combination. 
Further, following the formula presented by Greenwald et al. (2003), practice trials were 
always included, error penalties (600 ms) were given, and results were standardized at the 
level of the participant. 
Reliability of the IAT and ST-IAT 
To determine the reliability of the IAT and ST-IAT versions, (ST-)IAT scores computed from 
the practice trials were correlated with (ST-)IAT scores computed from the test trials 
(following the procedure outlined by Greenwald et al., 2003). Measures of internal 
consistency were then calculated by applying the Spearman-Brown correction to these 
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correlations (cf. Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). A reliability analysis on the positive IAT 
showed a lower level of internal consistency (adjusted r = .55) compared to the negative 
IAT which revealed a reasonable level of internal consistency (adjusted r = .63). Reliability 
analyses on the alcohol ST-IATs demonstrated greater internal consistency for the positive 
alcohol ST-IAT (adjusted r = .71) than for the negative alcohol ST-IAT (adjusted r = .47). 
Finally, the internal consistency of the positive soda ST-IAT (adjusted r = .64) was higher 
than the internal consistency of the negative soda ST-IAT (adjusted r = .55). 
Implicit Measures of Alcohol and Soda Attitudes 
Preparatory analyses revealed no influential outliers on IAT or ST-IAT data. With respect to 
the positive and negative IAT, Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA)20 were used to 
examine the effect of two counterbalancing factors: the order in which the two task 
versions were presented and the order in which participants performed the IATs and the 
alcohol and soda ST-IATs. Results showed an effect of order of the positive and negative 
IAT on negative IAT scores, F(1, 58) = 6.29, p = .015. Other main effects as well as 
interaction effects were not significant (p > .025). Follow-up analyses showed that positive 
IAT effects were not significant, t(61) = 1.05, p = .298, while negative IAT effects were 
significant both when participants received the negative IAT before the positive IAT, t(61) = 
7.40, p < .001, and when the negative IAT was performed after the positive IAT, t(61) = 
3.34, p < .001. Hence, these findings demonstrate that participants held implicit negative 
attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda but do not provide support for implicit positive 
attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda. 
For the alcohol and soda ST-IATs, we first examined the effect of three 
counterbalancing factors using ANOVAs20: the order of the IATs and ST-IATs, the order of 
the alcohol and soda ST-IATs and the order of the positive and negative task versions. 
Results demonstrated that the order in which participants performed the alcohol ST-IATs 
and the soda ST-IATs influenced scores on the positive alcohol ST-IAT, F(1, 54) = 8.62, p 
= .005. None of the other main effects or interaction effects reached significance (p > 
.025). Similar to results with the IAT, a significant effect emerged in the negative alcohol 
ST-IAT, t(61) = 4.25, p < .001, suggesting that participants had implicit negative attitudes 
toward alcohol. In addition, the positive alcohol ST-IAT also yielded a significant effect, 
revealing that participants also held implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol, but only 
when the alcohol ST-IATs were performed before the soda ST-IATs, t(61) = 4.70, p < 
.001, but not when the soda ST-IATs were performed first, t(61) = .44, p = .664. Neither 
the positive soda ST-IAT nor the negative soda ST-IAT yielded a significant effect, t(61) = -
1.49, p = .142, and t(61) = 1.07, p = .287, respectively. 
 
 
20 In order to control for type I errors due to performing multiple ANOVAs, α was set at .025. 
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Interestingly, the alcohol ST-IAT scores and soda ST-IAT scores can inform us about 
the contributions of single implicit attitudes toward alcohol and single implicit attitudes 
toward soda to IAT scores. As can be seen in Table 2, the positive IAT and the negative 
IAT were uncorrelated with both alcohol ST-IAT versions and with both soda ST-IAT 
versions, suggesting that the alcohol ST-IATs and the soda ST-IATs measure qualitatively 
different underlying constructs than the alcohol-soda IATs. Thus, these findings 
demonstrate that the alcohol ST-IAT provides additional information that is not reflected in 
alcohol-soda IAT scores. 
Table 2 
Correlations between the IAT, alcohol ST-IAT and the soda ST-IAT. 
IAT  Alcohol ST-IAT  Soda ST-IAT  
Variable Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
Positive -        IAT 
Negative .27* -       
Positive .20 -.11  -     Alcohol ST-IAT 
Negative .15 .17  .12 -    
Positive .03 -.15  -.03 .11  -  Soda ST-IAT 
Negative -.04 -.09  .05 -.17  .29* - 
Note. Partial correlations are shown, controlled for order of positive and negative task versions and for order of 
alcohol ST-IAT versions and soda ST-IAT versions. * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Explicit Measures of Alcohol and Soda Cognitions 
Mean scores were calculated separately for positive and negative expectancy items of the 
alcohol and soda expectancy questionnaires as well as for the positive and negative 
attitude items of the alcohol and soda attitude questionnaires. Results showed that 
participants expected positive effects more from drinking alcohol (M = 62.26, SD = 
16.63) than from drinking soda (M = 48.18, SD = 18.68), t(61) = 4.67, p < .001. In 
addition, participants also expected more negative effects from drinking alcohol (M = 
31.83, SD = 21.40) than from drinking soda (M = 20.27, SD = 15.94), t(61) = 3.99, p 
< .001. Also, participants’ attitudes toward alcohol (M = 47.72, SD = 17.03) were less 
positive compared to attitudes toward soda (M = 55.35, SD = 21.55), t(61) = -2.26, p 
= .027, and alcohol attitudes (M = 38.03, SD = 22.30) were also more negative 
compared to soda attitudes (M = 26.72, SD = 22.61), t(61) = 2.88, p = .005. None of 
the partial correlations, controlled for order of positive and negative task versions and for 
order of the alcohol ST-IATs and the soda ST-IATs, between implicit measures of alcohol 
and soda attitudes with explicit measures of alcohol-related and soda-related cognitions 
were significant after Bonferroni correction (p > .01). 
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Prediction of Alcohol-Related Behavior 
An estimate of alcohol consumption was computed as the log-transformed average weekly 
alcohol consumption calculated from the alcohol use questionnaire. An estimate of 
alcohol-related problems was computed as the mean of the z-transformed RAPI and 
AUDIT log-transformed sum scores. The alcohol use estimate and the alcohol-related 
problems estimate were significantly correlated, r = .68, p < .001, indicating that 
participants with increased levels of alcohol consumption also experienced more alcohol-
related problems. As can be seen in Table 3, positive IAT scores as well as positive alcohol 
ST-IAT scores were related to alcohol use, demonstrating that stronger implicit positive 
attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda as well as single implicit positive alcohol attitudes 
are associated with higher levels of alcohol consumption. In addition, positive IAT scores 
were also significantly correlated with alcohol-related problems. Negative IAT scores and 
negative alcohol ST-IAT scores, on the other hand, were unrelated to alcohol use and 
alcohol-related problems. 
Table 3 
Correlations of implicit measures of alcohol and soda attitudes with alcohol-related behavior. 
IAT  Alcohol ST-IAT  Soda ST-IAT  
Variable Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
Alcohol use .39** .03  .35** -.09  .06 .08 
Alcohol-related problems .43** .02  .22 -.02  .02 -.09 
Note. Partial correlations are shown, controlled for order of positive and negative task versions and for order of 
alcohol ST-IAT versions and soda ST-IAT versions. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * = 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
In addition, the predictive validity of both the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT 
was examined using hierarchical regression analysis. The regression analysis for the 
prediction of alcohol use is shown in Table 4. In step 1, none of the explicit alcohol-
related expectancies and attitudes significantly predicted alcohol use21. Importantly, 
entering the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT in step 2 significantly increased 
the explained variance. Both the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT significantly 
 
 
21 Given the high correlations between explicit alcohol-related expectancies and alcohol attitudes, alcohol-related 
expectancies and attitudes were also entered separately in hierarchical regression analyses for the prediction of 
alcohol use and alcohol-related problems. Results showed that alcohol use was significantly predicted by positive 
expectancies, β = .38, p = .005, but not by negative expectancies (p > .40). Further, neither positive alcohol 
attitudes nor negative alcohol attitudes significantly predicted alcohol use (p > .20). With respect to alcohol-related 
problems, results showed that both positive and negative alcohol expectancies were significant predictors, β = .53, 
p < .001, and β = .26, p = .037, respectively. Also, positive alcohol attitudes significantly predicted alcohol-
related problems, β = .51, p = .008, while negative alcohol attitudes did not (p > .70). 
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predicted alcohol use, demonstrating that the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT 
predicted unique variance in alcohol consumption. Moreover, a series of regression 
analysis showed that the positive IAT predicted 16% of the variance in alcohol use (9% 
above the variance explained by explicit measures and 7% beyond the variance explained 
by explicit measures and the positive alcohol ST-IAT) while the positive alcohol ST-IAT 
predicted 12% of the variance in alcohol use (7% beyond the variance explained by 
explicit measures and 5% above the variance explained by explicit measures and the 
positive IAT). 
Table 4 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol use by explicit alcohol-related cognitions 
and both the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT.  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .25 .18 1.38 .175 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .19 .14 1.32 .192 
 Positive alcohol attitudes -.00 .01 -.05 .23 -.21 .832 
 Negative alcohol attitudes -.01 .01 -.31 .22 -1.44 .156 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .24 .17 1.41 .163 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .00 .01 .06 .14 .45 .653 
 Positive alcohol attitudes -.00 .01 -.05 .214 -.21 .833 
 Negative alcohol attitudes -.01 .01 -.14 .21 -.68 .499 
 Positive IAT .59 .25 .28 .12 2.35 .022 
 Positive alcohol ST-IAT .49 .25 .25 .13 2.02 .049 
 Note. F(4, 57) = 2.91, p = .029, R2 = .17 for step 1; Fchange (2, 55) = 5.60, p = .006, R
2
change
 = .14 for step 2. 
Final model (step 2): R2 = .31, R2adjusted = .24, F(6, 55) = 4.12, p = .002. 
The hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems is shown 
in Table 5. In step 1, negative alcohol-related expectancies significantly predicted alcohol-
related problems while positive alcohol-related expectancies predicted alcohol-related 
problems at borderline significance21. Further, in step 2, the positive IAT significantly 
predicted alcohol-related problems whereas the positive alcohol ST-IAT was not predictive 
of alcohol-related problems. 
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Table 5 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the prediction of alcohol-related problems by explicit alcohol-related 
cognitions and both the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT.  
Step Variable B SE B β SE β t p 
1 Positive alcohol expectancies .02 .01 .31 .17 1.85 .069 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .27 .13 2.00 .050 
 Positive alcohol attitudes .01 .01 .25 .21 1.20 237 
 Negative alcohol attitudes -.00 .01 -.07 .20 -.35 .725 
2 Positive alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .25 .16 1.59 .117 
 Negative alcohol expectancies .01 .01 .19 .13 1.48 .145 
 Positive alcohol attitudes .02 .01 .31 .20 1.53 .131 
 Negative alcohol attitudes .00 .01 .05 .19 .27 .791 
 Positive IAT .65 .21 .34 .11 3.09 .003 
 Positive alcohol ST-IAT .09 .21 .05 .12 .41 .682 
 Note. F(4, 57) = 5.85, p = .001, R2 = .29 for step 1; Fchange (2, 55) = 5.16, p = .009, R
2
change
 = .11 for step 2. 
Final model (step 2): R2 = .40, R2adjusted = .34, F(6, 55) = 6.19, p < .001. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the present study was to examine whether single implicit alcohol attitudes 
assessed with the ST-IAT are qualitatively different from relative implicit alcohol attitudes 
assessed relative to soda with the IAT. In addition, we also assessed single implicit attitudes 
toward soda with the ST-IAT in order to examine the contribution of both single implicit 
alcohol attitudes and single implicit alcohol attitudes to alcohol-soda IAT scores. 
Moreover, the alcohol-soda IAT as well as the alcohol ST-IAT and the soda ST-IAT were 
presented in a unipolar format so that implicit positive attitudes and implicit negative 
attitudes could be independently assessed. The present findings demonstrate that the 
alcohol ST-IAT indeed provides additional information compared to the alcohol-soda IAT. 
While the negative IAT showed an effect, indicating implicit negative attitudes toward 
alcohol relative to soda, the positive IAT showed no significant IAT effect. In contrast, both 
the positive and negative alcohol ST-IAT yielded significant effects, demonstrating implicit 
positive alcohol attitudes as well as implicit negative alcohol attitudes. Moreover, alcohol 
ST-IAT scores and soda ST-IAT scores were uncorrelated with IAT scores, indicating that 
single implicit attitudes assessed with the ST-IATs were qualitatively different from the 
comparative implicit attitudes measured with the IATs. Importantly, this conclusion was also 
supported by the finding that the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT uniquely 
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predicted alcohol use above explicit measures of alcohol-related expectancies and 
attitudes. 
In the present study, both the negative IAT and the negative alcohol ST-IAT yielded 
significant effects, indicating that implicit alcohol attitudes are negative both when 
assessed relative to soda and when assessed alone. However, the positive alcohol ST-IAT 
provided support for implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol whereas the positive IAT did 
not demonstrate implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda. Hence, the 
alcohol ST-IAT yielded additional information that was not captured by the alcohol-soda 
IAT. However, it is interesting to note that the positive alcohol ST-IAT only provided support 
for implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol when it was presented before the soda ST-IAT. 
This finding is in line with the idea that contextual features can shape implicit attitudes (cf. 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Possibly, the soda ST-IAT created a frame of reference 
so that the alcohol ST-IAT, when it was subsequently performed no longer assessed single 
implicit attitudes toward alcohol. Hence, these findings imply that researchers interested in 
assessing implicit attitudes toward single target concepts using a non-relative measure 
such as the ST-IAT should pay close attention to task orders to ensure the non-relative 
nature of the task. 
To further our understanding of alcohol-soda IAT effects, we also assessed single 
implicit attitudes toward soda using a soda ST-IAT. Results demonstrated that both single 
implicit alcohol attitudes and single implicit soda attitudes assessed with ST-IATs were 
unrelated to alcohol-soda IAT scores. Thus, the present results suggest that the ST-IAT and 
the IAT captured qualitatively different constructs. It is likely that contrasting alcohol with 
soda in the IAT changes how alcohol is automatically evaluated compared to when it is 
not contrasted with a second category. Consistent with this conclusion, De Houwer, 
Geldof, and De Bruycker (2005) recently stated that it is likely that replacing a category in 
the IAT alters the properties by which categories are grouped. Thus, omitting or including 
the soda contrast in the IAT could change which features of the alcohol concept become 
salient and, therefore, the extent to which alcohol is more or less easily paired with positive 
and negative stimuli. It is important to note that the present findings with the positive 
alcohol-soda IAT were inconsistent with findings reported by Houben and Wiers (2006c) 
who did find evidence for implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda. 
However, participants in the present study on average consumed about 7 alcoholic drinks 
a week whereas participants in the study by Houben and Wiers (2006c) consumed twice as 
much. Hence, if implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol increase in strength with 
increased levels of alcohol consumption, as was demonstrated both in this study as well as 
by Houben and Wiers (2006c), it is highly likely that differences between the participant 
samples in mean alcohol consumption were responsible for the differences between the 
two studies in overall effects with the positive alcohol-soda IAT. 
Importantly, the positive alcohol-soda IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT uniquely 
predicted alcohol use above explicit alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes, which 
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further supports the conclusion that the alcohol ST-IAT and the alcohol-soda IAT captured 
unique constructs. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006c; Jajodia 
& Earleywine, 2003), results with both the positive IAT and the positive alcohol ST-IAT 
demonstrated that implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol predicted alcohol use above 
explicit alcohol-related cognitions, while implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol, whether 
assessed with the IAT or the alcohol ST-IAT, showed no relationship with drinking behavior. 
While it was suggested that previous studies might have been unable to demonstrate a 
relationship between negative alcohol-soda IAT scores and drinking behavior because 
these IAT scores might reflect implicit soda attitudes rather than implicit alcohol attitudes, 
the present results indicate that this was probably not the case. Hence, the present results 
demonstrate that both implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol relative to soda and 
implicit positive attitudes toward alcohol alone are important determinants of drinking 
behavior. Presumably, implicit negative attitudes toward alcohol reflect extrapersonal 
evaluative associations with drinking alcohol, possibly shaped by culturally shared 
knowledge, that are not part of one’s personally endorsed implicit attitudes and which are 
unrelated to drinking behavior. Support for this claim was recently found by Houben and 
Wiers (2006b) who found support for stronger positive than negative implicit attitudes 
toward alcohol in a personalized IAT that was designed to reduce extrapersonal 
contamination (Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
Finally, it should be noted that several other indirect measures have been developed 
that can assess implicit attitudes toward single attitude concepts besides the ST-IAT, 
including the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) and the Go/No-Go 
Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). However, both these measures are 
unsuited to test implicit positive and negative attitudes separately. While no research has 
yet attempted to present the GNAT in a unipolar format, the EAST has been modified for 
this purpose, however, at the expense of losing its non-relative nature with respect to the 
target categories (Wiers, Ganushchack, Van de Ende, Smulders, & de Jong, 2003). 
Further, de Liver, van der Pligt, and Wigboldus (in press), recently demonstrated that 
implicit positive and negative evaluative associations with single attitude objects can be 
assessed using a sequential priming paradigm. In addition, Karpinski and Steinman (2006) 
have introduced the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT) which is 
conceptually similar to the ST-IAT, differing only in minor procedural details. Karpinski and 
Steinman provided support for the reliability and validity of the SC-IAT as a measure of 
single implicit attitudes and demonstrated that the SC-IAT, like the ST-IAT in the present 
study, yields additional information that is not reflected in relative IAT scores. 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that it is useful to use measures of 
implicit alcohol attitudes that do not only present evaluative attribute categories in a 
unipolar format, but that also assess single implicit attitudes toward alcohol in addition to 
measures that assesses implicit alcohol attitudes relative to soda, since both types of tasks 
offer a unique contribution to the prediction of drinking behavior. Clearly, as we are 
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beginning to grasp the potential complexity of implicit alcohol attitudes as determinants of 
alcohol use and abuse, we need to find effective tools that can adequately capture these 
implicit attitudes. Hence, with the present research, we hope to contribute to as well as 
stimulate the further development of indirect measurement tools of implicit alcohol-related 
cognitions. 
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APPENDIX 
Target Stimuli 
Alcohol: beer, wine, whisky, drink, vodka 
Soda: Fanta, Coca Cola, Sprite, sinas (lemonade), ice-tea 
Attribute Stimuli 
Pleasant: amusing, sociable, happy, enjoyable, agreeable 
Unpleasant: down, lonely, unhappy, miserable, sad 
Neutral homogenous 1: standard, normal, general, common, objective 
Neutral homogenous 2: level, average, everyday, middle, universal 
Neutral heterogeneous 1: steep, compact, curved, regular, literally 
Neutral heterogeneous 2: brown, normal, digital, historically, general 
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The central focus of this thesis was to further our understanding of the automatic cognitive 
processes underlying alcohol use. This research interest was fueled by findings from 
previous IAT studies suggesting that implicit evaluative associations with alcohol are largely 
negative and not related to alcohol use (e.g., De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 
2004; Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005; Wiers, Van 
Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002). However, recent research has demonstrated 
procedural limitations of the IAT that may compromise such an interpretation of previously 
found IAT effects. First, several lines of evidence suggest that IAT effects can be based on 
influences other than personal evaluative associations with the given target concepts (e.g., 
De Houwer, Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005; Mierke & Klauer, 2001, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 
2004; Rothermund & Wentura, 2001, 2004; Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 
2005). Second, the IAT assesses associations between two pairs of categories and can, 
thus, only indicate the relative strength of pairs of evaluative associations (that form a 
dichotomous attribute dimension in the IAT; e.g., positive versus negative) with one target 
concept (e.g., alcohol) relative to the other target concept (e.g., soft drinks). Therefore, the 
research presented in this thesis examined to what extent previously reported findings with 
the IAT might be due to such procedural limitations and focused on finding ways in which 
the IAT as a measure of automatic cognitive processes that determine drinking behavior 
might be improved. 
OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Recoding Influences on Performance in the Alcohol-IAT 
In the first part of this thesis, it was examined to what extent IAT performance might be 
faster when alcohol shares a response with a negative attribute category (versus soda and 
a positive attribute category) than when alcohol is paired with a positive attribute category 
(versus soda and a negative attribute category) due to recoding processes rather than 
personal evaluative associations with the concept alcohol. 
 
Controlling and Eliminating Recoding Influences in the Alcohol-IAT. In 
chapter 2, we tested whether the figure-ground asymmetry could account for results with 
the alcohol-IAT. More specifically, if alcohol-related stimuli are more salient compared to 
soda-related stimuli, the figure-ground account could explain this IAT effect since negative 
stimuli are generally more salient compared to positive stimuli and performance in the IAT 
should be faster when salient figure categories are consistently mapped onto the same 
response than when they are not assigned to the same response (Rothermund & Wentura, 
2001, 2004). To test the influence of figure-ground asymmetries in the alcohol-IAT, figure-
ground asymmetries between the target categories were reversed by manipulating the 
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familiarity of the category exemplars (unfamiliar stimuli are generally more salient than 
familiar stimuli), to see if this would result in a reversal of the IAT effect. Although results 
confirmed that the manipulation succeeded in reversing figure-ground asymmetries 
between the alcohol and soda target categories, this reversal of figure-ground asymmetries 
only affected the size of the IAT effect but did not result in a reversal of the IAT effect. 
Further, effects in the familiar alcohol (vs. unfamiliar soda) IAT were negatively related to 
alcohol use, indicating weaker negative implicit associations with (familiar) alcohol (or 
stronger positive implicit alcohol associations) with increased levels of alcohol use. 
Importantly, controlling for figure-ground asymmetries did not attenuate this relationship 
between IAT effects and alcohol use. Thus, even though figure-ground asymmetries 
between the alcohol target category and the soda target category may contribute to effects 
in the alcohol-IAT, they cannot completely account for IAT effects or for their relationship 
with drinking behavior. 
Figure-ground asymmetries, however, are just one possible source of recoding 
processes in the IAT. Therefore, in chapter 3, we used the IAT-RF, a variant of the IAT that 
eliminates all recoding influences by abandoning the block structure of the IAT 
(Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, & Wentura, 2006), to study implicit alcohol-related 
associations. In contrast to the standard IAT procedure, compatible and incompatible 
response assignments are switched on a random trial-by-trial basis instead of in two 
different blocks. The implication is that the IAT-RF consists of two times two types of trials: 
trials are either compatible or incompatible with respect to their response assignment and 
trials either involve a switch or a repetition of the response assignment compared to the 
preceding trial. Compared to previous results with the standard IAT procedure (e.g., Wiers 
et al., 2002), results with the IAT-RF revealed less support (response assignment repetition 
trials) or no support (response assignment switch trials) for implicit negative associations 
with alcohol, indicating that previous findings with the standard alcohol-IAT at least partly 
reflected recoding processes. Moreover, predictive validity was demonstrated since IAT-RF 
effects for repetition trials were negatively related to alcohol use and predicted alcohol use 
better than explicit alcohol-related expectancies. This finding is consistent with the findings 
reported in chapter 2: Increased levels of alcohol use are characterized by weaker 
negative evaluative associations (or stronger positive evaluative associations) with alcohol. 
Further, IAT effects for switch trials were positively related to alcohol-related problems and 
predicted alcohol-related problems over and above the variance explained by explicit 
alcohol-related expectancies. This finding is consistent with the idea that negative alcohol-
related cognitions increase with the experience of alcohol-related problems but do not 
influence behavior until a certain threshold is reached (Jones & McMahon, 1996). It 
should be noted that these findings also suggest that IAT-RF repetition trials and IAT-RF 
switch trials measure different underlying cognitive processes and can both provide unique 
information. 
CHAPTER 9 
 142 
Eliminating Extrapersonal Contamination in the Alcohol-IAT. Another way in 
which categories in the IAT may be recoded in a way that is inconsistent with the intended 
nominal features of the categories is when participants conceptualize the evaluative 
categories as normatively positive or negative. When attribute categories are re-defined in 
terms of normative information, it is possible that IAT effects reflect extrapersonal 
associations or cultural associative knowledge rather than personal associations. It is 
important to note that this kind of ‘recoding’ cannot be eliminated by abandoning the 
block structure of the IAT (cf. chapter 3), since it involves a re-definition of the nominal 
features of the categories rather than using other features (e.g., salience) to discriminate 
between the stimuli. 
In chapter 4, we examined whether alcohol is perhaps more easily paired with a 
negative category than with a positive category due to negative extrapersonal information 
with respect to drinking alcohol. Here, we used a personalized IAT that reduces 
extrapersonal contamination by eliminating all reference to normative information to 
measure implicit alcohol associations. Consistent with the idea that participants are faster 
to combine alcohol with a negative attribute category than with a positive attribute 
category due to negative extrapersonal associations, the personalized IAT yielded positive 
implicit associations with alcohol rather than negative associations as found in earlier 
studies with the standard IAT. Moreover, positive implicit alcohol associations predicted 
alcohol use over and above explicit alcohol-related cognitions, indicating stronger positive 
associations with alcohol with increased levels of alcohol consumption. Hence, these 
findings replicate the relationship between implicit alcohol associations and alcohol use 
that was found in the studies reported in chapter 2 and 3. The important difference, 
however, is that this study for the first time demonstrated positive implicit associations with 
alcohol rather than negative implicit associations. Thus, these findings support the 
conclusion that negative extrapersonal associative knowledge contributes to effects in the 
standard IAT, causing faster performance when alcohol and negative are mapped onto the 
same response (vs. soda and positive) than when alcohol shares a response with positive 
(vs. soda and negative), and may even decrease its predictive validity. Further, results also 
showed that positive associations with alcohol significantly predicted alcohol-related 
problems so that participants who held stronger positive associations with alcohol also 
experienced more alcohol-related problems. However, similar to what was found in 
chapter 3, this relationship was completely mediated by alcohol use. When controlling for 
alcohol use in the hierarchical regression analysis, positive implicit alcohol associations no 
longer significantly predicted alcohol use, β = -.18, t = -1.09, p = .285, while alcohol 
use was the sole significant predictor of alcohol-related problems, β = .35, t = 2.22, p = 
.033. 
One could question to what extent an IAT that presents stimuli that are standard 
across participants can capture personal associations since stimuli will undoubtedly differ 
in the extent to which they are both known and liked by participants (cf. Fadardi, Cox, & 
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Klinger, 2006). Therefore, in chapter 5, we measured implicit alcohol associations with a 
personalized IAT that no longer presented standard stimuli but instead individualized 
stimuli for both the target and attribute categories that were selected by participants 
themselves. A direct comparison between the standard IAT and the individualized 
personalized IAT showed that both tasks were strongly correlated with each other and that 
both tasks yielded negative implicit associations with alcohol, although the IAT effect was 
significantly smaller in the individualized personalized IAT version. Moreover, both tasks 
did not only show strong overlap with each other, they were also both related to alcohol 
use. Hence, these findings do not unequivocally support the conclusion that the 
individualized personalized IAT is more sensitive to personal associations than the standard 
IAT. On the one hand, the reduced IAT effect in the individualized personalized IAT, 
compared to the standard IAT, could be due to reduced influence by extrapersonal 
contamination. However, in contrast to what was found in chapter 4, there was no support 
for positive implicit alcohol associations, suggesting that extrapersonal contamination was 
reduced to a lesser extent in this study, although one could also argue that the disparity in 
findings was due to differences in the level of alcohol consumption of the participants in 
the two studies. On the other hand, the standard IAT and the individualized personalized 
IAT were similarly related to alcohol use, which seems to contradict the conclusion that the 
individualized personalized IAT succeeded in eliminating extrapersonal contamination (or 
would suggest that there was no extrapersonal contamination in the standard IAT in first 
place). 
It should, however, be noted that in the study described in chapter 5, participants 
performed both the standard IAT and the personalized IAT in counterbalanced order, 
whereas in the study reported in chapter 4, participants only performed a personalized IAT. 
Possibly, performing the standard IAT after the individualized personalized IAT promoted a 
re-definition of the attribute categories in the standard IAT so that the evaluative categories 
were not conceptualized as normatively positive and negative. Similarly, performing the 
personalized IAT after the standard IAT might have caused a spill-over of extrapersonal 
contamination from the first IAT version to the latter IAT version. Importantly, such carry-
over effects might explain why the standard IAT and the individualized personalized IAT 
showed very similar patterns of results. Analyzing results separately for the two task orders 
provided some support for this conclusion. When participants performed the standard IAT 
first, the negative-alcohol IAT effect was significant in both the standard IAT, t(23) = 6.22, 
p < .001, and in the individualized personalized IAT, t(23) = 3.95, p = .001. However, 
when the individualized personalized IAT was performed first, the negative-alcohol IAT 
effect was significant in the standard IAT, t(21) = 3.38, p = .003, but not in the 
individualized personalized IAT, t(21) = .85, p = .403. Moreover, standard IAT effects 
were significantly larger when the standard IAT was performed first compared to when the 
standard IAT was performed after the individualized personalized IAT, t(44) = 2.39, p = 
.021. Similarly, effects with the individualized personalized IAT were borderline significantly 
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smaller when the individualized personalized IAT was performed before the standard IAT 
than when it was performed after the standard IAT, t(44) = -2.01, p = .051. 
 
Controlling or Eliminating Recoding Processes Increases the Validity of 
the Alcohol-IAT. Together, the studies described in the first part of this thesis 
demonstrate that recoding processes, in terms of performing the classification task based 
on other features than those initially intended, can influence IAT effects and thereby 
decrease the validity of the task as a measure of implicit alcohol-related associations. 
These findings further show that preventing recoding processes from affecting IAT 
performance increases the predictive validity of the IAT with respect to drinking behavior. 
Whereas previous studies have found no support to only moderate support for a 
relationship between evaluative implicit associations with alcohol and alcohol consumption 
(e.g., De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005), the studies described in chapter 
2 tot 5 all reveal a strong relationship between the IAT (variants) and behavior. 
Bipolar Target and Attribute Dimensions in the Alcohol-IAT: Double 
Jeopardy 
The IAT presents attribute categories in a bipolar format, which involves classifying 
attribute stimuli into two categories that typically form two poles of an evaluative dimension 
(e.g., positive vs. negative). Consequently, it is theoretically possible that a participant who 
has strong negative implicit alcohol associations as well as somewhat weaker positive 
implicit alcohol associations shows the same IAT score as a participant who has only 
negative implicit associations with alcohol. The implication is that this bipolar nature of the 
IAT may decrease the predictive validity of the IAT since positive implicit alcohol 
associations and negative implicit alcohol associations may be differentially related to 
alcohol use. In the second part of this thesis, unipolar variants of the IAT (e.g., positive vs. 
neutral) were used that allowed us to separately assess both positive implicit alcohol 
associations and negative implicit alcohol associations and their relationship to drinking 
behavior. Furthermore, the IAT also presents target categories in a bipolar format (e.g., 
alcohol vs. soda) and thus assesses implicit associations with one target concept relative to 
the other. Hence, it is unclear to what extent alcohol-IAT effects reflect implicit associations 
with the concept alcohol or with the contrast category soda. This issue was also examined 
in the second part of this thesis, where we assessed implicit alcohol associations relative to 
different contrast categories or with a non-relative variant of the IAT. 
 
Unipolar Implicit Alcohol Associations. In chapter 6, evaluative implicit alcohol 
associations as well as implicit alcohol associations with arousal and sedation (cf. Wiers et 
al., 2002) were assessed using unipolar IATs. Results demonstrated both positive and 
negative implicit associations with alcohol as well as both arousal and sedation 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 145 
associations with alcohol. Importantly, implicit alcohol associations with arousal predicted 
alcohol use above explicit alcohol-related cognitions, which is consistent with findings with 
the bipolar IAT by Wiers et al. (2002). Further, implicit alcohol associations with sedation 
predicted alcohol-related problems above explicit alcohol-related cognitions, which could 
be related to research which has demonstrated that negative reinforcement motives are 
predictive of alcohol-related problems (e.g., Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). 
Further, we demonstrated that positive implicit alcohol associations, in addition to implicit 
arousal associations, also borderline significantly predicted alcohol use over and above 
explicit alcohol-related cognitions. Negative implicit alcohol associations, in contrast, were 
unrelated to drinking behavior. In contrast, Wiers et al. (2002) found that implicit arousal 
associations with alcohol were related to level of alcohol use while implicit evaluative 
associations with alcohol were unrelated to alcohol use, and they linked their results to the 
incentive-sensitization theory which states that addictive substances sensitize the “wanting” 
system which is responsible for motivating behavior, but not the “liking” system which 
mediates the hedonic effects of addictive substances. Whereas findings with the unipolar 
IAT reported in chapter 6, suggest a tighter link between alcohol-related arousal and 
hedonic valence, it should be noted that such a pattern of results is consistent with normal 
appetitive behavior. Moreover, these results also fit nicely to the biphasic motivational 
model of emotion which states that emotion is organized around two motivational systems, 
one appetitive and one defensive. The motivational model further states that hedonic 
valence indicates which of these two motivational systems is active (i.e., pleasant = 
appetitive motivation and unpleasant = defensive motivation) while the degree of arousal 
reflects the degree of motivational activation (Bradley, 2000). Importantly, this model is 
not inconsistent with the incentive-sensitization theory of addictive behaviors, the main 
difference is that the incentive-sensitization theory predicts a dissociation between 
“wanting” (i.e., sensitized appetitive motivation) and “liking” (i.e., hedonic valence) when 
appetitive behavior becomes an addiction. In sum, results with unipolar IAT variants, thus, 
suggest that representations of appetitive reactions to alcohol cues (e.g., pleasure, 
activation) are an integral part of the associative cluster representing the concept alcohol 
with strong associative links to behavior. In contrast, negative hedonic valence or 
representations of the negative effects of drinking are probably not fully integrated in this 
associative cluster, perhaps because they are formed by reflective processes rather than 
automatic associative learning (cf. Deutsch & Strack, 2006). 
Further, the target concept of interest in the unipolar IATs that were used in chapter 
6 was either alcohol or beer. Because unipolar beer IATs might tap more personal implicit 
associations whereas unipolar alcohol IATs might be more prone to extrapersonal 
contamination, it was expected that implicit associations with alcohol would be more 
negative and less positive compared to implicit associations with beer. Moreover, these 
two target concepts were contrasted either with the concept soda as in previous alcohol-
IAT studies or with the concept animals. Results demonstrated that the composition of the 
CHAPTER 9 
 146 
target dimension only significantly influenced results with the unipolar IAT that assessed 
negative implicit associations with the target categories. Specifically, implicit associations 
with beer were less negative when beer was contrasted with animals than when beer was 
contrasted with soda and implicit associations with beer versus animals were less negative 
than implicit alcohol associations regardless of the category that alcohol was contrasted 
with. Hence, the choice of the contrast category mainly affected results for the negative 
unipolar IAT, which may suggest that especially effects in this dimension may be 
susceptible to artificial influences. Finally, a second study indicated that a recoding 
account in terms of figure-ground asymmetries could not explain results with the unipolar 
IATs. 
 
Non-Relative Implicit Alcohol Associations in a Unipolar Format. Although 
the results reported in chapter 6 indicated that the choice of the contrast category only 
affected results with the negative unipolar IAT but not results with the other unipolar IATs 
which were found to have predictive validity with respect to drinking behavior, it is 
important to note that the relativity of the IAT scores may still have deflated the validity of 
the unipolar IATs that were used. To further address this issue, positive and negative 
implicit alcohol associations were assessed in chapter 7 using a variant of the IAT, the 
Single-Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006; see also 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), which presents only one target category and can, thus, 
measure implicit associations with single concepts. Moreover, the ST-IAT was used in a 
unipolar format similar to what was done with the IAT. Further, as in chapter 6, implicit 
associations were assessed with either alcohol or beer. Consistent with results described in 
chapter 6, there was no difference in the size of ST-IAT effects between the alcohol and the 
beer condition. Importantly, however, in this study, correlations with drinking behavior 
were examined separately per target condition (i.e., alcohol ST-IAT or beer ST-IAT) and 
these results did suggest that the alcohol ST-IAT version may be more influenced by 
extrapersonal associations than the beer ST-IAT. More specifically, consistent with results 
described in chapter 6, positive implicit associations with beer, but not negative implicit 
beer associations, were positively related to alcohol use. In contrast, neither the positive 
alcohol ST-IAT nor the negative alcohol ST-IAT was related to alcohol use. Hence, these 
results replicate the results described in chapter 6, demonstrating that positive implicit 
alcohol-related associations are involved in alcohol use while negative implicit alcohol-
related associations do not appear to play a role in drinking behavior. 
In addition, these findings suggest that only the beer ST-IAT measured personal 
associations that are relevant to behavior while the alcohol ST-IAT may have been more 
sensitive to extrapersonal contamination since these ST-IAT scores were unrelated to 
behavior. It is important to note that the to-be-explained behavior was alcohol use and 
participants in this study indicated that, when they drank alcohol, they primarily consumed 
beer. Therefore, these findings are consistent with the findings reported in chapter 2 which 
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indicated that an IAT that assessed implicit associations with an alcohol category consisting 
of alcoholic drinks that were familiar to the participants predicted behavior but not an IAT 
that measured implicit associations with an alcohol category that consisted of unfamiliar 
alcoholic drinks. Moreover, in light of these findings, correlations between the unipolar 
IATs and alcohol use as described in chapter 6 were re-analyzed per target condition. In 
this study as well, results indicated that the positive unipolar beer IAT versions (i.e., beer vs. 
soda and beer vs. animals) were related to alcohol use, r = .33, p = .029, but not the 
positive unipolar alcohol IAT versions (i.e., alcohol vs. soda and alcohol vs. animals), r = 
.06, p = .692. The negative unipolar IAT was unrelated to drinking behavior in both 
conditions (p > .25). Moreover, the unipolar arousal IAT was related to alcohol use both 
in the alcohol condition, r = .30, p = .046, and in the beer condition, r = .37, p = .012, 
while the unipolar sedation IAT was related to drinking behavior only in the beer condition, 
r = .38, p = .009, but not in the alcohol condition, r = -.11, p = .471. Hence, these 
findings indicate that implicit arousal associations were related to alcohol use regardless of 
whether they were assessed specifically with respect to beer or more generally with respect 
to alcohol, whereas implicit positive associations and implicit sedation associations only 
related to alcohol consumption when they were specific to beer. Further, inspection of 
participants’ alcohol consumption showed that these participants on average drank 15.07 
(SD = 10.55) alcoholic drinks per week including 11.82 (SD = 11.75) glasses of beer. 
Together, these findings, thus, underscore the importance of choosing the appropriate 
target concept given the behavior that needs to be explained. More specifically, the closer 
the overlap between the processes that determine the IAT score and those that determine 
the actual behavior that one wants to predict, the better the IAT score will be able to 
predict the behavior (see also De Houwer, 2006). 
Finally, in chapter 8, unipolar ST-IATs that assessed single implicit associations with 
alcohol and single implicit associations with soda were compared with unipolar IATs that 
measured implicit associations with alcohol relative to soda. Findings indicated that the 
unipolar alcohol and soda ST-IATs and the unipolar alcohol-soda IATs captured 
qualitatively different underlying constructs. Hence, these results suggest that the alcohol 
target concept is conceptualized differently depending on whether it is presented relative to 
another target category or in a non-relative way. Importantly, both the positive unipolar 
alcohol ST-IAT and the positive unipolar alcohol-soda IAT predicted alcohol use. These 
findings are, thus, consistent with findings reported in chapter 6 and 7, demonstrating that 
stronger positive implicit associations predict an increase in alcohol consumption. Further, 
Thush and Wiers (in press) also found similar results with the positive unipolar ST-IAT in 
adolescents, and, in addition, demonstrated that both the unipolar positive ST-IAT and a 
unipolar arousal ST-IAT predicted drinking behavior after one year which is consistent with 
findings with unipolar IATs reported in chapter 6. Further, the positive unipolar alcohol-
soda IAT, but not the positive unipolar alcohol ST-IAT, predicted alcohol-related problems 
and, unlike previous results (chapter 3 and 4), this relationship was not mediated by 
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alcohol use. However, it should be noted that participants in this study, in contrast to 
participants in the studies described in chapter 3 and 4, were light drinkers who reported 
very little alcohol-related problems. Finally, consistent with other findings with unipolar IAT 
variants reported in this thesis, the negative unipolar alcohol-soda IAT and the negative 
unipolar alcohol ST-IAT were unrelated to drinking behavior. In sum, these findings 
indicate that the relative nature of the IAT does not necessarily deflate its predictive validity 
but rather that the relative IAT and the non-relative ST-IAT both have unique predictive 
validity. 
Main Conclusions 
1. In addition to implicit associations with alcohol, IAT effects reflect recoding 
processes that deflate both the construct validity and the predictive validity of the 
task (chapter 2 to 5). 
2. Eliminating or controlling for recoding processes in the IAT reveals that implicit 
alcohol associations are meaningfully related to drinking behavior (chapter 2 to 
5). 
3. Using IATs that present the attribute dimension in a unipolar format shows that 
implicit positive associations with alcohol are a driving force behind alcohol use 
while negative implicit alcohol associations do not appear to influence drinking 
behavior (chapter 6 to 8). 
4. Implicit associations with alcohol relative to soda and single implicit alcohol 
associations provide unique information with respect to drinking behavior 
(chapter 8). 
5. Since the overlap between the cognitive processes that determine IAT 
performance and the cognitive processes underlying the to-be-explained 
behavior determines the predictive validity of the IAT, one should select 
appropriate target concepts given the behavior that needs to be explained rather 
than general target concepts (chapter 2 and chapter 7). 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Psychometric Properties 
A necessary prerequisite for any measure of individual differences is that it should show 
adequate reliability. To examine reliability of all IAT variants that were tested in this thesis, 
internal consistencies were calculated by correlating the IAT effect measure calculated for 
the practice trials (i.e., IAT effect based on the first half of the compatible combination 
trials and the first half of the incompatible combination trials) with the IAT effect measure 
calculated for the test trials (i.e., IAT based on the second half of the compatible and 
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incompatible combination trials) (as in Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). However, 
dividing a measure into halves underestimates the reliability of the entire measure, and 
therefore we also calculated correlations adjusted with the Spearman-Brown correction 
which compensates for this underestimate of the true internal consistency (cf. Karpinski & 
Steinman, 2006). Internal consistencies for all IAT variants used in this thesis are presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Internal consistencies of the IAT variants used in this thesis. 
IAT Type IAT Variant r adjusted r 
Familiar alcohol vs. unfamiliar soda IAT (chapter 2) .84 .92 
Unfamiliar alcohol vs. familiar soda IAT (chapter 2) .87 .93 
IAT-RF .35 .51 
Personalized IAT (chapter 4) .61 .76 
Personalized individualized IAT (chapter 5) .67 .80 
Bipolar positive vs. negative 
Standard IAT (chapter 5) .70 .83 
alcohol/beer vs. soda/animals IAT (chapter 6) .46 .63 
Alcohol ST-IAT (chapter 7) .63 .77 
Beer ST-IAT (chapter 7) .16 .29 
Alcohol vs. soda IAT (chapter 8) .38 .55 
Alcohol ST-IAT (chapter 8) .56 .71 
Unipolar positive vs. neutral 
 
Soda ST-IAT (chapter 8) .50 .64 
alcohol/beer vs. soda/animals IAT (chapter 6) .44 .61 
Alcohol ST-IAT (chapter 7) .17 .29 
Beer ST-IAT (chapter 7) .29 .45 
Alcohol vs. soda IAT (chapter 8) .46 .63 
Alcohol ST-IAT (chapter 8) .31 .47 
Unipolar negative vs. neutral 
Soda ST-IAT (chapter 8) .38 .55 
Unipolar arousal vs. neutral alcohol/beer vs. soda/animals IAT (chapter 6) .52 .68 
Unipolar sedation vs. neutral alcohol/beer vs. soda/animals IAT (chapter 6) .46 .63 
Note. Internal consistencies were calculated by correlating (r) IAT effects based on practice trials (i.e., first half of the 
IAT combination trials) with IAT effects based on test trials (i.e., second half of the IAT combination trials), and 
applying the Spearman-Brown correction (adjusted r). 
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Results demonstrated good internal consistencies for all bipolar IAT variants used in 
chapter 2 to 5, which were similar to internal consistencies that have been reported in 
other IAT studies (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). In contrast, internal 
consistencies of the unipolar IATs were much lower which is probably due to the use of the 
neutral attribute categories in these IAT variants. More specifically, the neutral categories 
that were used in order to create a unipolar format for the attribute dimension typically 
consisted of a set of assorted stimuli which were all evaluated as neutral but did not form a 
category that was as coherent as for example the positive attribute category. It should be 
noted that in the study reported in chapter 8, unipolar formats were created for the IAT 
variants using either neutral attribute categories consisting of diverse neutral words (similar 
to those used in the studies described in chapter 6 and 7) or using neutral categories that 
consisted of neutral words that were all synonyms of the word ‘neutral’. It was expected 
that the latter neutral categories would be more coherent compared to the diverse neutral 
categories. However, results yielded similar results for both types of unipolar formats, 
including internal consistencies. 
Future research should further examine how the reliability of unipolar IATs can be 
improved given that these IAT variants can provide important additional information 
compared to standard bipolar IATs. Further, a possibly valuable alternative to using 
unipolar IATs is to use the Single Attribute IAT (SA-IAT; Penke, Eichstaedt, & Asendorpf, 
2006) which presents only one attribute category but is further comparable to the standard 
IAT. The SA-IAT is, thus highly similar to the ST-IAT, with the difference that in the SA-IAT, 
the attribute dimension is asymmetric whereas in the ST-IAT, asymmetry concerns the target 
dimension. Importantly, satisfactory reliability was demonstrated for the SA-IAT, indicating 
that it can provide a reliable measure of unipolar associations (Penke et al., 2006). 
Construct Validity 
It should be noted that positive and negative attribute concepts were operationalized in 
two different ways in this thesis. Specifically, some studies reported in this thesis used IAT 
variants that assessed associations between the target concepts and positive and negative 
attribute categories that consisted of alcohol-related positive and negative expectancies 
(chapter 2, 3, and 8) similar to what was done in the study by Wiers et al. (2002, 2005) 
and in the study by De Houwer et al. (2004). Other studies used IAT variants that 
measured associations of the target concepts with positive and negative attribute 
categories that were made up of general positive and negative stimuli (chapter 5, 6, and 
7), which is similar to social cognition research with the IAT (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwarz, 1998). For simplicity, IAT variants that used alcohol-related expectancies to 
operationalize the attribute categories will be referred to as expectancy IAT variants while 
IAT variants that used general positive and negative stimuli to operationalize the attribute 
categories will be referred to as attitude IAT variants. 
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While it has been demonstrated that differences in the features of the attribute 
categories can influence both IAT effects (e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2006) and their 
relationship to self-report measures (e.g., Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2006), influences of attribute stimuli on IAT effects have been mainly studied with 
respect to cross-category associations. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that 
using an attribute category that is conceptually related to one target category and another 
attribute category that is conceptually related to the other target category can give rise to 
stronger IAT effects. However, it is unlikely that cross-category associations differentially 
influenced the expectancy IAT variants and the attitude IAT variants since the two attribute 
categories were either not conceptually related to either of the target categories (attitude 
IATs) or both conceptually related to the alcohol target category but not to the soda target 
category (expectancy IATs). Still, findings are perhaps not directly comparable between 
studies in which positive and negative implicit associations were differently operationalized. 
Let us first turn to the studies that are directly comparable. Wiers et al. (2002, 2005) 
as well as De Houwer et al. (2004) demonstrated that alcohol was more easily paired with 
a negative attribute category consisting of negative alcohol-related expectancies, than with 
a positive attribute category that consisted of positive alcohol-related expectancies. This 
result was replicated and extended in chapter 2, where we demonstrated the same IAT 
effect regardless of manipulations of figure-ground asymmetries. Further, it was 
demonstrated in chapter 3 that this effect was reduced and even eliminated when using a 
recoding-free variant of the IAT. However, even though positive and negative attribute 
categories in this recoding-free IAT variant consisted of alcohol-related expectancies, it 
should be noted that this IAT variant used different attribute category labels which may 
reduce the comparability of findings with this variant and results with other IAT variants 
used in this thesis. Further, findings with unipolar expectancy IAT variants indicated that 
alcohol is more easily paired with both a negative category consisting of alcohol-related 
negative expectancies and with a positive category consisting of positive alcohol-related 
expectancies than with a neutral category, but only when a non-relative IAT variant is used 
that assesses single implicit associations with alcohol (chapter 8). Importantly, whereas 
Wiers et al. (2002, 2005) and De Houwer et al. (2004) did not find a relationship 
between effects with expectancy IATs and level of alcohol use, findings with expectancy IAT 
variants reported in this thesis that increased levels of alcohol use are related to stronger 
positive implicit alcohol associations (chapter 2, 3, and 8). 
Even though the attribute categories were differently operationalized in the attitude 
IAT variants, findings with attitude IAT variants were similar to those reported with 
expectancy IAT variants. First, bipolar attitude IATs also demonstrated that alcohol was 
more easily paired with a negative attribute category than with a positive attribute category 
(chapter 5). Moreover, this IAT effect was reduced (chapter 5) and even eliminated 
(chapter 4) when using IAT variants that eliminated extrapersonal contamination. Second, 
unipolar attitude IAT variants also yielded both positive and negative implicit alcohol 
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associations (chapter 6 and 7). Similar to findings with expectancy IAT variants, results with 
attitude IAT variants also showed that implicit alcohol associations are stronger with 
increased alcohol use (chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7). Notwithstanding the fact that results are 
similar regardless of whether expectancy IAT variants were used or attitude IAT variants, 
one can, however, not rule out that these different IAT variants assessed different 
underlying constructs, and future research should, thus, further examine this issue. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Do Implicit Alcohol Associations Determine Drinking Behavior: The 
Issue of Causality 
It is important to note that all studies reported in this thesis were cross-sectional in nature 
and exclusively relied on correlational data. Moreover, the dependent variable in all 
studies was drinking behavior of the week preceding the study. Hence, while results 
demonstrate that both explicit and implicit alcohol-related cognitions are (retrospectively) 
uniquely related to drinking behavior, the question whether these implicit and explicit 
alcohol-related cognitions are a cause or a consequence of drinking behavior cannot be 
answered. To further examine this issue of causality, future research should examine the 
relationship between implicit alcohol-related associations measured with the IAT and 
prospective drinking behavior, controlled for past drinking behavior. Similarly, Stacy 
(1997) demonstrated in a longitudinal study that both implicit alcohol-related memory 
associations measured with word association measures and explicit alcohol-related 
expectancies predicted prospective alcohol use beyond the variance explained by past 
alcohol use. Further, it is interesting to note that, in the study by Stacy (1997), implicit 
memory associations were stronger predictors of prospective alcohol use than explicit 
alcohol-related expectancies. Consistent with this finding, Jones, Corbin, and Fromme 
(2001) concluded that the variance in alcohol use explained by explicit alcohol-related 
expectancies decreases previous drinking behavior is included in the analyses. Together, 
these results suggest that implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes might be more 
important predictors of prospective alcohol use than explicit alcohol-related cognitions, 
and explicit alcohol-related expectancies in particular. Thus, it should be interesting to 
examine the relative contributions of implicit associations assessed with IAT and explicit 
alcohol-related expectancies and attitudes in the prediction of prospective drinking 
behavior. Moreover, as a more direct approach to examining the causality of the 
relationship between implicit alcohol-related associations measured with the IAT and 
alcohol use, future research could (temporarily) increase the strength of implicit positive 
associations with alcohol, for example through an evaluative conditioning procedure, to 
examine whether such a procedure produces parallel increases in alcohol consumption. 
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Executive Functioning as a Moderator of the Relationship between 
Implicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions and Drinking 
It was recently suggested that the dynamic interplay between automatic cognitive processes 
and controlled processes may be influenced by individual differences in executive control 
or executive functioning (e.g., Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Payne, 2005; Stacy, Ames, 
& Knowlton, 2004). Although there is no consensus definition of executive function, the 
term is generally used to refer to a range of top-down cognitive processes and abilities that 
enable flexible goal-directed behavior. Examples of such processes include planning and 
monitoring behavior, goal management, task switching, and overriding automatic 
responses (see also Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Hence, executive 
functioning could be an important moderator of whether automatic cognitive processes 
influence behavior or not. Indeed, recent research supports such a moderating role of 
executive functions. Payne (2005) for example measured executive control with the 
antisaccade task and estimated both automatic racial bias and executive control from 
performance on the weapon identification task and evaluative priming. Importantly, Payne 
(2005) demonstrated that executive control moderated the relationship between automatic 
racial bias and behavioral responses, such that automatic bias was more likely to be 
expressed in behavioral errors or in social judgments for participants with poor executive 
control than among participants with good executive control. Further, Grenard, Ames, 
Wiers, Thush, Sussman, and Stacy (2006) showed that substance-related associations, 
measured with the word association task, were stronger predictors of substance use among 
participants with lower working memory capacity than among participants with higher 
working memory capacity, as measured with the self-ordered pointing task. Finally, Thush, 
Wiers, Ames, Grenard, and Stacy (2006) demonstrated the same moderating influence of 
working memory capacity on the relationship between implicit alcohol associations with 
arousal, assessed with a unipolar IAT, and alcohol use. 
Together, these results are promising and indicate that executive functions can 
moderate the influence of automatic processes on behavior. Therefore, future research 
should further examine whether executive functions act as a moderator of the relationship 
between implicit alcohol associations assessed with the IAT and drinking behavior. Further, 
there is still debate on whether executive functions are supported by a single unitary 
process (e.g., Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004) or a diverse array of cognitive processes 
(e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). Thus, it would be interesting 
to explore whether the relation between implicit alcohol associations measured with the 
IAT and behavior is moderated by general executive functioning or by specific executive 
functioning processes, such as, for instance, the ability to inhibit automatic responses. 
Finally, these new insights also indicate that it might be interesting to investigate whether 
executive functions can be trained and improved (see for example Evans, 2005, for 
training of executive functions in the context of executive dysfunction; Olesen, Westerberg, 
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& Klingberg, 2004, for training of working memory), and whether such an approach could 
be effective in changing the automatic influence of implicit alcohol associations on 
drinking behavior. Especially people with poorer executive control might benefit from 
training aimed at improving their ability to override the influence of their automatic 
cognitive processes on behavior. 
Changing Implicit Alcohol-Related Cognitions 
Findings advanced in this thesis suggest that evaluative implicit associations are an 
important determinant of drinking behavior. Therefore, a prerequisite for intervention 
strategies aimed at reducing drinking is that they should not only target explicit alcohol-
related cognitive processes but also implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes. 
Interestingly, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) recently proposed the APE (Associative-
Propositional Evaluation) model that specifies under which conditions changes are 
expected in implicit cognitions, explicit cognitions or both. More specifically, they advocate 
that changes in implicit or explicit cognitions depend on which of the two processes is 
influenced but also on whether change in one type of process mediates change in the 
other type of process. As such, it is advocated that a direct change in implicit cognitive 
processes can be expected either when the associative structure is changed, for example 
by introducing new associations through evaluative conditioning, or when the temporal 
activation of preexisting associations is changed, for example due to context cues. 
Moreover, changes in explicit cognitive processes can indirectly lead to the construction of 
new implicit associations or to the activation of implicit associations that were not activated 
before, thereby causing changes in implicit cognitive processes. 
A direct approach to changing implicit cognitive processes, thus, is the construction 
of new implicit associations through evaluative conditioning. An example of this approach 
can be found in a series of studies by Olson and Fazio (2006), demonstrating that an 
evaluative conditioning procedure reduced prejudice against black people as indicated by 
an evaluative priming measure of implicit racial attitudes. Given these promising results, it 
should be interesting to explore whether an evaluative conditioning procedure could also 
succeed in changing implicit alcohol-related associations and whether such an approach 
will also produce corresponding changes in drinking behavior. A more indirect approach 
to changing implicit cognitive processes is to induce a change in explicit cognitive 
processes, which then leads to a corresponding change in implicit cognitive processes. An 
example of this approach is found in Wiers et al. (2005), who examined whether an 
expectancy challenge would be effective in changing both explicit and implicit alcohol-
related cognitions. While they found a decrease in explicit positive arousal alcohol-related 
expectancies, there was no evidence for a change in implicit alcohol-related cognitions 
assessed with the IAT. However, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argue that the 
crucial determinant of whether changes in explicit cognitive processes will produce 
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changes in implicit cognitive processes is whether explicit changes lead to a mere negation 
of implicit cognitions that are already activated or to an affirmation of implicit cognitions 
that were not activated before. Importantly, only the latter case will provide the necessary 
conditions for producing a change in implicit cognitive processes. Hence, it could be 
argued that the expectancy challenge in the study by Wiers et al. (2005) mainly negated 
positive arousal expectancies with respect to drinking, which could explain why no support 
was found for a change in implicit alcohol-related cognitions. Further, based on these 
considerations, it should also be interesting to examine whether training participants in the 
affirmation of negative evaluations with respect to alcohol could be able to change both 
explicit alcohol-related cognitions as well as implicit alcohol-related cognitions. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that findings reported in this thesis indicate that 
negative evaluative associations with the concept alcohol typically already exist without 
influencing drinking behavior as has also been found for explicit negative expectancies 
(e.g., Wiers, Gunning, & Sergeant, 1998; Wiers, Sergeant, & Gunning, 2000). Perhaps 
negative implicit alcohol associations do not affect behavior because they are not 
activated in contexts where people typically drink alcohol. If this is the case, it is perhaps 
equally important to explore ways in which the temporal activation of negative implicit 
alcohol associations can be increased in contexts where people consume alcohol. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In contrast to previous studies with the IAT, the findings in this thesis demonstrate that 
evaluative implicit associations with the concept alcohol are involved in drinking behavior, 
in such a way that stronger positive implicit alcohol associations are related to increased 
alcohol consumption. Further, in most studies, positive implicit associations with alcohol 
predicted drinking above the variance explained by explicit alcohol-related cognitions, 
supporting the value of supplementing self-report measures with implicit measures in 
alcohol research. The research in this thesis was also focused on developing and testing 
modifications of the IAT that overcome some of the limitations of the standard IAT 
procedure. Although this approach yielded new insights with respect to cognitive processes 
that may influence alcohol use relatively automatically, it is also evident that more research 
is needed that is aimed at developing indirect measurement procedures that can offer 
reliable and valid measures of automatic cognitive processes. Finally, given that implicit 
alcohol-related cognitions can be important determinants of alcohol use and misuse, 
future directions should include efforts aimed at changing automatic alcohol-related 
cognitive processes as well as their impact on drinking behavior. 
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Summary 
Almost everyone enjoys a few drinks from time to time, as do I. However, excessive alcohol 
use can cause both serious health problems as well as social problems. For this reason, 
researchers have been trying to identify the cognitive processes underlying alcohol abuse for 
many decades, so that appropriate interventions can be developed that are aimed at 
reducing alcohol intake. Until a few years ago, most research on the cognitive processes 
involved in alcohol use and abuse has been based on participants’ self-reporting of the 
reasons for their alcohol use. However, the increased understanding of addictive behaviors 
from the perspective of dual-process models as well as the development of indirect 
measurement procedures have recently fostered an interest in the role of so-called implicit or 
automatic cognitive processes in alcohol abuse. 
More specifically, dual process models state that behavior is determined by the 
dynamic interplay of two qualitatively different cognitive processes: fast, spontaneous, 
associative, automatic cognitive processes and slow, deliberative, rule-based, controlled 
cognitive processes (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans & Coventry, 2006; Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999). Whereas self-report measures can be easily used to tap controlled cognitive 
processes, it is far more difficult to measure automatic cognitive processes since participants 
may not always be able to report on the automatic cognitive processes underlying their 
behavior. Importantly, it has also been suggested that automatic cognitive processes become 
increasingly important as excessive alcohol use develops into an addiction (e.g., Bechara et 
al., 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans & Coventry, 2006), stressing the importance of 
developing appropriate measures that can be used to measure automatic cognitive 
processes. 
With the development of indirect measures, researchers believed that they had found 
the appropriate tools for measuring automatic cognitive processes that steer behavior. Unlike 
direct self-report measures, indirect measures do not rely on self-report but instead they infer 
cognitive processes indirectly from performance on a speeded reaction-time task. Hence, 
indirect measures could be uniquely suited to tap relatively fast, automatic cognitive 
processes while at the same time limiting participants’ ability for controlled responding. One 
of the indirect measures that received most attention over the last few years is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
The IAT is a double categorization task in which participants are instructed to 
simultaneously classify stimuli that are presented one by one on the computer screen into two 
target categories and two attribute categories with only two response keys. The two target 
categories typically represent the concepts in which the researcher is interested, such as 
SUMMARY 
 158 
alcohol versus soft drinks, whereas the two attribute categories often represent evaluative 
concepts such as positive versus negative.  Further, in two different phases of the task, the 
target and attribute categories are paired in two different combinations. During one phase, 
participants for example have to classify both alcohol and positive stimuli with one response 
key and soft drinks and negative stimuli with the other response key. In the second phase, this 
response assignment is then reversed so that alcohol shares a response key with negative 
stimuli while soft drinks are assigned to the same response key as positive stimuli.  The idea 
behind the task is that participants will respond faster when target categories and attribute 
categories are combined in a way that corresponds to participants’ implicit associations 
between the target concepts and attribute concepts. For instance, if participants respond 
faster when alcohol and positive stimuli have to be classified with the same key and soft 
drinks and negative stimuli with the other, than when alcohol shares a key with negative 
stimuli and soft drinks are mapped onto the same key as positive stimuli, this would suggest 
that these participants have positive implicit associations with alcohol. As such, the IAT can 
be used to index how participants automatically evaluate certain target concepts.  
This thesis focuses on the IAT as an indirect measure of automatic alcohol-related 
cognitive processes. The last few years, findings with the IAT repeatedly suggested negative 
implicit associations with alcohol, regardless of level of alcohol consumption, that were in 
clear contrast to participants’ self-reported positivity with respect to drinking alcohol (e.g., 
Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). Further, research demonstrated that, while heavy and light 
drinkers could not be differentiated based on their implicit evaluative associations with 
alcohol, heavy but not light drinkers hold implicit associations between alcohol and arousal 
(e.g., Wiers et al., 2002). Hence, these findings suggest that implicit evaluative associations 
play little to no role in drinking behavior, which appears to be determined more by implicit 
arousal associations and explicit positive cognitions with respect to drinking alcohol. 
Nevertheless, recent research has also uncovered limitations of the IAT procedure that may 
complicate the interpretation of IAT effects. Therefore, the focus of this thesis was twofold. 
First, it was examined whether limitations in the IAT procedure might have been responsible 
for previous results with the IAT. Second, it was examined how the IAT might be improved so 
that it would be better suited to tap implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes. 
In the first part of this thesis, it was examined to what extent findings with the alcohol-
IAT reflect recoding influences rather than implicit evaluative associations with the concept 
alcohol. Recoding refers to the phenomenon that target and attribute stimuli may be 
categorized on the basis of features other than those intended by the researcher. More 
specifically, in the case of the alcohol-IAT, participants may classify all stimuli based on, for 
example, salience or familiarity rather than categorizing target stimuli as being related to 
alcohol or soft drinks and attribute stimuli as being positive or negative. In chapter 2, it was 
demonstrated that manipulating recoding processes based on the salience of the categories 
in the IAT influenced the overall size of IAT effects but not their direction. Further, controlling 
for recoding based on salience did not attenuate the relationship between implicit evaluative 
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associations with alcohol and drinking behavior: Stronger negative implicit associations with 
alcohol were related to a decrease in alcohol use. 
Nevertheless, recoding based on salience is just one of the possible recoding 
influences that can influence IAT performance. Therefore, in the remaining chapters of the 
first part of this thesis, implicit evaluative associations with alcohol were measured using new 
variants of the IAT, which should eliminate or diminish the contribution of recoding processes 
to IAT effects. In line with the hypothesis that previous findings with the standard IAT at least 
to some extent may have reflected recoding processes, recoding free variants of the IAT 
yielded considerably less support for implicit negative associations with alcohol, and even 
revealed positive implicit associations with alcohol. Importantly, throughout the studies 
reported in the first part of this thesis, implicit evaluative associations with alcohol were 
demonstrated to be related to drinking behavior in such a way that stronger negative implicit 
associations with alcohol were related to reduced alcohol use and stronger positive implicit 
associations to increased alcohol intake. Thus, together these results firstly suggest that 
controlling for recoding processes in the IAT may increase the validity of the task as a 
measure of implicit associations and secondly, that implicit evaluative associations with 
alcohol do play a role in drinking behavior. 
The second part of this thesis comprised studies that were concerned with the dual 
bipolarity of IAT categories. More specifically, participants typically have to categorize stimuli 
into two times two categories. Two categories, for example alcohol and soft drinks, represent 
the poles of the target dimension, and the other two categories, for example positive and 
negative valence, represent the poles of the attribute dimension. Hence, both the target 
dimension and the attribute dimension are bipolar. Due to the bipolarity of the target 
dimension, the IAT only informs us whether, for instance, alcohol is associated more strongly 
with negative than with positive when compared to soft drinks. Hence, implicit alcohol 
associations assessed with the IAT are always relative to a contrast category such as soft 
drinks. Therefore, the IAT may reflect both implicit associations with alcohol, implicit 
associations with soft drinks, or both, which complicates the interpretation of IAT effects. 
Further, due to the bipolarity of the attribute dimension it is impossible to assess whether 
positive and negative implicit associations with alcohol exist simultaneously, which is 
problematic given that ambivalence is typically quite strong in the case of alcohol use 
(Conner & Sparks, 2002).  
In order to separately assess both positive and negative implicit associations with 
alcohol as well as their relationship with behavior, studies reported in the second part of this 
thesis used variants of the IAT that presented the attribute dimension in a unipolar format. 
Specifically, instead of opposing a positive attribute category against a negative attribute 
category in a single bipolar IAT, separate unipolar IATs can be used in which positive and 
negative attribute categories are contrasted with neutral attribute categories. In this way, 
positive and negative implicit alcohol associations can be measured separately in different 
unipolar task variants. Moreover, in the first study of part two of this thesis, implicit alcohol 
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associations with arousal and with sedation were also separately assessed using similar 
unipolar IAT variants. Findings with unipolar IAT variants indeed demonstrated both negative 
and positive implicit associations with alcohol. More importantly, positive implicit alcohol 
associations were found to be related to alcohol use whereas negative implicit alcohol 
associations were not. Hence, together with findings reported in the first part of this thesis, 
these results suggest that alcohol use increases as participants hold stronger positive implicit 
associations with alcohol as indexed by positive unipolar IATs. The size of effects in unipolar 
negative IATs, on the other hand, appears unrelated to drinking behavior and may reflect 
recoding processes rather than, or in addition to, implicit alcohol associations to a larger 
extent than effects in positive unipolar IATs. Further, in line with earlier findings (e.g., Wiers et 
al., 2002), participants were also found to hold implicit alcohol associations with arousal that 
were strongly related to drinking behavior. In addition, results also demonstrated implicit 
alcohol associations with sedation that related to the severity of alcohol-related problems. 
Further, in part two of this thesis, it was examined whether results with the IAT would 
differ depending on the specific target category that the alcohol target category is contrasted 
with. When implicit associations with alcohol were assessed relative to a different category 
than soft drinks, which is typically used in alcohol-IAT research, results indicated only a slight 
impact on IAT effects. However, although testing implicit associations with alcohol relative to 
different contrast categories can be useful, findings with the IAT still remain relative and, 
therefore, difficult to interpret. For this reason, implicit evaluative associations with alcohol 
were also measured using a non-relative variant of the IAT, the Single Target IAT (ST-IAT; 
Wigboldus et al., 2006), which does not request that the alcohol target category is 
contrasted with a second target category. Findings demonstrated that the non-relative ST-IAT 
can yield different results compared to the relative IAT and that both task variants measure 
different underlying constructs. Further, positive implicit associations with alcohol relative to 
soft drinks and non-relative positive implicit alcohol associations were found to predict 
different aspects of drinking behavior. 
The research presented in this thesis thus demonstrates that certain features of the IAT 
procedure may complicate the interpretation of IAT effects and suggests that these limitations 
of the IAT procedure were to some extent responsible for previous IAT findings in alcohol 
research. Nevertheless, the present findings also indicate that the IAT, with minor 
modifications, can yield new insights in the cognitive processes underlying alcohol use. 
Together, the findings in this thesis indicate that positive and negative implicit associations 
with alcohol may simultaneously exist. However, whereas positive implicit alcohol 
associations were found to be related to drinking behavior, negative implicit associations 
were unrelated to alcohol intake. Thus, these results suggest that positive implicit alcohol 
associations may play an important role in drinking behavior, in addition to implicit arousal 
associations with alcohol and explicit cognitive processes. Based on these findings, it is 
concluded that research should examine ways to change the strength of implicit alcohol 
associations and their impact on drinking behavior. 
 161 
Samenvatting 
 
Veel mensen kunnen een glaasje alcohol van tijd tot tijd wel appreciëren, net zoals ik. 
Overmatig alcoholgebruik kan echter leiden tot ernstige gezondheidsproblemen en sociale 
problemen. Omwille van die reden proberen onderzoekers al geruime tijd te ontdekken 
welke denkprocessen een rol spelen bij alcoholgebruik en alcoholmisbruik, zodat 
geschikte behandelingen kunnen ontwikkeld worden om alcoholgebruik te verminderen. 
Tot enkele jaren geleden werd dergelijk onderzoek grotendeels uitgevoerd met behulp van 
vragenlijsten die mensen vroegen om zelf redenen aan te geven voor hun alcoholgebruik. 
Dit soort vragenlijstenonderzoek kent echter een aantal beperkingen en recente 
ontwikkelingen hebben dan ook geleid tot een nieuwe lijn van onderzoek die zich richt op 
impliciete of automatische denkprocessen die mogelijk een rol spelen in alcoholgebruik.  
Recente ontwikkelingen tonen aan dat verslavingsgevoelig gedrag zoals 
alcoholgebruik beter begrepen kan worden vanuit het oogpunt van dual-process 
modellen. Deze modellen stellen dat gedrag doorgaans bepaald wordt door een 
dynamische wisselwerking tussen twee kwalitatief verschillende denkprocessen. Zo zou 
gedrag gestuurd worden door zowel snelle, spontane, associatieve, automatische 
denkprocessen, als door trage, gecontroleerde denkprocessen die gekenmerkt worden 
door bewuste overwegingen en regels (bv., Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans & Coventry, 
2006; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). Bovendien lijkt het zo te zijn dat automatische 
denkprocessen steeds belangrijker worden naarmate overmatig alcoholgebruik zich 
ontwikkelt tot een verslaving (bv., Bechara et al., 2006; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans & 
Coventry, 2006). Het is dus belangrijk dat onderzoekers de juiste meetinstrumenten 
hebben om beide soorten denkprocessen te kunnen meten. Gecontroleerde 
denkprocessen zijn over het algemeen gemakkelijk vast te stellen met behulp van 
vragenlijsten. Automatische denkprocessen zijn echter moeilijker te meten omdat men niet 
altijd inzicht heeft in de automatische processen die gedrag sturen.  
De ontwikkeling van zogenaamde indirecte maten was voor vele onderzoekers een 
doorbraak omdat zij geloofden dat deze maten mogelijk de aangewezen 
meetinstrumenten zouden kunnen zijn om automatische denkprocessen te meten. Indirecte 
maten verschillen immers van (directe) vragenlijsten in die zin dat denkprocessen niet 
gemeten worden aan de hand van zelfrapportage, maar op basis van de prestatie op een 
computertaak waarin er snel moet gereageerd worden op gepresenteerde stimuli. Om die 
reden wordt dan ook aangenomen dat indirecte maten mogelijk een goede indicatie 
kunnen geven van relatief snelle, automatische processen. Bovendien zijn indirecte maten 
waarschijnlijk ook minder gevoelig voor gecontroleerde reacties omdat er zo snel 
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gereageerd moet worden tijdens de taak. Eén van de indirecte maten die de afgelopen 
jaren het meeste aandacht heeft gekregen is de Impliciete Associatie Taak (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
De IAT is een taak waarin stimuli, die één voor één op het computerscherm 
verschijnen, met twee knoppen op het toetsenbord moeten geclassificeerd worden in twee 
keer twee categorieën. Hierbij worden er twee targetcategorieën en twee 
attribuutcategorieën onderscheiden. De targetcategorieën zijn doorgaans concepten 
waarin de onderzoeker geïnteresseerd is, zoals alcohol tegenover frisdrank. De 
attribuutcategorieën zijn meestal evaluatieve concepten, zoals positief tegenover negatief. 
Omdat deelnemers slechts twee knoppen mogen gebruiken om deze stimuli te 
classificeren in vier categorieën, zitten telkens één targetcategorie en één 
attribuutcategorie onder dezelfde knop. De twee targetcategorieën en de twee 
attribuutcategorieën kunnen bovendien op twee verschillende manieren gecombineerd 
worden. Deelnemers voeren beide combinatietaken uit tijdens verschillende fases van de 
taak. Tijdens één fase moeten deelnemers dus bijvoorbeeld alcohol en positieve stimuli 
met de ene knop classificeren en frisdrank en negatieve stimuli met de andere knop. In de 
tweede fase zit alcohol vervolgens onder dezelfde knop als negatieve stimuli en frisdrank 
onder de andere knop samen met positieve stimuli. Het achterliggende idee van deze taak 
is dat deelnemers sneller zullen reageren wanneer de targetcategorieën en de 
attribuutcategorieën gecombineerd moeten worden in overeenstemming met hun 
impliciete associaties tussen de targetconcepten en de attribuutconcepten. Als men dus 
sneller is wanneer alcohol en positieve stimuli met de ene knop geclassificeerd moeten 
worden en frisdrank en negatieve stimuli met de andere knop, dan wanneer alcohol en 
negatieve stimuli een knop delen en de andere knop gebruikt moet worden voor frisdrank 
en positieve stimuli, zou dit betekenen dat deze persoon positieve impliciete associaties 
heeft met alcohol. Op die manier kan de IAT dus gebruikt worden automatische gevoelens 
of evaluaties ten opzichte van de targetconcepten te onderzoeken. 
In dit proefschrift ligt de nadruk op de IAT als indirecte maat van automatische 
alcoholgerelateerde denkprocessen. Bevindingen met de IAT van de afgelopen jaren 
hebben meerdere malen negatieve impliciete associaties met alcohol laten zien, 
onafhankelijk van hoeveel alcohol men drinkt. Deelnemers waren dus sneller wanneer 
alcohol en negatieve stimuli onder één knop zaten en frisdrank en positieve stimuli onder 
de andere knop dan in de omgekeerde combinatie. Dit resultaat was onverwacht 
aangezien dezelfde deelnemers op vragenlijsten aangaven dat zij positief waren over het 
drinken van alcohol (bv., Wiers et al., 2002, 2005). Hoewel men zware en lichte drinkers 
dus weliswaar niet kan onderscheiden op basis van hun impliciete evaluatieve associaties 
met alcohol, toonde onderzoek aan dat enkel zware drinkers ook impliciete associaties 
hadden tussen alcohol en gevoelens van opwinding terwijl lichte drinkers dergelijke 
impliciete alcoholassociaties met opwinding niet lieten zien (bv., Wiers et al., 2002). 
Samen suggereren deze bevindingen dat alcoholgebruik grotendeels bepaald wordt door 
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impliciete alcoholassociaties met opwinding en expliciete positieve cognities met 
betrekking tot het drinken van alcohol, terwijl impliciete evaluatieve associaties met 
alcohol geen belangrijke rol lijken te spelen bij het sturen van alcohol gebruik. Het is 
echter belangrijk om op te merken dat recent onderzoek ook heeft aangetoond dat de IAT 
een aantal beperkingen heeft die de interpretatie van bevindingen met de IAT kunnen 
bemoeilijken. Het doel van dit proefschrift was dan ook tweeledig. Ten eerste werd er 
onderzocht of beperkingen in de procedure van de IAT mogelijk de reden vormden voor 
eerdere resultaten met de IAT op het gebied van alcohol onderzoek. Ten tweede werd er 
nagegaan op welke manieren de IAT eventueel verbeterd zou kunnen worden zodat de 
taak beter geschikt zou zijn om impliciete alcoholgerelateerde denkprocessen te meten.  
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift werd onderzocht in welke mate bevindingen 
met de alcohol-IAT eerder veroorzaakt zouden kunnen zijn door hercoderingsprocessen 
dan door impliciete evaluatieve associaties met alcohol. Hercodering verwijst hier naar het 
fenomeen dat targetstimuli en attribuutstimuli mogelijk geclassificeerd worden op basis van 
andere eigenschappen dan degene die de onderzoeker in gedachten had. In het geval 
van de alcohol-IAT zou het bijvoorbeeld kunnen dat deelnemers alle stimuli classificeren 
op basis van opvallendheid of bekendheid terwijl zij eigenlijk targetstimuli zouden moeten 
classificeren als alcohol of frisdrank en attribuutstimuli als positief of negatief. In hoofdstuk 
2 werd aangetoond dat enkel de grootte van IAT effecten, maar niet hun richting, 
beïnvloed werd wanneer hercoderingsprocessen gemanipuleerd werden door de 
opvallendheid van de categorieën in de IAT aan te passen. Bovendien lieten de resultaten 
zien dat de relatie tussen impliciete evaluatieve associaties met alcohol en alcoholgebruik 
niet werd afgezwakt wanneer er werd gecontroleerd voor hercodering op basis van 
opvallendheid: sterkere negatieve impliciete associaties met alcohol gingen gepaard met 
een afname in alcoholgebruik. 
Het is echter zo dat hercodering op basis van opvallendheid slechts één van de 
mogelijke hercoderingsprocessen is die de prestatie op de IAT kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Daarom werden er in de overige drie hoofdstukken in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift 
nieuwe varianten van de IAT gebruikt, die hercoderingsprocessen in de taak zouden 
moeten elimineren of afzwakken, om impliciete evaluatieve associaties met alcohol te 
meten. In overeenstemming met de hypothese dat eerdere resultaten met de standaard IAT 
in zekere mate door hercoderingsprocessen werden veroorzaakt, werd er met deze IAT 
varianten minder ondersteuning gevonden voor negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties en 
lieten resultaten zelfs positieve impliciete associaties met alcohol zien. Verder lieten ook 
alle studies in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift zien dat impliciete evaluatieve associaties 
met alcohol gerelateerd waren aan alcoholgebruik: sterkere negatieve impliciete 
alcoholassociaties gingen gepaard met een afname in alcoholgebruik terwijl sterkere 
positieve impliciete alcoholassociaties gerelateerd waren aan een toename in 
alcoholgebruik. Deze resultaten suggereren dus ten eerste dat de validiteit van de IAT als 
maat voor impliciete associaties vergroot kan worden door te controleren voor 
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hercoderingsprocessen in de IAT. Ten tweede laten deze bevindingen zien dat impliciete 
evaluatieve alcoholassociaties wel degelijk een rol spelen in drinkgedrag. 
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift behandelde de dubbele bipolariteit van de 
categorieën in de IAT. Met dubbele bipolariteit wordt bedoeld dat deelnemers tijdens het 
uitvoeren van de IAT stimuli moeten indelen in twee keer twee categorieën. Twee van deze 
categorieën, bijvoorbeeld alcohol en frisdrank, vormen de targetdimensie en de andere 
twee categorieën, bijvoorbeeld positief en negatief, vormen de polen van de 
attribuutdimensie. Dit betekent dat zowel de targetdimensie als de attribuutdimensie twee 
polen hebben en dus bipolair zijn. De bipolariteit van de targetdimensie zorgt ervoor dat 
de IAT alleen kan aantonen dat alcohol bijvoorbeeld sterker geassocieerd is met negatief 
dan met positief in vergelijking met frisdrank. De impliciete alcohol associaties gemeten 
met de IAT zijn dus altijd relatief ten opzichte van een contrastcategorie zoals frisdrank. 
Hierdoor is het onduidelijk of de IAT impliciete associaties met alcohol reflecteert, of 
impliciete associaties met frisdrank, of beiden. Het feit dat ook de attribuutcategorieën 
bipolair zijn maakt het bovendien onmogelijk om te onderzoeken of er tegelijkertijd zowel 
positieve als negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties bestaan. Dit vormt een probleem 
aangezien alcoholgebruik gekenmerkt wordt door een sterke ambivalentie (Conner & 
Sparks, 2002). 
In de studies in het tweede deel van dit proefschrift werd gebruik gemaakt van 
varianten van de IAT waarin de attribuutdimensie in een unipolaire vorm werd 
aangeboden. Dit betekent dat bijvoorbeeld een positieve en een negatieve 
attribuutcategorie niet langer met elkaar worden gecontrasteerd, zoals in een bipolaire 
IAT, maar dat er verschillende unipolaire IATs gebruikt worden waarin positieve of 
negatieve attribuutcategorieën gecontrasteerd worden met neutrale attribuutcategorieën. 
Op die manier kunnen positieve en negatieve impliciete associaties met alcohol dus 
afzonderlijk gemeten worden met verschillende unipolaire IAT varianten. Bovendien is het 
zo ook mogelijk om de relatie van positieve en negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties met 
alcoholgebruik afzonderlijk te onderzoeken. Op dezelfde manier werden in het eerste deel 
van dit proefschrift ook impliciete alcoholassociaties met opwinding en impliciete 
alcoholassociaties met passiviteit afzonderlijk gemeten met unipolaire IATs.  
Zoals verwacht werden er zowel positieve als negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties 
gevonden met unipolaire IATs. Bovendien waren positieve impliciete alcoholassociaties 
gerelateerd aan alcoholgebruik terwijl negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties geen relatie 
lieten zien met drinkgedrag. Wanneer deze bevindingen gerelateerd worden aan de 
bevindingen uit het eerste deel van dit proefschrift, kan gesuggereerd worden dat 
alcoholgebruik lijkt toe te nemen naarmate men sterkere positieve impliciete associaties 
heeft met alcohol. Resultaten met negatieve unipolaire IATs blijken daarentegen 
ongerelateerd aan alcoholgebruik en reflecteren dus mogelijk in sterkere mate 
hercoderingsprocessen dan impliciete alcoholassociaties in vergelijking met positieve 
unipolaire IATs. In overeenstemming met eerdere bevindingen (bv., Wiers et al., 2002), 
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werd ook aangetoond dat deelnemers impliciete associaties hadden tussen alcohol en 
opwinding en dat deze impliciete associaties bovendien sterk gerelateerd waren aan 
drinkgedrag. Verder lieten de resultaten ook impliciete associaties tussen alcohol en 
passiviteit zien die gerelateerd waren aan de ernst van alcoholgerelateerde problemen. 
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift werd ook onderzocht of resultaten met de IAT 
verschillen afhankelijk van de targetcategorie die gebruikt wordt als contrast voor de 
alcohol targetcategorie. Resultaten lieten zien dat het meten van impliciete associaties met 
alcohol relatief ten opzichte van een andere categorie dan frisdrank, zoals standaard 
gedaan wordt in alcohol-IAT onderzoek, slechts een kleine impact had op de bevindingen. 
Het is echter wel belangrijk om op te merken dat het meten van impliciete 
alcoholassociaties relatief ten opzichte van verschillende contrasterende targetcategorieën 
wel een bruikbare strategie is, maar dat IAT resultaten nog steeds relatief zijn en bijgevolg 
moeilijk te interpreteren. Daarom werden impliciete alcoholassociaties ook gemeten met 
een niet-relatieve IAT variant, namelijk de Single Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus et al., 
2006). In tegenstelling tot de IAT is het in de ST-IAT namelijk niet noodzakelijk om de 
alcohol targetcategorie te contrasteren met een tweede targetcategorie. De IAT en de ST-
IAT lieten inderdaad verschillende resultaten zien en meten dus mogelijk verschillende 
constructen. Verder lieten de resultaten ook zien dat positieve impliciete associaties met 
alcohol relatief ten opzichte van frisdrank en niet-relatieve positieve impliciete 
alcoholassociaties voorspellend waren voor verschillende aspecten van drinkgedrag. 
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift toont aan dat bepaalde eigenschappen van de IAT 
procedure de interpretatie van bevindingen met de IAT kunnen bemoeilijken en suggereert 
dat deze beperkingen van de IAT in elk geval in zekere mate verantwoordelijk waren voor 
eerdere bevindingen met de IAT in alcoholonderzoek. Echter, de huidige bevindingen 
laten ook zien dat de IAT, mits voorzien van een aantal kleine aanpassingen, nieuwe 
inzichten kan verschaffen in de denkprocessen die alcoholgebruik sturen. Zo werd er 
aangetoond dat positieve en negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties gelijktijdig kunnen 
bestaan en dat positieve impliciete alcoholassociaties gerelateerd zijn aan drinkgedrag 
terwijl negatieve impliciete alcoholassociaties geen relatie vertonen met alcoholgebruik. 
Deze resultaten suggereren dus dat positieve impliciete alcoholassociaties, net zoals 
impliciete associaties tussen alcohol en opwinding en expliciete denkprocessen, mogelijk 
een belangrijke rol spelen in drinkgedrag. Het is dan ook belangrijke dat toekomstig 
onderzoek zich toelegt op het ontwikkelen van manieren om zowel de sterkte van 
impliciete alcoholassociaties als hun invloed op gedrag te veranderen. 
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